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PREFACE
This is written primarily to aid the electric and
gas consumer in understanding the rationale behind the forces
which shape utility rates in Montana.

But it is also in

tended to impart some knowledge of the interaction and
impact of political "pressure" or interest groups in
Montana and to aid students in understanding the political
process in Montana,
I want to thank Senator Lee Metcalf, Vic Reinemer,
Harry L. and Gretchen G, Billings, Mrs. Francis Logan, and
Jerome J, Gate for getting me interested in the utility rate
issue. It is hoped that this study will supplement work
already done by them in this area.
The suggestions of Dr. Thomas Payne, my advisor,
and Edmund L. Freeman have greatly improved the writing
style.

And as members of the Board of Thesis Examiners,

Drs. Brad E. Hainsworth and Richard E. Shannon helped
resolve inconsistencies in political theory.
The people interviewed during the writing of this
have corrected privately many of my mistakes.
their candidness and appreciate their help.

I admire

To Dad and Mom who financed it and to Janet who
shared it.
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CMPTER I
THE DYNAMICS OP GROUP THEORY
In Through the Looking Glass Alice remarked to
the twins, "Really it's coming on very dark," and
asked if they thought it might rain.
Tweedledum spread a large umbrella over himself
and his brother, and looked up into it. "No, I don't
think it is," he said: "at least not under here,
nohow."
"But it may rain outside?"
"It may—if it chooses," said Tweedledee, "we've
no objection, contrariwise,"^
The Montana Power and Anaconda Copper Mining com
panies were the twins, Tweedledum and Tweedledee, in Joseph
Kinsey Howard's analogy describing the political power
struggle in Montana prior to 1944.

He thought that for all

practical purposes their alliance had controlled the alloca
tion of resources in the vast Treasure State,
The Anaconda Copper Mining Company (ACM), as
Montana's largest business, had exerted varying influence
on Montana political institutions.

For example, Anaconda

owned seven of Montana's fourteen daily or almost-daily
newspapers in four of its five major cities.2 In addition.
^Joseph Kinsey Howard, "The Montana Twins in
Trouble?" Harper's Magazine, CLXXXIX(September, 1944), p, 342,
quoted from Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
(New York: Heritage Press, 1941), pp. '76-77'V
2

ACM owned The I"'issoulian-Sentinel in Missoula,
The Livingston Enterprise in Livingston, The Independent
Record in Helena, The Ballings Gazette in Billings, and
1

2
Anaconda^s president, John D. Ryan, had organized the Montana
Power Company as a privately owned utility to insure the
sale of cheap electricity and gas to ACM's plants and mines
at Butte, Anaconda, and Great Falls, which by 1940 used more
power than the entire U.S. airplane industry.

Ryan was also

interested in the electrification of the Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railroad.

Because it supplied energy to the mines and

railroads, Montana Power grew until it served the western
two-thirds of Montana and had the largest service area of any
electric utility in the United States.
Because it is a public utility, Montana Power is
granted a natural monopoly over its service area.

It is

subject to gas and electric rate regulation by the Montana
Railroad and Public Service Commission, a state government
agency of three elected officials.

One of the first actions

the Public Service Commission took after its creation in
1913 was to order the Montana Power Company to lower its
3

electric rates.

The commissioners said that consolidation of the
smaller companies into Montana Power had made more efficient
The Montana Standard in Butte. The major city that had
a newspaper not owned by ACM was Great Falls, where 0. S.
Warden ran the Great Falls Tribune-Leader.
^Montana, R. R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Seventh
Annual Report. 1913-14, pp. 17I-I9O.

service possible.

Then they ruled that the monopoly profit

that Montana Power had made before regulation was too much.
Between 1912 and 19^7, the Public Service Commission
reduced Montana Power residential electric rates eight times.
The biggest reduction came in 1923 when the Company reduced
the average residential electric light bill (20 KWH) by
16 per cent and reduced by an even larger percentage the
price on usage of greater amounts of power.
In 1964, the rates were again lowered to pass on to
the consumer a utility tax cut the federal government ha,d
granted to stimulate a recessive economy.

It was the first

of nine federal tax reductions since World War II to be
passed on to Montana Power patrons. In 1948, the Commission
granted a $0 per cent increase for all kilowatt hours con
sumed over 1,000 a month. And as can be deduced from Table 1,
Montana Power customers discovered their bill had also increas
in 1957 and 1969.
As Table 2 illustrates, Montana Power was ordered
to reduce its gas rates in 1933 and 1935*

The Commission

granted natural gas rate increases in 1953, 19^2, and I969.
Gas price increases have ranged from 66 to 150 per cent
(depending upon the amount of gas used) since the last rate
reduction in 1935.

And electric price increases have ranged

from 16 to 50 per cent (depending on the amount of electricity
used) since the last meaningful rate reduction in 19^7.
(The 1964 reduction merely passed on a federal tax cut to

4
TABLE 1
MONTANA POWER COMPANY RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC RATES
REGULATED AFTER 1912

YEAR

250 KWH

500 KWH

?^0 KWH

1912 (small towns)
133.25
#66.50
§99.75
1913 (large towns)
23.00
43.00
58.00
1913 (small towns)
24.23
43.23
57.48
I923&
8.00
13.00
18.00
1929 15 KWH bill reduced from $2.00 to $1.20. Larger
usage rates unchanged.
1935
7.93
11.93
15.68
1939
7.75
11.75
15.50
1941
7.61
11.36
15oil
1944
7.08
10.83
14.58
1947^
6.83
^ , 9.33
11.83
1948 The price went from 1^/KWH to 1^^/KWH for electricity
used in excess of 1,000 KWH, a 50 per cent
increase.
1957
7.53
10.78
14.03
1964
6.91
10,16
13.41
1969
7.95
11.45
14.95
Per Cent of Rate Reduction
from 1923 to 1947^
15^

28^

34#

Per Cent of Rate Increase
from 1947 to 1969

23#

26%

16#

^In 1922, the average residential customer used
20 KWH of electricity each month at a cost of $1.90. In
1923, the Public Service Commission asked for a rate reduc
tion. The Company complied, setting the price of 20 KWH
at $1,60 and reducing the rates for greater amounts of
electricity used more drastically. Company officials said
they hoped that the reduction in these categories would
increase consumption. Average consumption today is 450
KWH/month. Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Montana Utili
ties Reports. XVI (1923), 229-30.
^The 1948 raise, which affected 400 customers, was
decided on in a conference between Company officials and the
Public Service Commissioners. No public hearing was held, no
advance publicity about the conference was given. The Com
mission said a hearing would be held if opposition to the new

5
rates de/eloped. The Western News, September 7, 19^8, p. 4,
The 50 per cent 19%raise is often ignored by Montana
Power, Note, for example, the following quote from a letter
which J, E. Corette wrote to Company stockholders on
August 12, 1957: "Now for the first time in 4-5 yearsj your
Company finds it necessary to raise its rates to electric
customers." See also The Missoulian. February 14-, 1968, p. 1,
°The efficiency of electric generating plants has
increased tremendously in the last 50 years. In 1917, for
example, it took 2.69 pounds of coal to produce a kilowatt
hour of electricity. In 1967, it took only .87 pounds of
coal to produce the same amount of electricity, Edison
Electric Institute, EBI Pocketbook of Electric Utility
Industry Statistics (15th ed,; New York: Edison Electric
Institute^ 1969), P» 21.
TABLE 2
MONTANA POWER COMPANY GENERAL SERVICE GAS RATES^

YEAR

1 Mcf^

100 Mcf

300 Mcf

1000 Mcf

1931
1933
1935
1953
1962
1969

11.70
1.70
1,00
1.30
2,00
2,50

#46.25
46,25
45.55
59.71
66,35
75.76

$128.25
106,25
105.55
143,41
158,35
183,76

#313.25
260,75
259.55
360.71
410.35
477.76

# 993.25
940.75
939.55
1360.71
1690.35
1997.76

74^

84^

112^

43^

52%

101^

5000 Mcf

Per Cent of Rate Increase
from 1935 to 1969
150fo

66%

Per Cent of Net Rate Increase
from 1931 to 1969
^7%

6k%

^'Montana Power fought the gas rate reduction order in
1935. Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 12 P.
Supp. 9^-6" (1^5")« Commission findings in other cases may be
found in the Public Utilities Reports available at many county
law libraries. Citations to these cases may be found in the
bibliography.
In 1953, the average residential user's gas bill

6
increased 32 to 4? per cent. This is compared to a 10 per
cent increase in the costs of the American Smelting and
Refining Company in East Helena (from 25^ to 27§^ per Mcf).
A few large companies like American Smelting and Refining
negotiate separate contracts with Montana Power and are
able to get lower prices or keep rate raises front hitting
them as hard as the rest of Montana's businesses because
Montana Power realizes they might choose to use competing
forms of energy if gas and electric prices become too high.
Small general service customers are charged 7^^
per Mcf for gas, while large industrial users who negotiate
contracts with the Company are charged an average of 3^^ per
Mcf, The Cut Bank Gas Company buys gas for as little as
22j%^ per Mcf, Montana Power Co., Applicant's Exhibits, Re
The Montana Power Co., Docket No, 5^98 (Montana R.R. & Pub.
Serv. Comm'n., I968), exhibit I5.
^1 Mcf = 1,000 cubic feet of gas, A cubic foot of gas
is that quantity of gas which, at a temperature of sixty
degrees Fahrenheit and at a pressure of 1^,73 pounds per
square inch absolute (psia), occupies one cubic foot.
the consumers.) These increases came at a time when the
U, S, electric utility industry was boasting a decrease in
prices.^ This record has brought forth criticism of Montana
Power for alleged influence over her sole rate restraint, the
Montana Public Service Commission.
The most recent test of the extent of Montana Power
influence arose on February I3, 1968, when the Company
petitioned the Public Service Commission for permission to
raise electric and gas prices.
J, E, Corette, Montana Power board chairman and
chief executive officer, said a three-year investment of
$98.6 million in new facilities plus "extraordinary expenses"
In 1966, 32 electric companies instituted rate
reductions and only one asked for and received a rate increase.
Robert H. Short, vice president of Portland General Electric
Co., in Commercial & Financial Chronicle. March 2, I967, p. 1.

7
totaling $11.8 million led the Company to seek a rate
increase.-^

Corette said that during the last ten years

wages had increased ^9 per cent, all state and local taxes
had gone up 96 per cent, and the Montana corporation license
(income) tax had increased 5^3 per cent,^

He said that cur

rent interest expenses (based on interest rates ranging from

6,5 to

6 per cent), increased depreciation charges, and

the cost of acquiring and developing additional natural gas
supplies also accounted for the boost in operating expenses.?
Ten witnesses presented the Company's story to the
Public Service Commission on May 1, 2, and 3, I968.

At that

time the Commission did not cross-examine the Company wit
nesses.

Nor did it allow protestants, the people who oppose

the rate increase, to cross-examine.

The Commission did,

however, permit questions to clarify testimony and exhibits
submitted by the Company.

Cross-examination was permitted

during a second hearing which commenced on August 7, 19^8,
and terminated on August I6, I968.

The testimony and cross-

^The Missoulian, February 14-, I968, p. 1.'
^Montana Power paid a I967 corporation license tax
of $1,419,767. In 1967, the corporation license tax rate
was 5è per cent of a company's net income, which is defined
as revenues less legitimate business expenses. The I967
rate increased only one-fourth of one per cent over the 1957
rate. So the 5^3 per cent increase in Montana Power's corp
oration license tax may largely have been due to increased
net income (profit). Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1 Report
to
FPÇ, p. 222.
~
^Montana Power Co., press release. May 1, I968,
pp. 1, 2.

8
examination of Dr. R,' Hayden Howard and Dr. George P. Hess,
utility experts hired by the Public Service Commission, was
allowed at the second hearing.

The testimony and examination

of Dr. David a Kosh, a rate expert hired by the consumers,
was heard September 3, 19&8. Attorneys for all sides were
allowed three months to prepare briefs in support of their
positions.

On January 30, 1969, the Commission decided that

the rates should be increased.
Montana Power's rate increase request seemed a
particularly bold move for at least two reasons.

First, the

Company told the press it wanted a 15 per cent increase in
electric and gas revenues. This statement was true, but
an increase in revenue was confused in the minds of news
paper readers with an increase in costs to the consumer.
When the rate schedules were actually computed, the requested
increase amounted to more than 25 per cent in most resi
dential utility bills,' l-Zhen the revenue obtained from a
25 per cent cost increase in residential rates is averaged with
the revenue obtained from commercial sources, the result is
a 15 per cent increase in revenue.
Second, Montana Power displayed confidence by
requesting a substantial election year increase at a time
when Senator Lee Metcalf had been publicly alleging for
several years that an average yearly overcharge of $10 million
was being paid by Montanans to the utility,

^

Indeed, according to Electric Power and Light, the

9
electric industry*s house organ, Montana Power was number
one in the nation with a 196? net income that was 25.37 per
O
cent of its gross revenue.
Reacting on the basis of Metcalf's allegations of
overcharge, consumers formed two groups, the Concerned
Consumers' Council and the Montana Consumers' Council,
which arose to oppose the utility rate raise request. Their
effectiveness in preventing the increase is the topig of this
thesis.

Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith has pos

tulated that:

"As a common rule, we can rely on counterQ
vailing power to appear as a curb on economic power,"
If

the postulate is correct, we would assume that the consumer
groups would be able to mobilize enough countervailing
opinion to keep Montana Power from obtaining the increase.
What actually happened, however, was that the Montana Public
Service Commission authorized an increase in electric and
gas bills that averaged 15 per cent—most of what the Company
requested.

This would suggest that one should seek an

alternate hypothesis to Galbraith's,' At least one should
seek a more complete understanding of the political process
in this particular situation.

Group theorist David B, Truman

has said that in such situations
®"The Top 100 Electric Utilities,"
and Power, June, I968, p. 75»

Electric Light

^J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept
of Countervailinn: Power (2d ed.' rev.; Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 195^), p. 11.3.

10
the behaviors that constitute the process of
government cannot be adequately understood apart from
the groups, especially the organized and potential
interest groups, which are operative at any point
in time.lu
If Truman's argument is correct, we should arrive at a more
adequate understanding of the Montana Power Company rate
raise by focusing this study on the group interaction in
the regulatory process.

But, before we proceed to a hypoth

esis about such group interaction, some explanation of group
theory will be necessary.
Group Theory
By asking, as a corporation, for a rate increase,
Montana Power fits David B. Truman's definition of a politi
cal interest group,

A group, writes Truman, is "any

collection of individuals who have some characteristic in
common.

When the individuals become aware of the shared

characteristics, attitudes, or interests, they may interact
on the basis of their awareness.

The frequency of such

interaction produces more shared attitudes or interests and
uniformities of behavior. Presumably, the more interaction
between group members, the more cohesive will be their shared
attitudes, the stronger their interests,

and the more uniform

their behavior.
^^David B.' Trumaji, The Governmental Process: Political
Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951), p.' 502.
l^Ibid., p, 23.

11
A group (e.g., the Montana Power Company) becomes
an Interest group, says Truman, when because of one or more
shared attitudes between group members, it organizes to make
"certain claims upon other groups /consumers and taxpayers/
in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or en
hancement of forms of behavior /higher rate^Z that are implied
12
by the shared attitudes."
As a corporation, Montana
Power is a group whose members include directors, officers,
employees, and bond and stockholders.

These people have

mobilized in quest of a utility rate increase as a common goal.
When a group organizes to seek a goal and "makes its claim
through or upon any of the institutions of government
/Railroad and Public Service Commission or city councils/,
TO
it becomes a political interest group."
Professor Truman believes that his definition of
political interest groups has more advantages than other
definitions because "it permits the identification of various
potential as well as existing interest g r o u p s . I n t e r e s t
groups arise when widely held attitudes are expressed through
interaction.

If these attitudes are not expressed in

interaction but merely held in a state of readiness by their
possessors, the people holding the shared attitude comprise
a -potential interest group.' For example, all of the taxpayers
l^ibid., p.' 33.
l^Ibid., p. 34.'

^^Ibid.. p. 37.

12
and consumers affected by the rate raise proposal may be
included in a potential group which wants lower electric
rates and lower taxes.-

Thus, the power of the utility

company allegedly will be tempered, checked, or kept in
"balance" by a countervailing force of consumers and tax
payers.
"The possibility," says Truman, "that severe dis
turbances will be created if these submerged, potential
interests /consumers/ should organize necessitates some
recognition /by Montana Pov/erZ of the existence of these
15
interests and gives them at least a minimum of influence,"
Such a disturbance might result in restriction or elimina
tion of the group that caused the potential interest to
react.

According to this rationale, a private power com

pany, which set its rates too high, might find its service
area invaded by lower cost public utility districts or by
some other power supplier.
This does not mean that widespread unorganized
interests are always dominant.

"Nor does it mean," writes

Professor Truman, "that the slightest action in violation
of any of them inevitably and instantly produces a restrictive
response. . .' .Mobilization of these unorganized
interests depends upon many factors, including:

the means

of communication existing within a society, the quality of
^5lMd., p/ 512.

^^Ibid., p. 514.

13
leadership generated within the emerging group, the degree
to which the group members' tolerance is exceeded, the degree
to which the group's members' attitudes are frustrated or to
which the rules of the game are violated, and the obstacles
to mobilization which organized groups place in the way.
In addition, citizens who generally do not vote or participate
in the political process are hard to arouse to action.
Nevertheless, Professor Truman believes that in
relatively vigorous political systems, unorganized interests
are dominant with sufficient frequency in the behavior of
enough important segments of society that, despite their
restrictions, they serve as balance wheels to keep the
activity and methods of organized interests within broad
17

limits.

Even when the threat that potential interests might
mobilize is not apparent to members of existing pressure
groups, the existing group's action is tempered by multiple
and overlapping group memberships.

"Multiple membership"

refers to a situation in which a person belongs to two or
more groups.

And "overlapping membership" occurs when a

group contains a person who is also a member of another,
perhaps competing, interest group.
Political groups in America do not have monolithic
memberships.

No single individual accounts for all the

policy of any group, and no single group affiliation accounts
l^Ibid.. p. 515.'

14
for all of the attitudes or interests of any individual
(except a fanatic or neurotic).

Individual group members

participate in a variety of activities and bring their
unique frames of reference to the policy-making process of
the groups to which they belong. Thus, when a group is
making policy, it must listen to a variety of ideas and
interests. If the group wishes to maintain its membership,
the group policy must to some degree reflect all of these
interests.

Otherwise, members who disagree with the policy

might cease their support of the group.
For example, the leaders of the Montana Chamber of
Commerce may be indebted to the Montana Power Company for one
of their largest (if not the largest) membership contributions
of $4,844' paid in I967, but they cannot parrot the Company
position on every issue.Only 39 per cent of the
Chamber's total income is derived from contributions above
$100.^9

If the Chamber took an overt stand favoring the

electric and gas rate raise, it would likely encounter
internal dissension and cohesion problems among smaller
members whose taxes and business expenses might be increased
^^Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1^ Report to the FPC,
p. 427. The largest membership contribution to the Montana
Chamber of Commerce was in the neighborhood of 3_$,000, accord
ing to the Chamber's executive vice-president Del H. Siewert.
He declined to divulge the names or amounts of contributors.
^^Interview with Del H.- Siewert, executive vicepresident, Montana Chamber of Commerce, August I6, I968.

15
because of zhe action.

Members of the Chamber are also

consumers, and this overlapping membership prevents the
Chamber from bringing its power to bear in one urited effort
favoring the rate raise/
Because multiple and overlapping membership exists
among the personnel of every group, Professor Truman thinks
it "is more important as a restraint upon the activities of
organized groups than the rarely aroused protests of chronic
nonparticipants."

20

He thinks both factors are important

in checking the political power of organized vested interests,
however. And he contends that "multiple memberships in
potential /Emphasis added/ groups based on widely held and
accepted interests . . * serve as a balance wheel in a going
political system like that of the United States,"
The traditional meaning of "balance" in the sense
of "balance of power" has been that the political

power and

influence in a society were distributed equally among groups
in the society.' This traditional meaning has carried with
it the notion that these balanced political groupings could
lay equal claim to the resources of a society.

This notion

is misleading,
A society may be stable or essentially free from
overt conflict and disruption, but the resources of the
society may not be distributed equally—as in the case of
20

Truman, oq, cit., p. 510,

91

IMA., p. 514,

16
countless different political sycterns.

They may be controlled

by the few for the benefit of a few. Yet the political power
is said to be "balanced" because the forces that precipitate
social change are more or less static,

A close look at this

type of situation indicates that political force is not
always met by an equal but opposite reactionary political
force.

A preponderant amount of force may be yielded by one

side so that the opposition may be incapacitated or suppressed
completely.
It is true that the political power or resources of
the participants will not change much relative to each other
until something intervenes to alter the relationship.

But

we cannot say that these powers are balanced in the sense of
being equal.
What we can say is that at any given point in time
the political system is at rest and an equilibrium or
"balance" of sorts is in effect.

But as we move in time

the equilibrium changes; technology, natural resources,
political attitudes, and leadership are the precipitant
factors. This is the concept of a "moving equilibrium"
used by Arthur P. Bentley and others who have viewed the
political action as a constantly changing "process."
"The pressures never do . , , work themselves
through to a final balance," says Bentley.

Even the

status quo of law is "a forming, a systematization, a

17
struggle, an adaptation, of group interests, just as govern
ment is."22
Because this process appears to be one of constant
adjustment, David Easton has suggested we call it "perpetual
disequilibrium" rather than "moving equilibrium."

23

Then the idea of equilibrium can apply to a balanced
condition which, even though it never materializes, can be
used as a norm for comparing several disequilibrium condi
tions, The task of the political scientist is to identify
and describe and quantify (if possible) the disequilibrium
in the light of what would have happened if the equilibrium
norm had emerged.

The reasons for the failure of the

equilibrium to materialize are then sought.
An equilibrium condition or one closely approxi
mating it has been suspected as a necessary correlate to a
free and peaceful society.

Where all groups are in balance,

it is hypothesized, the abuse of power by any one group is
2k

thereby restrained.

A contrary hypothesis could be

posited here that "where strong combinations of groups,
^^Arthur P, Bentley, The Process of Government
(first published in I908; Chicago; University of Chicago
Press; San Antonio, Texas; Principia Press of Trinity Uni
versity, 1949), p. 272,
^^David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry
into the State of Political Science"TNew York: Alfred A,
Knopf, 1963), pT 2W,
24
Ibid., p. 294.

18
relatively equal in strength, have each poised against the
other, this has usually been a sign of the threatened
24
disintegration of the going political system. . ,
But for the moment we will accept the first hypothesis that
greed must be balanced to be restrained.
How do the groups adjust their power?

Apparently

each group will become as powerful as possible in order to
gain as much as possible.

Then there will be a give-and-take

compromising adjustment. The collective bargaining situation
offers a good model for this type of adjustment.

Once the

compromise is completed, according to the theory, a point
of equilibrium is reached, the differences or conflict
resolved, and stability restored.
The model for this study will be a political system
in which change is customarily produced not by violence,
but by a government based for the most part upon political
equality, popular sovereignty, popular consultation and
majority rule.

Citizens who are aware of their common

interest form groups to coordinate consistent activity
in an effort to gain favor from or control of government,
the authoritative allocator of resources.
Hypothesis and Methodology
The hypothetical equilibrium condition of this model
that will be reified for this study is an equilibrium where
2%bid., p. 303.

19
the consumers and taxpayers groups are able to muster enough
countervailing force to prevent the Montana Power Company
from receiving a rate raise»
It will be postulated that although potential inter
est groups occasionally arise to oppose organized interests,
unless they are helped, potential groups are rarely effec
tive in routing the organized groups/ The rarity of their
effectiveness means that they cannot be relied on to counter
balance the activity of organized groups.
Three reasons why these potential interest groups
fail to mobilize effectively are apparent.' First, over
lapping memberships, such as interlocking directorates,
often hinder the rise of effective countervailing power
more than they temper the actions of institutionalized power.
As an example of this, it must be pointed out that the same
multiple and overlapping memberships that prevent the Chamber
of Commerce from favoring the rate raise also prevent it
from opposing the rate raise,- The Chamber in this case is a
political eunuch that cannot take a stand on either side of
the issue if it wants to maintain internal harmony.

It is

dubious to argue, however, that the stalemate in this sit
uation indicates a perfect balance of power." A stalemate
favors the Montana Power Company because small business members
of the Chamber of Commerce usually look to it for political
leadership and action in their interests. If that action
is effectively thwarLed, small businessmen will have to form
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an organization outside of the framework of the Chamber to
represent them by advocating low utility rates. The task of
forming an extra organization is made more difficult because
some small members of the business community believe that no
extra organization is necessary in this instance. They
think the Chamber will represent them as it has done in other
matters. Also, some businessmen have already budgeted for
Chamber of Commerce dues and are reluctant to give a new
organization funds to do the job they expect the old one to
do. And finally, even if businessmen do realize their
interest in lower utility rates and the Chamber's inability
to advocate them, they will be reluctant to participate in a
new interest group because Montana Power might cancel its
business with firms participating in anti-rate raise activities.
Thus, the foregoing example also illustrates the
second and third reasons why potential interest groups fail
to mobilize,! Potential groups lie dormant because the
interests of potential opponents are obscured by the or
ganized groups and are not generally perceived by the op
ponents (even though perception is sometimes possible).•
Thirdly, the interests that are recognized by potential
opponents of existing groups are often overshadowed by con
flicting interests that destroy the incentive of the
potential opponents to mobilize.
To determine whether these assumptions about group
action within the model are valid, documents and interviews
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were obtained from members of the press, representatives of
the Montana Power Company, its proponents and opponents, and
representatives of Montana's Public Service Commissioners,
The two-week rate hearing where Montana Power's requested
increase was considered was also attended and some of the
material presented there was included in this analysis.

CHAPTER II
THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY AND
ITS REGULATOR
The company will present its accounts as a record
of established facts. And the representatives of
the public will seldom be equipped to challenge the
propriety of the items they contain. Upon occasion,
certain items may be disallowed /in the rate base/.
But such control, at best, is indirect and v;ea.k.^
At the beginning, the question arises: Why do some
Montanans want to challenge the propriety of items in Montana
Power's rate base, oppose utility rate increases, or "beat"
the Company? For the answer, one must look to Montana
Power's creation.
Montana Power
Creating an Electric Utility
Montana Power was organized by the president of the
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, John D. Ryan. Ryan entered
the electric power business in August of I9O8 when he bought
for $1,538,246.46 all the stock of the Great Falls Water Power
and Townsite Company from Great Northern Railroad magnate
^Clair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin,'Inc., 1955), pp. 520-521.
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James J.
With these power sites under his control, Ryan bar
gained for low Anaconda Copper electric rates from the Butte
Electric & Power Company, one of Montana's most successful
electric producers, Butte Electric's general manager,
I^, Turner, said that Ryan told him that unless an amalgama
tion with Butte Electric could be arranged, Ryan, "would
develop the Great Palls power, transmit it to Butte, do their
/Anaconda Copper'£7 own power business, and . . . take on
/residential^ light business also."^
Concerned about possible competition, C, W, Wetraore,
Butte Electric's President, requested Copper & Powelson,
consulting engineers, to prepare an analysis of consolida
tion. The Consultants said the commendable profit record of
Butte Electric's general manager was "possible only because
he has been able so fa.r to keep out competition and to
ward off regulative legislation."

To protect this monopoly

situation, the consultants advised Butte Electric, "Ally
yourself with the Ryan interest at once. , . , B u t t e
Electric followed this advice. In May, 1909, Ryan sold one2

Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s,) at 207,
n. 22 (Federal Power Commission, 19^5)»
3lbid.. p. 109.
^Ibld., p. 210 n. 26, quoting from December 31, 1908,
report by Copper & Powelson, consulting engineers to Presi
dent C, W, V/etmore of the Butte Electric & Power Company.
^Ibid., p. 209.

24

half of his stock in his Great Palls operation to the Butte
Electric & Power Company for $2,500,000, of which $150,000
was cash and the rest stocks and bonds of the Butte Company.^
Since one-half the original value of Great Palls Water
Power was $750,000, Ryan's one-year profit from the trans
action was $1,750,000. As a result of the transaction, Ryan
also became the largest single stockholder in the two companies.
His profits continued to increase when Butte Electric
& Power merged with the Madison River Power Company, the
Billings and Eastern Montana Power Company, and the Missouri
River Electric and Power Company on December 12, 1912, to
form the Montana Power Company, On the morning of consoli
dation, common stock held by the owners of Butte Electric &
Power and its subsidiaries was worth approximately $6,55^,000.
During the merger, it split four-to-one and each stockholder
was issued four shares of 100-par Montana Power stock for
each 100-par~value share of Butte Electric. Because of this
transaction, the "on-paper" value of Montana Power stock was
set at $26,217,000, of which $19,663,391.11 was self-created
value or fictitious writeup.?
Pour days after consolidation, Ryan took over as
president of the Montana Power Company when the Butte Electric
president retired because of illness.
As president, Ryan further inflated Montana Power's
worth by selling the company his remaining half of the Great
^Ibid.. p. /lO.

^Ibid., pp. 202-207.
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Palls properties for $22,500,000 in common and preferred
stock.8 The original cost of this half of the property was
$750,000 when Ryan purchased it in i9o8. So its worth was
inflated by $21,750,000 when he sold it five years later on
February 11, 1913.
On the same day in 1913, he sold for $5,000,000 in
Montana Power stock the Thompson Falls and Pish Creek power
sites that he had purchased two and one-half months earlier
for $928,887.10 from the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail
way, of which he was a director. Of course, the resulting
$^,071,112.90 of self-created value was included in the Com
pany's rate base as the "original" acquisition cost of utility
property.9
"Original" Acquisition Costs
in a Utility Rate Base
The rate base is an accounting figure that represents
the total value of all of a utility's property. State utility
regulatory commissions ratify the value and thus the rate
base of the utilities within their jurisdiction. The commis
sions then allow a rate of return to the oivners of the utility
on the value of the investment they have made. This means
^Ibid.. p. 207.
^Ibid,. p. 217, citing testimony of J. D, Ryan before
the Interstate Commerce Commission in i926 (Federal Power
Commission Docket No. IT-5825, Exhibit No, 145, 1944). See
also. The People's Voice, April 28, 1944, p. 1, and issues
of The People's Voice from March 31 to May 26, 19^4, and
Howard, loc. cit.. pp. 338-3^0 for reports on these Montana
Power overvaluations.
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that the utility can charge enough for its product to cover
costs of operation and to pay the stockholders a profit. If
either the rate base or the rate of return can be increased,
more profit will accrue to the investors,
Ryan increased the "original" acquisition cost of
utility property and thus the rate base by selling his own
property to himself for more than it was worth. He also in
creased the rate base by neglecting to retire property from
the rate base which was no longer used by the Company, All
totaled, the series of write-ups pumped at least $^6,891,597.^1
of "water" into Montana Power's capital structure.
This amount includes write-ups occurring in 1892,
1899» and 1901 when through reorganization and exchange of
securities Butte Electric & Power, the immediate predecessor
of Montana Power, increased book assets by #2,605,795.89
without increasing the real value of the Company's property.
Commenting on the suggestion that the books of Butte Elec
tric's predecessor be stamped over and used by the reorganized
company, Butte Electric's C.P.A., H, A. Niles, advised,
"Entirely new books should be opened for the new company.
You have deliberately watered the stock of the company and
therefore you should . , . prevent reference to the old
books.
Once the rate base was watered and thus inflated, the
^^Re The Montana Power Go., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 235.
^^Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 202
and 203,
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consumer had to pay a higher electric bill that included a
rate of return to the Company for money that was never really
spent to enhance the service given. The extra amount that
customers had to pay is illustrated in the following example.
Suppose that the state regulatory commission allowed
electric utilities a six per cent return on their investment.
If a utility increased its rate base or the net worth of its
investment by $^6,891,597.^1, the consumers would have their
light bills increased enough so the Company could receive
$2,813,496 each year as profit on the investment (rate base
of $46,891,597 times the rate of return of six per cent).
But if the capital investment was never in reality made to
build more electric generating or transmitting facilities,
the consumer would be paying for something he never received.
The fact that Montana consumers were being overcharged
was not generally known until Mr, Ryan's efforts to pyramid
Montana Power's assets finally attracted the attention of
Federal Power Commission (PPC) auditors who were enforcing
the Federal Power Act of 1935.

12

The 1935 Act was the cul

mination of a resolution first introduced into the United

States Senate in 1927 by Thomas J, Walsh of Montana.13
After it was amended, the Walsh resolution authorized the
Federal Trade Commission (PTC) to investigate the electric
12

U . S . ; Codes Annotated, c, I6, sec. 3 0 1 ( a ) ,

l^U.S,, Congress, Sena.te, S.R. 83. 70th Cong,,
1st Sess,, 1927.
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power trust. Investigating utilities from 1928 to 1932,
the FTC brought to light more than one and one-half billion
dollars of watered electric company stock.1'+ At the time
of this investigation, the Montana Power Company refused to
let the PTC look at its books. To correct such evasion and
other improprieties 5 Congress passed the Federal Power Act
of 1935, requiring the Federal Power Commission to enforce the
use of proper accounting methods by the nation's electric
utilities.1s During the next nine years the PPC discovered
$^00f000,000 in inflated values in U.S. utilities.

Most of

this was dropped from the respective rate bases without
opposition from the utilities involved and even without a
hearing.
Investigation of Montana Power began in 19^1 and 19^2
when the field staff of the Federal Power Commission made an
extensive reclassification study of the Company's books,
records and documents. The Public Service Commissions of
Idaho and Montana were invited to participate in this
reclassification study. The Idaho Commission did not
^^Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 195.
^•^The People's Voice, April 7, 1944, p. 1; Ernest
Gruening, The Public Pays . . . and Still Pays: A Study of
Power Propaganda (2d. ed. rev.; New York: The Vanguard
Press, Inc., 19^4), pp. 3-17; Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F.
Healy, Yankee from the West (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
1962), pp. 306^:31^.
1 A

The People's Voice, April 7, 1944, p. 2, and Re The
Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 196.
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respond to the PPG's offer, and the Montana Commission sait?
it would be unable to participate because of lack of
appropriations.^^ The reclassification study culminated on
March 27, 1944, when the PPG began seven weeks of hearings
in Butte, Montana, by asking the Company to "show cause" why
it should not be required to eliminate $53 million in excess
capitalization and fictitious writeups from its rate base by
adopting the bona fide "original cost" of utility property
accounting provided for in the Federal Power Act of 1935.
PPC attorney Reuben Goldberg also asked for reclassification
of $6,000,000 that was in the Company plant accounts. At the
federal agency's invitation, the Montana Railroad and Public
Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over the rates
charged by Montana Power, sat jointly with the PPC in these
hearings. The two commissions maintained independent rules
for the acceptance of evidence, however. This independence
was exhibited when the PPG examiner, John J, O'Neill, ruled
that the Butte Electric stock split was irrelevant evidence
and did not increase the original $6,55^,000 cost of the
utility's facilities,
"The same plant and property was there in the after
noon /after the consolidationT" as was there in the morning
/before consolidation/ and the same people owned it," he
l^Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R, (n.s.) at 196.
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said,
The Montana Public Service Commission Chairman,
Austin B. Middleton, whose son-in-law, Kendrick Smith, was
a Company counsel at the hearing, disagreed with the PPG
examiner, Middleton accepted Montana Power's estimate of
its worth after the merger as admissable testimony and a
valid determination of utility investment. Because Middleton's decision has never been changed, Montana consumers
have had to continue paying a return to the Company for money
that was never really spent to enhance the service given.
The Montana Public Service Commission disagreed with
the PPC on a number of other matters. In its reclassification
order, the Montana Commission said, "The evidence clearly
shows that the transactions were hard-fought and at arm's
length. , , ,"19 Furthermore, the Commission said, "Ryan
and his associates did not devote any property to a public
use" before the final transactions with the utility com20

panies involved.

And since the Montana Commission ruled

that the "original cost of the property is defined by the
system of accounts as the cost to the persons first devoting
it to public use," Montana Power was allowed to retain in its
rate base part of what the federal commission considered
l^Howard, loc. cit., p. 339, quoting John J, O'Neill,
assistant chief accountant in the Federal Power Commission's
division of original cost,

^^Re The Montana Power Co.. ^6 P.U.R, (n.s.) at 224
(Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, 19^4),
Z^Ibid,, p. 219. See also p. 213.
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"water," In defense of this classification, the Montana
Commission said:
The Federal Power Commission staff, in reaching its
conclusions, disregarded state laws; and their /sic/brief
argues that the Federal Power Act supersedes state law.
We do not believe that this Federal Agency has the right
to disregard state laws. ... We consider this a fund
amental question of states rights, and we cannot agree
with a Federal agency which refuses to recognize a
transaction carried out under state law,2l
The Montana Commission did ask Montana PoweaMfo write
off some $28,793,^95*33 of its excess rate bass, however.

22

In part, this decision was based not on the original cost of
utility property but on the difference between the par-value
of stock and_ the actual market value a.t the time of stock
issuance. For example, in the Thompson Falls power sites
deal, John D. Ryan received ^0,000 shares of $100 per share •
par-value common stock in the Montana Power Company, Because
of dividend restrictions, however, this stock was worth only
$35 per share. The Montana Commission ruled that |65 of
each $100 worth of this stock issued "represents stock . , .
for which no value was received and, therefore, the amount
of $3,250,000 must be placed in Account 10? and disposed
of. , , ."23
Except for Montana Power's Mystic Lake properties,
the Federal Power Commission and the Montana Public Service
21lbid., p. 206. A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Northwestern Electric Go. v. Federal Power Comm'n,, 321
U.S. 119, held that state law is not controlling.
^^Ibid.. p, 237.

^^Ibid.. p. 236.
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Commission have agreed on the value of Company plant addi
tions and retirements since 1944. But the Montana Commis
sion's 1944 decision still accounts in part for the current
#21.6 million difference in utility plant valuations made by
the Montana Public Service Commission and the Federal Power
Commission,*?ll In addition to disagreeing on the original
acquisition cost of the utility, the two commissions use
different formulas to determine the value of utility property.
"Fair Value" and Reproduction
Cost New in a Utility Rate Base
The Federal Power Commission uses the original cost
depreciated rate base to determine utility value. This is
the original cost of the property plus the cost of improve
ments less the accrued depreciation shovm on the utility
?5
books from year to year,"
In other words, the original

cost (OC) of property is what it cost the utility to build
its plant or purchase its land. The original cost depreci
ated (CCD) is what the original plant and property are worth
after they have been in use. A utility's OCD gets smaller
as its plant gets older and its machinery wears out. There
fore, as time passes, any rate base will ^et smaller if it
is determined by using a utility's original cost depreciated.
9h

Montana Power Co., 196? Report to Stockholders,
p. 14- (Montana Public Service Commission accounting] com
pared to p. 16 (Federal Power Commission accounting).
^•^U.S., Federal Power Commission, Statistics of
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States,
196b, pp. 651-653.
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Thirty states and the District of Columbia have joined
the FPC in its use of the original cost depreciated rate base.
Montana is one of 13 states that still uses the so-called
"fair value" system of determining rate bases,
Montana's "fair value" is arrived at by adding a per
centage of the original cost of the property depreciated to
a percentage of the reproduction cost new depreciated. This
figure is added to one-half the value of the company's
materials and supplies (inventory)»

Also, in place of work

ing capital permitted by some commissions, Montana allows
the reserve that has been accrued through accelerated depre
ciation to be included in the rate base. Reproduction cost
new (RCN) is what it would cost a utility to build its
original plant today. Reproduction cost new depreciated
(RCND) is what the utility would be worth today if it had
been originally built at today's prices and the plant had
been allowed to depreciate until today.
Reproduction cost valuation is accomplished by making
plant valuations change to correspond with the changes in
construction costs. For example, if a company was valued
at $10 million in 1930 and construction costs doubled by
^^Michigan uses average net investment to figure
utility rate bases. Four states, Minnesota, Nebraska, South
Dakota, and Texas, do not have commissions authorized to
regulate electric utilities. The recently established com
missions in Alaska and Hawaii have not established firm
policies yet. U,S., Congress, Senate Committee on Government
Operations, State Utility Commissions, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1967, Senate Doc. '56, insert VII. Cited hereinafter as Senate,
State Utility Commissions, I967.
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1970, the company would be revalued at #20 million, the rate
base inflated, and the investors paid a rate of return on
$10 million they never really invested.
The rate base or method of valuating a utility's
property should not be confused with the operating costs
that a utility incurs while paying for its labor or adver
tising, while paying taxes, or while maintaining and repair
ing its plant. Operating costs are not included in the rate
base, which is the total value of a utility's property. A
utility, however, is allowed to charge the customer for all
of its operating costs. The use of either the reproduction
cost new or the original cost depreciated methods of calcu
lating a rate base will have no effect upon the utility's
ability to pay its operating expenses. Operating costs a.re
figured independently from rate bases (value of utility
plant). A utility should, be allowed a rate of return only
on its rate base and not on its costs of operation. These
costs of operation are completely paid for by the consumers.
Those who support reproduction cost valuation say
that it is needed to keep earnings in regulated industries
in line with those in other industries and with cost of
living changes.
They say that stockholders expect to see their invest
ments grow over time, at least at the rate of inflation.
Those who oppose reproduction cost valuation say that the
"change in construction costs index" used to figure RCN is
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not the same as the "change in cost of living index,"
Furthermore, they contend that, under RON valuation, divi
dends on common stock rise more than prices do. Public
utility expert, Clair Wilcox, explains how this can happen:
Assume a company with a valuation of $10 million and a
return of 6 per cent, producing earnings of #600,000.
On $3 million of bonds at 4 per cent, it pays $120,000.
On $3 million of preferred stock at ^ per cent, it pays
$150,000, It has 1330,000 left. On $4 million of com
mon stock, it can pay % per cent. Assume that the
price level doubles. The company is revalued at #20
million* With its return still at 6 per cent, it now
earns $1,200,000. It still pays #^70,000 on its bonds
and its preferred stock /because interest on bonds or
dividends on preferred stock do not change as prices
change/. But it now has $930,000 left for its common.
This gives it a yield of 23% per cent. Prices have 27
doubled, but dividends on common stock have tripled.
In 1966, as Table 3 illustrates, the return to Montana
Power stockholders on their equity was 17.7 per cent.

Only

two other U.S, electric utilities granted a higher return on
common stock equity in i966 than did Montana Power. In
addition, "the value of the stock in The Montana Power
Company increased five times in the years 1950-60," according
27Wilcox, loc. cit.. p. 529. See also the dissent in
Southwestern Bell Tel. Go. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 262 U.S.
276, 305 (1923) where Justice Brandeis writes, "To follow a
reproduction-cost-new rate base, especially in times of
inflation, is to take no cognizance of the immense resulting
windfall to stockholders arising from the fact that the
interest obligation on the bonds remains static."
^^Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Pri
vately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States. 1966,
pp. 655-656.
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to evidence accepted by the Monta:ia Supreme Court.29
TABLE 3
MONTANA POWER'S RATE OP RETURN ON
COMMON STOCK EQUITY^

Montana Power rate of return on
Common equity
..

1965

1966

1967

17.7^

17>7%

16.4^

Number of major electric utilities
paying a higher return than
Number of companies compared in
above ranking

3

2

8

204

205

207

^The FPC offers the following clarification about
this data: "The presentation of the rates of return on
common equ_ity is not intended_^as an evaluation of the reason
ableness /or unreasonablenes£7 of the returns under the appli
cable regulatory standards," However, they do serve as a
useful and valid comparison between companies since the cri
terion they are figured on is standardized by the PPG for
all companies. U.So, Federal Power Comm'n., Statistics of
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States
(1966 and 1967")', pp. 655'-^^
Montana consumers have opposed this rate of return to
Montana Power's investors, because not only is the return
high, but most of it goes out of state. Only 13.7 per cent
^Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 1% Mont. I69, iTJI One share of Montana F^er
stock purchased for $17.50 in 19^9 could be sold for #78 in
1959—before the stock split three-for-one. Immediately
after the split, the price dropped to $22 per share. Then
the market price rose to a high of $45*37 per share in 1965.
Three shares (originally bought as one for $17.50 before
the stock split) could now be sold for $136.11—a 778 per
cent profit in 16 years. Due to the recently depressed market,
the price of Montana Power common stock fluctuated around
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of Montana Power's stock is owned by Montanans.^^ And the
dividends paid to out-of-state stockholders shrinlc Montana's
disposable personal income and thus lower the buying power of
its inhabitants by at least $7 million.
Some Montana consumers contend that such high monopoly
earnings may be kept in line with prices by varying the rate
of return without manipulating the rate base. In Wilcox's
example, earnings were raised from $600,000 to #1,200,000
by raising the rate base from #10 million to #20 million and
keeping the rate of return constant at six per cent. Wilcox
points out that a utility could have gotten the same increase
in earnings by leaving the rate base at $10 million and
raising the rate of return to 12 per cent. A public utility
would not allow its earnings to be increased in this way,
says Wilcox, "Public opinion would be outraged if the rate
of return to investors in regulated industries were doubled.
,,

But it does not complain when the 'same effect is

achieved through revaluation," because valuation is a mystery
$26 a share in June of 1970. Earnings per share (which are
not to be confused with dividends per share which are less
than the earnings since not all of the earnings are paid out
but some retained) increased from 98 cents per share in 19^5
to $3»85 per share in 1958 when the stock split three-forone. Since 1970, after-the-stock-split earnings are esti
mated to be $2.50 per share, the earnings per 19^5 share have
gone from $.98 in 19^5 to #7.50 in 1970. Data from Standard
& Poor's Corporation, Standard Listed Stock Reports, and
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Public Utility Manual
(New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1927-69),
^^Letter from Colin W. Raff, vice president of The
Montana Power Co,, July 15, 1966,
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to the public and "it does not realize what is going on.
It is indeed hard to find out how a "fair value" rate
base is set in Montana. As was stated previously, "fair
value" is arrived at by adding a percentage of the OCD to
a percentage of RCND, Exactly what percentages of the OCD
and the RCND are to be used is not clear under Montana law.
According to W, M. Johnson, auditor for the Public
Service Commission of Montana:
There is no mathematical formula for determining fair
value. The commission arrives at a fair value deter
mination as a matter of judgment, after carefully con
sidering a.ll the valuation elements mentioned above.32
The elements which the Commission considers in addition to
RCND and OC are prudent investment theory and certain public
records.
The Courts "Legislate"
a Utility Rate Base
The RCND guidelines were determined not by the Montana
legislature but by the Montana Supreme Court. The guidelines
evolved when the Montana legislature empowered the Commission
to determine property values. The law specifically provides:
The Commission may, in its discretion, investigate
and ascertain the value of the property of every
public utility actually used and useful for the con
venience of the public. In making such investigation
the Commission may avail itself of all information
contained in the assessment rolls of various counties,
^^Wilcox, loc. cit.
^^Letter from W. M. Johnson, auditor, Montana
Public Service Comm'n,, April 10, 1§69
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and the public records of the various branches of the
state government, or any other information obtain
able, and the Commission may at any time of its own
initiative make a revaluation of such property
/emphasis added/.
This legislative mandate says nothing about "fair value" or
original cost methods of valuation. The law does not say
that the Commission must consider "fair value" and it does
not say that it cannot. The Montana Supreme Court has ruled,
however, that the Commission must relate rates to the finding
of "fair value," The Court said;
While our statute does not establish a formula for
arriving at fair value, it does require such value
be found and used as the base in fixing rates. The
reasonableness and justness of the rateg must be
related to this finding of fair value,^
This legislation by the Court has evolved from the
19^0 Tobacco River Power Co, v. Public Service Comm'n.
decision.35 The circumstances leading to this decision
started on July 7, 1936, when, after a hearing, the Montana
Public Service Commission ordered the Tobacco River Power
Company in Eureka, Montana, to lower electric rates charged
its 225 customers. Upon seeing that its rate base was not
big enough to justify the rates, the Tobacco River Power
Company invested in an electricity-producing diesel engine
^^Montana, Revised Codes (19^+7), sec, 7O-IO6,
34

State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n,, 131
Mont. 272, 2TB~(195717
35

Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.,
109 Mont. 521, 98 P. 2d '886 (1^0),

^1-0

so that its rate base (investment) would increase. It
then asked the Montana District Court to enjoin the rate
schedule set by the Public Service Commission and to order the
Public Service Commission to set a new schedule figured on
the new base and upon reproduction cost new less depreciation.
The schedule was enjoined and the Public Service Commission
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court,
The Supreme Court observed that
considerable latitude is allowed the Public Service
Commission in determining value. Neither the Public
Service Commission nor the utility company is limited
to or bound by any particular method in arriving at
the solution of the question of value.
Since nobody was limited to 8.ny particular method of
ascertaining value, the Supreme Court said, the utility could
use "fair value" if it wanted to. Indeed, the Court ruled:
The cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, is
usually regarded as one of the most important, if
not the dominant factor, in the determination of
value (51GJ17).37
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
injunction and ordered the Public Service Commission to con
duct a new hearing. Ironically, this ruling has had the
effect of limiting the Commission's freedom in determining
utility value. The ruling meant that the utility could de
termine its ov.Ti method of valuation and the Commission
^^Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n..
109 Mont. 521, 529.
37lbid., p. 530.
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would have to accept that method and apply it subject to the
rules of inspection the Court outlined for determining
reproduction cost new. Since the Public Service Commission
had to accept the utility's method of valuation, the utility
could, to a large degree, regulate itself,The Montana
courts have had difficulty reconciling the two mutually
contradictory principles that evolved from the remedy in
the Tobacco River Case, In one statement the Montana
Supreme Court has ruled:
The language of the statute is clear that the Com
mission shall determine "the value of the property
of every public utility actually used and useful
for the convenience of the public" 2®mphasis by
the CourtTT This30urt has previously determined
that this means the present fair value of the utility's
property /citing Tobacco Hiver Case/.
And then in the very next statement the Court said;
Neither the Public Service Commission nor the utility
company is limited to nor bound by any particular
method in prriving at the solution of the question
of value.
This is rhetoric, of course, since the ruling in
the first statement makes the situation described in the
second statement impossible to achieve. Writing in the
Montana Law Review. James V. Bottomly comments on the Court's
^Although the Commission believes it has to use the
so-called "fair value" to establish a rate base, it does not
have to include everything the utilities request in the base.
The Commission has not allowed the utilities to include non
productive gas leases and other things that the utilities
would have liked in the rate base. See Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv. Comm.'n., l44 Mont, I69 {196T),
^^State ex rel, 01sen v. Public Serv, Comm'n,,
131 Mont. 272, 27b, 309 P. 2d 1035~TW7).
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inconsistency.
How or why the imperative shall is read into the per
missive may of the statute is never explained by the •
court. It is submitted . , . that the court should at
least treat the matter with consistency. Only two
pages later in answer to the contention of the pro
testant that Revised Codes of Montana, 19^7, section
7O-IO6, makes it incumbent upon the commission to make
an independent investigation of its own /and not blindly
accept Company testimony without doublechecking it7
before increasing rates, the^court stated that the
statute was permissive only.
The fact that utilities believe the Commission is in
reality limited in its method of determining value is illus
trated by the following assumptions made in Montana Power's
utility rate increase arguments:
Montana law requires, however, that Applicant /Montana
Power/ be allowed a fair rate of return on the "present
fair value" of its property used and useful in its
utility business. The law does not relate a fair rate
of return to depreciated original cost
He /rate expert for the consumers/ justifies the above
with mystic calculus formulas and then frosts the cake
by recommending a fair rate of return based upon net
original cost rate base, which this Commission is barred
by law from applying.^2"
The Montana Public Service Commission adheres to the
utilities' interpretation. Commissioner Louis G. Boedecker
has said that because of the Tobacco River decision, "the
^^James V. Bottomly, "The 'Pair value' Test in Montana
Public Utility Rate Regulation," Montana Law Review, XXII,
No. 1 (Pall, i960), p. 71.
4l

Montana Power Co,, Applicant's Brief, Re The
Montana ^wer Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R.R. & Pub.
Serv. CormiFii., 1968), p, 36,
^Zlbid., p. 53.

43

Commission must use the present fair value of the utilities'
property.
Strangely enough, the Court seems to disavow its own
legislative function in requiring the so-called "fair value"
rate base to be used in Montana. It said:
This Court has pointed out that it is a legislative
function to regulate public utilities and that the
legislature can do so through an administrative agency.
Too that the acts of this agency are legislative and
not judicial.
And:
The elected officials of the Commission . . . are
accountable ... to the people only, . . . and this
court will not interfere so long as they follow the
law. . . . The forum in which their actions are to be
judged is in the minds and consciences of the people,
whose servants they are, and who alone can hold them
responsible. . , ,^5
The Court, of course, as well as the people, has
held the Public Service Commission accountable for its actions.
In so doing, the Court has exercised legislative authority.
On the other hand, the Commission has made judicial as well
as legislative decisions while regulating utilities. To
deny it, as the Court seems to want to do, only muddles the
political picture. And the system of checks and balances
does not require such self-deception. Indeed the system
of checks and balances may be enhanced by a realistic
^^Address by Louis G. Boedecker, "Public Utility Rate
Increases and Consumer Protection," Montana Farmer-Labor
Institute, Missoula, Montana, February 1, 1970, p. 9.
^^Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 144 Mont. 1^^192~TÎ9^.
43lbid.. at 193.
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appraisal of the political picture. Then the proper functions
of government will not be as clouded by contradictory legal
rhetoric. The fact that the Court has legislated a guide
line that limits the Commission's determination of utility
value should be seen clearly. Whether or not that guideline
is proper or even constitutional, however, are questions
that are still open to debate.
Consumers Want So-called
"Fair Value" Abolished
The consumer advocates, for example, contend that socalled "fair value" should not be used in Montana. They say
that in Maryland, Michigan, Nevj Jersey, Oregon, and Washing
ton statutes that require the use of fair value in rate base
valuation are ignored in recent court decisions that usually
have been based on depreciated original cost. In some of
these states, the old reproduction cost new concept of "fair
value" has been discarded because the courts have accepted
original cost depreciated figures as a valid method of determining "fair values,"

Also, in arguing against a rate

increase granted to the Montana Power Company in 1969 the
utility opponents said:
The Commission's Order No. 3295 utilizes as its
basis the Tobacco River Case, . . . which in fact
relies upon an I898 decision of the United States
^^Senate, State Utility Commissions, I967,
insert VII.
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Supreme Court which is not the law of the United ^
States at this time, and has not been since 19^1. '
So-called "fair value" was required by the 1898
Supreme Court to obtain a fair return on the value of
property in Smyth v, Ames.

This method of valuation was

originally intended to protect utility consumers from valuation
claims based on inflated prices of the past—claims, for
example, like those made by John D. Ryan about the inflated
worth of Montana Power. As the United States Supreme Court
has pointed out:
Those were the days before state legislation prohibited
the issue of public utility securities without authori
zation from state officials; before accounting was pre
scribed and supervised; when outstanding bonds and
stocks were hardly an indication of the amount of capi
tal embarked in the enterprise; when depreciation
accounts were unknown; and when book values, or property
accounts, furnished no trustworthy evidence either of
cost or real value. Estimates of reproduction cost were
then offered, largely as a means, either of supplying
lacks in the proofs of actual cost and investment, or of
testing the credibility of evidence adduced or showing
that the cost of installation had been wasteful. ^
With the advent of modern accounting and record keep
ing procedures, the Supreme Court overruled Smyth v. Ames
^C.W. Leaphart, Jr., _et al., Montana Consumers'
Council, Protestants' Petition for Rehearing, Re The Montana
Power Go., Docket No. 5^98 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n.,
Î9WT, p. 2.
48smyth v. Ames. I69 U.S. #6 (I898).
ziq

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n..
262 U.S. 276 (1923)1 For an excellent understanding of the
difficulty inherent in reproduction cost new valuation see
cross examination by and testimony by Mr. George P. Hess,
Montana Public Service Commission expert in Docket No. 5698.
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in Federal Power Commission v, Hope Natural Gas Company.
The utilities clung to the "fair value" rate base whenever
they could, however, because the economy had shifted from
depression to inflation. When prices rise during inflation,
so does reproduction cost new and the "fair value" rate base,
which is figured from reproduction cost new, Montana has
continued to valuate utility property using the "fair value"
rate base because the Montana Supreme Court has ruled that
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Ga,s Company did not
change the law in the state.

<1

Montana Power Return on
Net Plant Investment
Because the Montana Public Service Commission con
tinues to use a different rate base (fair value) than the
Federal Power Commission (original cost depreciated), the two
commissions quite naturally arrive at different rates of re
turn actually accruing on utility investment. In I967, as
Table 4 will show, the FPC calculated that the Montana Power
Company was receiving a 10.66 per cent return on net electric
^^Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Go., 320
U.S. 591, 88 L, Ed. 333 (19^2). Prior to the Hope case, four
states used original cost or prudent investment as the rate
base (Massachusetts, California, Wisconsin, a,nd possibly
Washington). During the ten years following the decision,
19 states explicitly changed from fair value to original
cost or prudent investment, and eight more employed original
cost as the measure of fair value. Joseph R, Rose, "The Hope
Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States," Columbia
Law Review, LIV (195^), 190-212.
^^State ex rel. 01sen v. Public Serv. Comm'n., supra,
note 39; Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv,
Comm'n., 1% Mont. lo9, 39^ P, 2d 856 (1964), cert, denied

table 4

PERCENTAGE RATES OF RETURN ON NET ELECTRIC PLANT INVESTMENT^
(All rates of return are calculated on net electric plant investirient)
Year^
Montana Power's Rate
of Return

1961

1962

1963

1964

9.78^ 10.12$ 10.24% 10.92#

Rank of Montana
Power's Rate Corn=
pared with Rates of
Major Companies
6/183

3/l87

3/1ÛÔ

:

2/138

1965

1966

11.37^

11.33# 10.66#

3/192

196?

3//f9

3/^?y

:

The F?C offers the following clarification about this data: "It should
be noted that this review of rates of return as calculated by the Commission's
staff is not intended as an evaluation of the reasonableness of the earnings of
any electric utility company under the applicable State or local regulatory
standards. In many jurisdictions the statutory rate base differs fron; that used
in the present calculations. Also, the treatment of income taxes differs among
the various jurisdictions, as does the treatment of certain other elements of
cost of service," However, they do serve as a useful and valid comparison between
companies since the criterion they are figured on is standardized by the FPC for
all companies. Source: U.S. Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States (1963-196777'PP• 651-Ô53»
^Prior to 1961 Montana Power's percentage return on net electric plant
investment was: I960, 9.4#; 1959, 9.2#; 1958, 9.3#; 1957, 9.1#; 1956, 9.7#.
Source: Ronnie J. Straw, A Report on Overcharges of 38 Major Electric Utilities,
based on Statistics of Electric Utilities (Privately Owned) in the United
States ) Fed era1 Pow er Commission, 1 955-6D (V:ashington," D.C.: Rati.iiicT" Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, 1963), pp. 6, 7, and 1f.
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TABLE 4 (Cont'd.)
Year

1962

1961

Aggregate Average
Rate of Return of
Major Companies
Major Companies

7.08;

6.96%
192

1963

192

1965

7.39$c

7.33#f
187

Number of Companies
with a Rate of
Return above
10 Per Cent

4

3

3

Per Cent
with a
Return
10 Per

2.2$

1,6%

1

of Companies
Rate of
above
Cent

1964

187

1186

1966

7.42^

1967

7.44$

187

199

/

.6$

6

5

7

8

3.2^

2,1%

3.7$

4.2^

^Median rate of return.
See also, Owen Ely, "Financial News and Comment: Frank Chutter
Reviews State Rate Regulation," Public Utilities Fortnightly (January 3, 1963)j
p, 49; Arnold H, Hirsch, "Effective Rate Regulationj Pact or Fiction?" Public
Power (May 1962), pp. 11-13, for different method of calculating rate of return
that all show Montana to allow a larger rate of return than any other state*
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plant investment—the third highest rate of return in the
nation. At the same time, the Montana Public Service
Commission reported the Company had a 5»21 per cent rate of
return on a "fair value" electric rate base of $296,950,000,-^^
By federal standards, Montana Power was enjoying a
prosperous year despite the fact that a copper strike had
reduced company revenue, and the state legislature had
decided to start daylight savings time in 1967. The Company's
10.66 per cent return was well above the near 6 per cent
return usually prescribed by law.63 The actual rate of
return, however, usually averages more than that which is
legally valid. In 1967, the I89 major U.S. electric utilities
had an average rate of return on net plant investment of 7.44
52Montana Railroad and Public Service Comm'n., Order
No. 3296. Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. ^698 (January 30,
19691TP'.

^^The legally prescribed rate of return reported by
state public service commissions averaged 6.14 per cent in
1966—the last year for which figures a.re available—ac
cording to Senate, State Utility Commissions, 196?, p. 25.
The 6 per cent prescribed rate of return figure may
be revised upward if utilities are forced to continue borrow
ing at the current 8§ per cent interest rate. At present
the overall interest most utilities pay to service their
borrowed capital is still below 6 per cent because many of
their bond financing projects were launched during the de
pression when interest rates were substantially below 6 per
cent. According to E, W, Clemens, Economics and Public
Utilities (New York: Appleton-Century-Groft, Inc., 1950),
pp. 105 and 108, there had been, "a steady decline in cost
of utility bond financing from
per cent in 1921 to
less than 6 per cent in 1922, with a gradual and continuous
decline thereafter to less than 5 per cent as late as 1931.
From 1921 to 1924, the simple average yield of new public
utility interest-bearing securities dropped below that of
other utilities (excluding railroads) by one-half of one per
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per cent. And Montana Power's rate of return was well
above this average.
Long-term - low-interest financing can increase rate
of return.—Theoretically, this rate of return should be set
to allow utilities to meet obligations on old financing and
to attract capital to finance new expansion at current
(inflated or deflated) rates of interest. But if a utility
does little expanding and does not have to refinance its
current debt at .a higher interest rate, it will not need more
money to service its long-term capital since it may continue
to pay the old rate of return until the bonds expire. A
utility, as any business, will finance at the lowest rate
possible and will generally finance through long-term
investments, bonds, preferred stock, etc., only when the
rate is low.

It will finance using short-term investments

during a time of high interest rates and then liquidate the
short-term investment in favor of long-term investment as
soon as the interest rate drops. Montana Power, for example,
cent or more," Despite the fact that interest was lower on
utility securities than on other securities, the demand for
utility securities increased. This was due not only to the
fact that utility securities were secure, but also to the
fact that new laws were adopted permitting savings banks to
invest in utility securities.
-^It should be noted here that if company insiders are
in a position to invest in the company, there may be little
incentive for company managers to finance at the lowest pos
sible rate. Instead, they may try to sell bonds or stock to
company insiders at as high a rate as possible, thus insuring
themselves a high rate of return on their investment, often
for a very long period. Some stockbrokers, for example,
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issued |30 million in four-year bonds that will mature in
19?^. Therefore, a utility like Montana Power that is
granted a rate increase to cover current interest rates might
soon find that it no longer needs that much money to service
its capital because it has refinanced at a lower rate.
When refinancing occurs, the utility is rarely asked to
reduce its rates and the "extra" money continues to accrue
in company coffers. This "extra" money is not always paid
to company stockholders. In I968, for example, the nation's
private electric utilities paid out only 70 per cent of the
earnings they had available for the servicing of common stock
equity.This left them with a retained earned surplus of
wondered why Montana Power did not wait for a month or so
for interest rates to decline before issuing its last bonds.
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Montana Power could
obtain after-the-rate-raise justification for its increase
by financing at higher interest rates. In addition, Company
insiders could make good money by investing in Montana Power
securities. And all this manipulation would not harm the
Company financially since it passed the cost of attracting
capital on to the consumers in their light bills. An example
of long-term, high interest rate financing occurred recently
when the American Telephone and Telegraph Company issued
30-year AAA bonds at 8 3/4 per cent,
•5%ederal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States (I968), p. xxvi.
In 1968, after paying ->280 Million dividends to preferred
stockholders, and $1,360 million interest on long-term debt,
privately owned electric utilities in the United States had
$2,700 million available for the servicing of common equity.
The utilities paid out #1,900 million of that $2,700 million
and kept $800 million in retained earnings. The utilities
retained $400 million more in 1968 than they did in 1958. So
retained earnings have increased by 100 per cent in the last
decade.
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about #800 million—enough to run Montana's entire state
government at the current level of expenditure for the next
10 years.
Retained earnings finance extra-utility activitiesrSometiraes utilities use this "extra" money to finance new
construction. Then the value of the resulting plant is in
cluded in the rate base. And the consumers are required to
pay a rate of return on money that in reality they, not the
stockholders, invested in the utility. Senator Lee Metcalf
of Montana has recently testified to the Senate's antitrust
subcommittee that utilities are buying real estate companies
and setting up housing subsidiaries that competing fuel com
panies are not allowed to serve. Such tax-sheltered ven
tures, often financed from the retained earnings of a
utility, yield more than 20 per cent annually on their
equity,-5^
Another example of retained utility earnings used to
finance activities not related to the public utility business
o&curred in Missoula, where in 19^6, the Montana Power Company
owned stock in the Florence Hotel, a parking corporation,
and a skiing facility. Including these Missoula activities,
MEG- had non-utility property and investments valued at
5&"Metcalf Says Utilities Use Tax Shelters to Buy
Houses," The Missoulian, June 12, 1970, p. 22,
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nearly $4- million in 1966.^"^ In addition, Montana Power had
invested $15i million in associated companies such as gas
pipelines and gas, oil and coal exploration ventures.
Montana Consumers' Council laifyers found that by using retained
earnings to finance what is alleged to be natural gas ex
ploration, Montana Power can in reality finance oil explor
ation and charge the cost of "dry hole operations" off as an
operating expense. If the Company "accidentally" strikes oil
while looking for gas, the consumers do not benefit from the
strike because the revenue from the oil well is transferred
to a "non-utility" account. Montana Power has $2.4 million
in its "non-utility" oil properties account.

Kg

If, on the

other hand, the Company has bad luck and drills a dry "gas"
well, the expense of the drilling is considered to be an
operating expense that may be included in the consumer's
light bill.
Retained earnings provide stock option plans.—
Sometimes, retained earnings are used by company insiders to
finance stock option plans. In Montana, this started in 1956
Montana Power Co,, I966 Form 1 Report to the FPC
(accounts 121 and 124), pp. 201, 202A, and 202.
^^Ibid., (account 123), p. 202A.
^^Ibid., (account 121), p. 201. See also C. W. Leaphart, Jr., £t al., Montana Consumers' Council, Protestants'
Brief, Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R. R.
& Pub» Serv. Comm'n., I969), p. 12. Some of these wells were
designated as oil wells before they were drilled. And if they
were, the cost of drilling them is charged to the "non-utility"
account so the consumer does not pay for drilling them.

rA

when the Federal Power Commission authorized issuance of
100,000 Montana Power common stock shares to Company of
ficials. The price was not to be less than 95 per cent of
the stock's closing price on the dates the options were
granted and the plan was to expire in June of 1959. In
May, 1959, the PPC authorized a three-for-one Montana Power
stock split that increased the stock option authorization to
300,000 shares. During June of 1959, Montana Power stock
holders (without PPG approval) extended, for 10 years, the
expiration date of the stock option plan to June l6, I969,
and authorized options on an additional 450,000 shares to
123 employees. Then in I96I, before the PPC had reviewed
the action, Montana Power relinquished its corporate registra
tion in New Jersey and became a Montana-based corporation.^^
This move exempted the Company's securities from PPC
scrutiny and placed them under the control of the Montana
Public Service Commission. The Montana Commission has never
investigated the options on the additional 450,000 shares or
passed on the validity of them.
Once stock options are authorized by stockholders,
they are then issued or granted by the company, A company
may not issue all of the authorized options at one time. Once
the option is issued the stock is said to be "under option"
which means that the person granted the option may at a
later date of his own choosing exercise the option by paying
^^Letter from Joseph C. Swidler, chm,, PPC, to Lee
Metcalf, U.S. Senator from Mont., June 24, 19d4.
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the company the market price the stock sold at on the day
the option was granted. (Ninety-five per cent of market price
if option is granted before 1964.) This should not bo con
fused with the price of the stock on the day the option is
exercised which is higher than the price on the day the option
is granted or the option would be forfeited and not exer
cised. Once an option is exercised the stock may be sold
for immediate profit or held for future speculation.
By 1964, eight Montana Power executives had re
ceived $655,000 profit through the exercise of stock options.
In some cases, Company officials had paid less than 30 per
cent of the option-exercised-day market value for the stock.
And none of the officiais had to pay brokerage fees on his
buying transactions. The Federal Power Commission staff
estimated that when options on all 750,000 shares were exer
cised, the Company's cost (probably paid from retained
earnings) would be |9 million. In addition, the equity of
the ordinary stockholder would be diluted by $9 million.
Montana Power defended its options as being necessary
to attract "competent, dedicated personnel," 11 per cent of
whom were made eligible to benefit under the stock option
plan.

Senator Metcalfs assistant, Vic Eeinemer, countered

^^U.S., Congress, Senate, "lOU No. 24: Stock Option
Windfall For Company Insiders—Ordinary Stockholders, Con
sumers Unknowingly Provide Multimillion Dollar Windfall,"
Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 110, No. 95,
May 13,"19557 pp. 10422-25.
^^The Independent Record. May 27, 1964,

56

that the eight officials who had. received $655,000 by exer
cising options were already making an average yearly salary
of 130,000 before the options were exercised,J, E, Corette, Montana Power's president, said that 704 United States
companies had similar plans in 1962.

Metcalf said that

24 of the nation's 224 private electric utilities had re
stricted stock option plans in 1961,^^ And only one of
those—the original 100,000 share option of Montana Power—
had been approved by the Federal Power Commission,He also
pointed out that in 1964 the PPC had reversed its earlier
position on the approval of stock options and denied the
Black Hills Power and Light Company authority to issue com
mon stock options.
According to a Company official, who did not want to
be:quoted by name, Montana Power has enough options avail
able to "last for the next 100 years," In 1969, the Com
pany's stockholders voted to extend the expiration date of
the present stock option plan to 1979. Stockholders also
^^Vic Reinemer, "A Montanan's Washington Notebook,"
newsletter from the office of Senator Lee Metcalf, July 13,
1.964, p. 2,
^^The Independent Record, May 27, 1964,
^%enate, "lOU No, 24," loc, cit.
^^Letter from Vic Reinemer to Harry L. Billings,
editor of The People's Voice, no date..
67
U.S., Federal Power Commission, Opinion No. 433.
Re The Black Hills Power and Light Co., Docket No. E-704d
TJune 30, I95ÎTT
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authorized an additional 200,000 shares of stock to be op
tioned,bringing the total available shares to be optioned
between

195^ and 1979 to 950,000—13 per cent of the

Company's outstanding stock and four and one-half per cent
of the Company's total shares of no par value common stock
authorized for issuance. Apparently, the Company intends to
continue modifying the present plan and extending the ex
piration date, thereby avoiding the need for Public Service
Commission approval of new stock option issues. Presently,
because of new Internal Revenue Service rules, the stock in
option plans must be at 100 per cent of market price at the
time of the acceptance of the option. And no capital gains
treatment is given unless the stock is held three years and
the option exercised within five years.
The stock option plan has not always meant short-run
profit to Company officials. Recently, some options were
exercised at 135* The price of the stock has since dropped
to about $26, leaving the officiais with a short-run net
loss of $9 per share—a phenomenon which will attract
"competent, dedicated" workers for the Company only if short
-term loss can be turned into long-term gain. Indeed, mostly
because of the depressed value of the stock, options on
294,206 shares were forfeited and not exercised by the
option holders in 1969. The total number of option shares
exercised from 1954 to 1970 is 260,193.
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Allegations of excessive stock options and utility
overcharges continued to mount in Montana, Many of these
charges emanated from the office of Senator Lee Ketcalf. So
Montana Power defended itself. In 1966, the year Senator
Metcalf was running for re-election, Montana Power doubled
its advertising budget and spent more than $216,000 to sup
port its business practices, Metcalf, who could not afford
to match this advertising with counter-advertising, softpeddled the utility issue. And during his campaign he con
centrated on other issues. Once Metcalf was re-elected, he
resumed his criticism by co-authoring, with his assistant,
Vic Reinemer, a book called Overcharge, The book, made
possible by a grant from the American Political Science
Association, assailed utility overcharges and resulted in
some consumer awareness of utility practices in the United
States. In Montana, the book did not cause a furor over
Montana Power's rates.
But informed opinion leaders such as Clyde T, Jarvis
and Gordon R, Twedt of the Montana Farmers Union, James W,
Murry of the Montana APL-CIO, Dr. M. P. Keller and State
Senator Herbert J. Klindt of the Republican Party, State
Senator John L. McKeon of Anaconda, and Gordon R. Bennett,
campaign manager for Governor Forrest H. Anderson, Senator
Lee Metcalf, and Roland R. Renne,remained concerned about the
situation. They said, however, that they had little hope
that Company influence could be overcome enough to change the
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situation,' They said they thought that a majority of the
people they represented %ere frustrated because they could
not benefit from low-cos^ electricity that should accompany
a state with the vast hydro-electric generating and water
resources of Montajia.' But they also said that some of their
people were consoled by Montana Power advertising that pointed
out that its electric rates were often lower than rates
charged in other areas, Riley Wm. Childers lamented that this
advertising did not point out that Montana Power was comparing
its rates with those charged in areas that must use an ex
pensive coal-steam method of generating electricity. Since
this and other facts about utility rates were not widely
understood, he thought that, by and large, Montanans had learned
to live with their electric and gas bills. This uneasy truce
was broken when on February 13, 1968, Montana Power pe
titioned the Public Service Commission to increase its
.
68
rates.

The Montana Railroad and Public
Service Commission
Compensation, Education
and Function
The Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission
has always consisted of three members who are elected for
six-year terms, one member coming up for election every
^3Montana Power Co., Applicant's Petition, Re The
Montana Power Co., Docket No, 5o9S"TMontana R.R. & Pub. Serv.
c3ii"'lî:,'T9~6ïï)7"
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two years.
By 1975» Montana's three Public Service Commissioners
will be paid $11,500 a year.^^ They also are reimbursed
for actual and necessary traveling expenses while away from
Helena—provided such expenses do not exceed #4-0 per day.70
As nearly as can be determined from available re
ports, Montana pays its commissioners a lower yearly
salary than that received by commissioners for any of the
71
other 52 fulltime utility regulatory agencies.
This meager compensation has not attracted the most
highly educated personnel to run for the office of Montana
Railroad and Public Service Commissioner. Only one of
Montana's present commissioners has attended college,
Louis G,' Boedecker has a B.A. degree. In contrast to this,
at least two-thirds of the nation's public service commis
sioners have had some college, and more than a third have
law degrees.
Created in I907 to regulate the operation of rail
roads, the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of
^^Montana, Revised Codes (19^7), sec, 25-501,
70
Montana, Revised Codes (19^7), sec, 59-538,
71Senate, State Utility Commissions. 1967, p. 6 insert.
Since state law provides that a commissioner cannot have a pay
raise during his terra, each commissioner must wait six years
until he is elected to a new terra before his wage is increased.
Under this system, all commissioners are paid a different
salary. Commissioner Smith is being paid less than #10,000,
His successor will be paid at the current rate,
f^ibid.
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Montana was delegated additional authority in 1913 to
"supervise and regulate the operations of the public
utilities, . . ."73 The legislature provided that a newly
created body, called the Public Service Commission of Mon
tana, would conduct its business of auditing utility accounts,
insuring quality service, and setting public utility rates
separately from the business of the Railroad Commission, But
the railroad commissioners were made ex officio members of
the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Commis
sion was to use the Railroad Commission's staff personnel.
The Commission was granted authority to hire "examiners,
experts, clerks, accountants or other assistants as it may
deem necessary," but its existing staff absorbed most of
the extra workload.
The Commission hired only an engineer and an audi
tor, each at $200 a month, to help regulate l49 electric,
gas, phone, water, streetcar, and telegraph utilities.75
The engineer has since been dropped from the payroll.
In 1961, the Commission was again asked to accept
additional responsibility—this time to control the issuance
"^^Montana, Revised Codes (19^7), sec. 70-101.
7^Montana, Laws Resolutions and Memorials of the State
of Montana Passed by the Thirteenth Regular Session of the
Legislative Assembly (held January 6-March 6, 1913), ch. 52,
sec. 16, p. 95,
^^Montana,R.R.' & Pub, Serv, Comm'n,, Sixth Annual
Report, I912-I913» p. 166, and Seventh Annual Report, 19131914.pp, 226-234,
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of utility securities and stock option plans.No
securities analyst has been retained by the Commission to
aid in the scrutiny of these stock issuances.
Also, the Commission often arbitrates disputes be
tween utilities azid their customers. These disputes con
cern service shutoffs for non-payment of bills, meter and
billing accuracy, and feasibility studies for expanded
service.
Staff and Budget
To help in its regulatory efforts, the Commission
retains an l8-meraber staff that includes two attorneys, a
rate analyst, an executive secretary, an accountant, a
hearings reporter, eight inspectors, and four secretaries.77
Only occasionally has it hired experts to help it make
utility plant or cost of capital valuations.'^
The Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission
spent 1213,355 in 1968 to regulate 664 transportation utilities and 194- non-transportation utilities.79 In that year,
^^Montana, Revised Codes (19^7), sec, 70-117.1.
^^Senate, State Utility Commissions. 1967, p. 16 insert;
Interview with Bruce Tomko, Montana Railroad Comm'n. staff,
April 17, 1970,
"^^The Commission has hired the following rate experts:
1961 Montana Power gas rate case, J, W. Kushing (^:4,106.9^
fee); I965 Montana-Dakota Utilities Rate Case, Oregon firm
of Cornell, Rowland, Hayes and Merryfield (^^6,^84- fee); 1967
Mountain Bell rate case» Dr. Thatcher, professor of business
economics at the University of Wisconsin ($4,765 fee).
^^Ibid,, p. Z2 insert, and p. 3^ insert. See also.
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the Montana Power Company spent almost half that much,
$82,914,20, while pursuing only one rate increase request.
(The Montana Consumers' Council spent #15,000 opposing that
increase,)
The number of utilities the Commission must regulate
is rapidly increasing. In 1970, Commissioner Louis G. Boedecker said, "The total number of utilities under our juris
diction is in excess of 225. Under the motor carrier act,
we regulate approximately 1,000 motor carriers, , , , Each
year the Montana Commission performs over 200 desk audits
and several detailed field audits
Perhaps one of the reasons the Commission has not
hired more staff to better scrutinize utilities is that it
is often thought of as a court. The Montana Supreme Court
reflected this train of thought in a 1957 rate increase
case when it ruled: "The Public Service Commission is a court
Montana, Executive Budget 1969-1971, p. 23.' Electric and
telephone cooperatives have been exempted from regulation by
the legislature because cooperatives are customer-owned and
are regulated by the people they serve.
^^Letter from W. M. Johnson, auditor, Montana Public
Service Comm'n,, April 10, I969. Montana Power is also
reported to have spent $300,000 preparing for this rate case.
See U.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Hearings' on
S, 607, To Establish an Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel,
91st Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1969, p. 151. Cited hereinafter as
Senate, S_, 607 Hearings, I969.
0-1

Louis G, Boedecker, "Public Utility Rate Increases
and Consumer Protection," Speech to the Montana Farmer-Labor
Institute, Missoula, Montana February 1, 1970, pp, 7, 14-,
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and does not need to make an independent determination of
whether a utility is presenting proper figures for ratemaking purposes,"

Op

This means that the Public Service Com

mission can blindly accept the evidence presented it by a
utility if nobody appears in opposition. The Commission
does doublecheck some utility figures, however. During the
1968 Montana Power rate raise request, some members of the
Commission staff spent several days reviewing Company oper
ations in Butte,
Because of the small Public Service Commission budget
and the lack of utility experts employed by the Commission,
directors of the Montana Consumers' Council felt that they
needed help in determining the validity of utility rate
raise requests. They filled this void by hiring an expert
of their own. The mobilization of resources to hire a con
sumer representative in the I968 Montana Power rate case is
discussed in the following chapter.

The People's Voice, March 22, 1957. Note the Court's
inconsistency by comparing this statement with that cited in
footnote 4-4, Chapter II.

CHAPTER III
CONSUMER INTERESTS MOBILIZE
Consumers Determine Effect of Rate Raise
Rate Raise Effects on Resi
dential Electric and Gas
Customers
Consumer concern in the Montana Power Company rate
raise case was first stirred when the utility's February 14,
1968, news release carried by the Associated Press claimed
the proposed "increase would be about 15|- per cent, based
on anticipated 1969 revenues,"^ Eugene P, Pike, general
manager of the Missoula Electric Cooperative, wrote the
Public Service Commission for a copy of Montana Power's
petition and discovered that the percentage increase would
not fall evenly on all of the utility's customers.
Power companies generally maintain different rate
schedules governing the sale of energy to residential, com
mercial, and industrial customers. Street and yard lighting,
and irrigation pumping charges are figured independently
of these schedules.
Pike found that Montana Power's average residential
^The Missoulian. February 14-, I968, p, 1.
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electric user (4^0 kilowatt hours) would have his bill
increased by 27f per cent or #31.68 a year.

The commercial

consumer or small businessman would witness his electrical
costs rise by 23 per cent,^ And gas consumers using less
than 5,000>000 cubic feet of gas per month would experience
a cost increase of 26 per cent or more.^
Pike's findings, published in The People's Voice,
gave Montanans who were already predisposed to mistrust the
Company reason to believe Montana Power was bending statis
tics to mislead the public about the extent of the proposed
increase,^ If residential and small business users were
being asked to bear the burden of most of the increase, they
reasoned, energy cost increases of industrial users must be
very slight. Other Montanans, working independently of Pike,
thought it might be a good idea to find out why.
Concerned Consumers' Council
The first group opposition to the rate raise appeared
in Billings, Montana, where Jerome J, Cate, a lawyer,
p
Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The
Montana Power Company Schedules GS-64 and R-68a (proposed).
Docket NoT 3^9^
^Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The
Montana Power Company Schedules GS-64 and GS-68a (proposed),
Docket No. 5698.
4Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The
Montana Power Company Schedules GSG-62 and GSG-68 (proposed),
Docket NÔI 35^9^
^The People's Voice, March 15, 19^8, p. 2.
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spearheaded the Concerned Consumers' Council, Cate, whose
opposition to Montana Power crystalized during an intern
ship he served in Senator Lee Metcalf's office, worked with
the Consumers' president, Erail Sewell, to raise money and
circulate anti-rate raise petitions. The efforts of this
group were aborted because of a lack of sustaining leader
ship, Mr, Cate, who was already busy with his law practice
and his position as Montana Civil Rights Coordinator, became
involved in presidential politics as Montana coordinator
of the Robert Kennedy campaign. îlr. Sewell also encountered
health problems that pre-empted him from devoting much time
to the Consumers' efforts. The Concerned Consumers raised
only $2^.^ Its main achievement was to distribute the
anti-rate raise petitions and to act as the Billings branch
of a more active group that was forming—the Montana Consumers'
Council,
Rate Increase Effects
on a Town
Strangely enough, the Montana Consumers' Council got
its leaders because of a poorly executed Montana Power
public relations program that v;as designed to break the news
gently to local officials about how much they could expect
their energy budgets to increase. As part of this program,
Montana Power personnel met with municipal officials in
several places to explain the rate increase request. The
Telephone interview with Jerome J. Cate, lawyer
from Billings. Montana. September S. 1968.
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Company official who contacted Mayor William E, Hunt of
Chester failed to engender good will, however.
Hunt, whose small town of 1,158 people is located
between Shelby and Havre on Montana's "high line," said he
was told by a Company official, not asked, to increase
Chester's electric energy budget by 15 per cent. Hunt
resented the Company official's order as premature, especi
ally since hearings had not yet been held on the merits of
the rate increase request,
"The rate increase does not bother me as much as our
lack of political freedom and I intend to fight for that as
well as the dollars involved," Hunt wrote to Senator Lee
Metcalf on April 24, 1968.^
Hunt began a close examination of the rate increase
application filed with the Montana Public Service Commission,
He discovered that the Company was asking for a general
electric schedule (GS-68) rate increase of 25 per cent. Yet
the Company official had suggested that city electric rates,
which are figured under this schedule, would only increase
by 15 per cent. Mayor Hunt said that this indicated that
the 25 per cent increase was neither needed nor expected by
the Company, and that Company officials were "just going
to give the commission/er^ something to cut off there
"^Letter from Hon. William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester,
Montana April 24, I968.
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so they could go to the voters . .

and claim they had
g

trimmed the fat from Montana Power's request.
As part of his examination, Mayor Hunt reviewed
Chester's energy budgets. He found that the tovm was
paying the Company 15 per cent more for electricity than it
had 10 years previously. He said, "Between I966 and I968
the amount Chester paid Montana Power for utility facilities
used by the tovm increased about $1,700 from $8,300 to
o
$10,000," Hunt determined that this increase in Company
revenue was due not to increases in investment by Montana
Power, but "to a small but steady growth in the town,"
He said the city was using more power because of "additions
to the sewer system with more lift stations with their
electric pumps; greater use of water that had to be
lifted out of Tiber Reservoir to settling basins near town,
/ând7 then to the water tank, , ,
Hunt said, "Our activities, the people's activities,
the consumers' activities, not the Power Company's, enlarged
the use of electricity." Hunt could not remember seeing
the Company "so much as put in a new insulator in the
last 10 years. , .
^Senate,
607 Hearings, 1969, p. 148.
Q
^Interview with Hon. William E, Hunt, mayor of
Chester, Montana, July 24-, I968.
^^Senate,
l^Ibid,

607 Hearings, 1969, pp, 148-49.
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He said he could not understand why the Company now
needed more money from Chester's citizens when it had not
done anything to deserve more. The Company's revenue from
the city of Chester had already increased 15 per cent between
1957 and 1967 because of increased electricity usage.
Mayor Hunt, however, said, "I am not a rate expert
nor do I pretend to be."12 And realizing that the Company's
situation might be different in places other than Chester,
Hunt, acting in the consumers' interest, began calling for
an investigation by qualified personnel to see if the rate
increase was necessary,
Montana Consumers' Council
Chester Town Council Seeks
Allies to Help Investigate
Need for Rate Raise
First, Mayor Hunt presented the problem to the Chester
Town Council. The Council adopted a resolution requesting
investigation of the rate increase request. It asked the
other 126 incorporated Montana cities to join Chester by
helping pay the cost of hiring a qualified rate expert to
represent the consumers when the request was heard by the
Railroad and Public Service Commission, The response to this
plea resulted in the formation of the Montana Consumers'
Council, the major opponent to Montana Power's rate in
crease request. The details of the Council's formation and
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its effectiveness in combatting the increase are the major
topics of this study and will be investigated in this and
later chapters.
On April 2, 1968, the Chester, Montana, Town Council
resolved that its "duty was
to investigate and report to the people matters
of concern that affect the well being of the town
and its inhabitants including any act which increases
taxes on the state and county as well as the town
level,13
It found that if the Montana Power Company raised its rates
the resulting increase in Chester's gas and electricity costs
would require "an additional tax of more than one and
three quarters (1 3/^) mills

." before the toim's energy

bill could be paid.
Chester's mayor, William E. Hunt, said that in tax
dollar terms the increase would
cost more than #1.00 per year for each man,
woman and child for the tovm alone. In the past,
the increase to the /non-government/ individual
user has been much more. Only a rate expert can
tell how much more.^^
The council felt the town of Chester lacked the
resources to investigate the need for Montana Power's
requested gas and electric rate increase. Nor could the
^^Chester Tovm Council, "Resolution to Investigate
Power and Natural Gas Rates," Chester, Montana, April 2, I968.
^^Ibid. One mill equals one-tenth of one cent (#.001).
^•^Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester,
Montana, to 126 Montana Cities, April 22, I968,

council, by itself, effectively oppose any increase not
shovm to be in the public interest. But a combination of
cities and towns could muster the resources to hire an
independent rate expert to conduct such an investigation.
So in a resolution, the Chester Toivn Council urged other
cities to join it in underwriting the cost of an independent
investigation.
"No stronger force can be developed than the
local municipal governments," Mayor Hunt wrote on April 22,
1968.^^ He was relaying the Chester Council's message to
Montana's 126 incorporated tovms and cities, asking them to
form a phalanx of query, capable of probing the need for any
utility rate increase. "If the rates were justified," said
Hunt,"we would have to be satisfied and adjust our budget
accordingly."17 But first, he said, consumers should
determine whether or not the requested rates can be justified.
Support for an Independent Rate
Investigation Is Sought from
Montana Municipal League Members
Mayor Hunt said he planned to gain support for an
independent investigation of Montana Power's rate increase
request during a meeting of the Montana Municipal League on
l^Ibid.
17
Senate, S_^ 607 Hearings, 1969, p. l49.
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May 10, 1968.^^ He hoped the League would pass a resolu
tion calling for an independent investigation. And he told
a Billings Gazette reporter that he had "received encourage
ment from Butte Mayor Tom Powers, Great Palls Mayor John
McLaughlin and Havre Mayor Pete Hamilton, . , ,"19
Mayor Thomas F, Powers was president of the Montana
Municipal League. His support would greatly aid the passage
of any resolution proposed to the League, Hunt tried to
jell Powers' support by sending him an advanced copy of the
letter Hunt was composing to request money from the cities.
In a note that accompanied that advance, Hunt outlined his
strategy for forming a Consumers' Council and restated his
belief that Powers would back the forming of such a coalition.20
As mayor of Great Falls, Montana's second largest
city, and as second vice-president of the Montana Municipal
League, John J, McLaughlin would also be a valued ally to
the consumer effort. In the 1966 Democratic primary
McLaughlin had sought nomination to the Montana Railroad and
Public Service Commission and lost by 904 votes to incumbent
^®The Montana Municipal League changed its name to
the Montana League of Toi-ms and Cities in August I968,
^^The People's Voice, April 26, 1968, p. 1 (reprinted
from The Billings Gazette).
20

Letter from Hon. William E, Hunt, mayor of Chester,
Montana, to Mayor Thomas Powers of Butte, Montana, president
of the Montana Municipal League, April 16, 1968.
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Louis G, Boedecker. In that election McLaughlin had been
supported by persons who were now emerging as leaders and
supporters of the consumers' movement. Persons, for example,
like consumers' lawyer Leo C. Graybill, Jr.-, and public
relations man, Joseph A. Renders.
Mayor Powers' role at the League meeting.—The support
Mayor Hunt had anticipated from the Municipal League's May
meeting did not materialize, however. Mayor Powers describes
the League meeting as follows:
Mr, Hunt was granted every courtesy and ample time
to present his proposal at G1endive. He spoke for at
least twenty (20) minutes but failed to arouse much
sympathy from any of the mayors present. Five dele
gates were on their feet vying for permission to move
for referral of the entire matter to the Railroad and
Public Service Commission, . .
Powers was not active in organizing mayoral support for the
consumer coalition/ He said:
My interest at the Glendive Meeting of May 10th,
1968, was directed entirely toward my personal goals
of reorganizing the League of Cities, relocating its
offices in Helena, getting a new^director at the helm
and achieving fiscal stability.
Mayor McLaughlin's role at the League meeting.—Mayor
McLaughlin, whom Hunt said had encouraged a consumers' plea
to the League, did not favor Municipal League investigation
of the rate increase/ McLaughlin said he desired to avoid
Montana Power opposition to important city programs that the
Letter from Hon. Thomas P. Powers, former president
of the Montana Municipal League, to the author, January 13,
1970.
^^Ibid,
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Leagu.e vrould present to the I969 Montana Legislature,23
League support of an independent investigation could have
sparked reprisal against League-sponsored legislation by
powerful Company lobbyists,
McLaughlin apparently experienced a conflict of
interest about whom he should represent at the Municipal
League meeting. He later said of his non-support of the
Consumers• Council:
I am Mayor of all the people in Great Palls, not just
the Democrats.' The Montana Power Company is our
county's largest taxpayer. The City of Great Palls .
trades land and does much other business with them.
One observer speculated that the reason Mayor McLaugh
lin refused to support the Consumers' Council was that he
was in line to become president of the Montana Municipal
League and did not want Montana Power to oppose his candi
dacy, McLaughlin declined to comment upon this speculation,
^^Telephone interview with Hon, John J. McLaughlin,
mayor of Great Palls, Montana, May 9» 1968.
2U

Letter from Hon. John J. McLaughlin, mayor of Great
Falls, Montana, to the author, January 3, 1970. Mayor
McLaughlin's reference to Montana Power as Cascade "county's
largest taxpayer" can be more correctly stated "county's
largest tax-collector." Public utilities are allowed an
after-tax rate of return on their investment because taxes
are considered to be an operating expense by the Public Ser
vice Commission. Also, Montana Power has a clause in its
rate order that states, "The Company may increase the bill
for electric service supplied under this Schedule by an amount
equal to the proportionate part of any taxes other than those
in effect on February 13, 1968, subject to the prior approval
of the Montana Public Service Commission." The underlined
portion was added to the rate schedule in 1968. The date is
changed whenever a new order is issued. The tax-shifting
clause and the allowing of taxes to be included as an operating
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saying only, "It has been my experience in public life that
it is best not to go on the defensive in regard to such
matters.

It is always a case of 'who believes who?'"25

McLaughlin is now president of the Municipal League's suc
cessor, the Montana League of Cities and Towns.

But this

fact alone is not enough to substantiate the innuendo that
McLaughlin's motivations were self-seeking.

With or without

Montana Power's support, McLaughlin, as second vice-president
of the League and head of Montana's second largest city, was
a strong contender for the League presidency.

The League

often moves its officers up the ladder into its top offices.
The voting members of the Montana League of Cities and Towns
must be elected officials of a paid-up city or town.

The

Montana Power Company influences many decisions in the state,
but it is doubtful that it could control a majority of the
126 mayors who would ballot for the League's president.
less such control could be demonstrated,

Un

McLaughlin would

have no need to fear Montana Power's opposition.
Before too much significance is attached to the roles
expense work together to enable Montana Power eventually to
shift to the consumer the full anount of any tax levied upon
it. Since the Company's taxes are shifted 100 per cent to
the consumer, in the long run the Company is really a tax
collector, not a taxpayer. Thus, "tax the company" politi
cians are only taxing the Company for short periods when
they levy a new tax on it. The tax will be shifted to the
consumer at the first opportunity and Montana Power will get
the credit for providing the taxes which the consumer
actually pays,

Z^ibid.
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of Powers

and McLaughlin, it should be noted that their in

action alone could not have killed the resolution calling for
support of a Consumers* Council.

As Mayor McLaughlin points

out, "I didn't act alone in this matter.

The League has

many Republican Mayors as well as Democrats.
Mayor Hunt's analysis of the League's inaction.—•
Mayor Hunt said he feels that much of this inaction by
League mayors is due to their conservative attitude that
government should be run like a business not to hurt busi
ness.

"Montana Power lobbyist, Robert D. Corette, plays

this conservative sentiment like a symphony conductor," he
said.

"Often Corette does not even have to talk to a public

official about a subject.

He knows the man will vote in the

Company's interest because of his conservative leanings.

A

Company bought lunch every two years is enough to keep these
people in line."

Hunt said,

"The mayors would be indignant

if somebody suggested that Montana Power controlled their
vote.

They sincerely think they vote independently."^^ And

Montana Power does not destroy this belief.

Instead, the

Company relies upon the conservative tendencies of these
officials because conservative officials generally vote
"right" without being lobbied or prompted.
The League's many voting members are not the only

Z^Ibid.
^^interview with William E. Hunt, Helena, Montana,
March 27, 1970.
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people who can exert influence on it.

Private individual^'

and organizations may also exert influence by paying $100
dues each year and affiliating with the League as non-voting
associate members.

Mayor Hunt said he had been told the

Montana Power Company was a paying associate member of the
Montana League of Cities and Towns,

And, at one time, he

thought the Company's opposition as an associate member was
the reason "the League failed to act" on his resolution calling for an independent rate investigation. 28
If Montana Power did influence the League's decision
on Hunt's resolution,

it was not because of the reason men

tioned by Mayor Hunt,

The Montana Power Company is not a

paying associate member of the Montana League of Cities and
Towns,

Dan K. Mizner, executive director of the Montana

League of Cities and Towns, said:
To my knowledge no industry or company has ever
approached the League for or against any support for
legislation. Rather it has been the League asking for
their help, , , ,
Our relations with the Montana Power Company and
other industries, as well as labor organizations, have
been and will be strictly on a basis of support for
improved and good local government laws, , , , Sometimes
to get good legislation passed we have to call on
industry, labor unions and other local government
29
organizations to , , , assist us in the legislature.
Letter from the Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of
Chester, Montana, to Rev. Robert J. McEwen S.J,, Department
of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts,
July 2, 1968,
29
Letter from Dan K. Mizner, executive director of
the Montana League of Cities and Towns to the author,
December 31, 19d9. The associate members of the League are:
Thomas, Dean & Hoskins; Dain, Kalman and Quail; Washington
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The League's monthly newspaper, The Montana League of
Cities and Towns, did not report Mayor Hunt's request for
help or his speech at the May 10 meeting.

This non-

reporting, though, probably cannot be attributed to Montana
Power pressure.

The Company does not advertise in this pub

lication and therefore would not be able to withhold adver
tising if the editor did not do the Company's bidding.
Consumers' Council Organizes
Even though the Montana League of Cities and Towns
failed to support Mayor Hunt's resolution for an independent
rate investigation, the May 10 meeting provided an oppor
tunity for public officials who questioned the rate increase
request to find each other and to organize.

Ten of these men

resolved that their association known as the Montana Con
sumers' Council should become a non-profit corporation.

They

elected Mayor William E, Hunt of Chester, president; Mayor
E, 0, Pike of Superior, vice president; Mayor Victor E.
Jones of Hingham, secretary; and Mayor Roger H, Elliot of
Columbia Falls, treasurer.

The other members were made

directors of the Montana Consumers' Council,

They included

Mayor Thomas A. Pairhurst of Three Porks, Mayor W, E. Munce
of Harlowton, Mayor John L. Dunckel of Choteau, Mayor Clay H,
McCartney of Chinook, County Commissioner Pred C. Vanisko of
National Insurance Co., and Morrison-Mairele. Basil
Andrikopoulos recently quit his job as Montana Power lobbiest to work for Dain, Kalman and Quail in Billings,
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Deer Lodge County, and Councilman Owen P, McNally of Ana, 30
conda.
Mayor Hunt did not limit his support-seeking efforts
just to members of the Montana Municipal League.

To expand

his coalition, Hunt sent letters to the boards of trustees
of 164- school districts, and on June 18, to the commis
sions of all 56 Montana counties.

He invited all groups

interested in consumer affairs to join the Council, including
"hospitals, industry, and the individual taxpayer who
eventually has to pay the entire increase."

31

Hunt appealed to the presidents of 65 Democratic
Women's clubs to start a "Housewives for Reasonable Rates"
organization.
Mothers March.

It would be, he said, "as important as a
The money saved for your community means

money saved for education, health, community betterment,
recreation, and in many cases, . . . the very basic needs of
life."32
Hunt tried to attract the allegiance of the Montana
^^Mayor Munce resigned from the Council for health
reasons. Mayor McCartney resigned as mayor because of his
health, but he is still on the Council. McCartney apparently
oivns part of a natural gas interest—High Crest Oil—which
competes with Montana Power in the Bear Paw Mountains near
Havre.
31
Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester,
Montana, to 126 Montana cities, April 22, I968,
^^Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council, to 65 Democratic Women's Clubs
in Montana (no date).
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Freight Rates Association headed by Robert Pester of Hingham,
Montana.

He told Pester:

The Consumers ' Council lias devoted all of its re
sources to the immediate goal of investigating the
Montana Power Company rate increase request. But
after we have completed what we can do on gas and
electric rates, we will certainly join with you and
do what we can to lower freight rates,^3
Specifically, Hunt encouraged assistance from the
Montana APL-CIO, the Montana Farmers Union, the Montana
Associated Utilities (composed of rural electric coopera
tives), and the Montana Trial Lawyers Association.
Although Consumers' Council membership is open to all
persons or groups interested in consumer affairs. Council
officers and directors must be elected officials of a city,
county, or other bona fide governmental organization.

Finan

cial contributions to the Council are accepted from anyone.
Consumers' Council Seeks
Money to Hire a Rate Expert
To raise money for an independent investigation of
Montana Power's rate increase request, the Council asked
that all cities, counties, and school districts pay dues of
10 cents for every person within their governmental boun
daries if these boundaries were also in the Montana Power
Company's service area.

Local governments in areas not

served by Montana Power were asked to donate

five cents for

^^Interview with Hon, William E, Hunt, president of
Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, August 8, I968,
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each person within their boundaries.

Statewide consumer sup

port was sought because taxpaying Montanans who are not in the
Montana Power Company service area are affected by a utility
rate increase.

To pay an increased state energy bill, state

taxes are raised uniformly for all taxpayers regardless of
their location in or out of a utility's service area.
Mayor Hunt told the people from whom he was seeking
money that he planned to retain Dr. David A, Kosh as the
Consumers' Council rate expert.

In the early spring of 1968,

Hunt had flown at his own expense to Washington, D.C., to
find a rate expert.

He asked the advice of U.S. Senator Lee

Metcalf and his administrative aid, Vic Reinemer.

They were

able to suggest names of several utility rate experts for
Hunt to contact.
The first expert Hunt contacted was John W, Cragun,
He had helped the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes of
the Flathead Indian Reservation increase by $700,000 Montana
Power's rent for tribal land use.

He said that since one of

Montana Power's justifications for a rate increase was its
increased cost of leasing Indian lands, it would be embarrassing
for the consumers to have him fight such an increase.

This

expert said that somebody should fight the increase, however,
because in his opinion Montana Power did not need it.
also gave Hunt another list of experts to contact.

He

Hunt com

pared that list with the one given him by Vic Reinemer and
found that the name of Dr. David A. Kosh was on both lists.
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Dr, Kosh told Hunt that he knew and liked Metcalf and
Reineraer, but that he had no ax to grind about Montana
Power's alleged overcharge as they did.

He said he did not

represent just one type of client such as consumers, but that
he had represented all types including public service com
missions, companies and consumers.

He said he would work

for the Consumers' Council if he would be free to examine
the Company books and let the facts speak for themselves,
and if the consumers would accept the outcome of such an
investigation.

Mayor Hunt agreed and Kosh was hired at a

fee of between $5»000 and $25,000, depending on the work.

3^

Hunt recalls that "After an examination of Montana
Power's records, Kosh told me 'It is unconscionable that a
company would ask for a rate increase under these circum
stances. ' "
Mayor Hunt said, "I probably would not have continued
with the consumer movement if either of the experts I con
tacted had said the increase was justified.'

But they both

egged me on.
The Consumers' Council directors had originally hoped
to raise |150,000,

Mayor Hunt wrote to Roger H. Elliot,

^^The name of George P. Hess, the engineer who was
later hired for $5,000 by the Montana Railroad and Public Ser
vice Commission, was also on the list Cragun gave to Hunt.
Kosh, the consumers' expert, was sought after by the Montana
Railroad and Public Service Commission, but it decided it
could not afford his fee of $15,000.
^•^Intervievj with Hon. William E, Hunt, president of
the Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, August 8, 1968.
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the Council's treasurer, "I would judge that the total cost
of this hearing will be somewhere in the vicinity of $35,000
to $40,000,"^^

Any leftover money was to be used for appeals

and legislative lobbying.
Early attempts to gain money were unfruitful, however,
and on May 27, 1968, Senator Lee Metcalf wrote to Hunt:
I am sorry that the support you sought to generate for
the rate case did not develop as hoped, but am pleased
to see that you and Bill Leaphart /consumer lawyer/ r,n
and a few others are going to follow through anyway.
By June 4-, Hunt announced "We have actually organized drives
in four counties and . • . expect to have organizations in
thirty to forty counties by June twentieth with the help of
several groups that have contacted me—mostly farm and labor
organizations with several individual businessmen indicating
they will help."^^
He wrote 24 interest-group leaders and asked them to
attend a June 7 meeting in Helena, Montana.

To those 10 to

12 people who attended the meeting, he outlined the following
instructions on how to organize their counties:
^^Letter from Hon, William E, Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council, to Hon, Roger H. Elliott, mayor
of Columbia Falls, Montana, June I3, I968.
^^Letter from Sen, Lee Metcalf to Hon, William E,
Hunt, president of the Montana Consumers' Council, May 27,
1968. "
^^Letter from Hon. William E, Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council, to 24 interest group leaders asking
them to attend a June 7 meeting in Helena, Montana, June 4,
1968,
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1.

2.

3.

Call a public meeting to organize a county
A, Form a group to circulate petitions door to
door at every business and house in county
B. Form telephone committee to call persons and
tell them of the petitions and need for
signatures and donations
Make sure people understand the need for action
A. There will be an increase in property tax if
the increase is granted whether or not a person
is served by Montana Power
B.' Tax greatest in areas served by Montana Power
C. Increase will stunt economic growth
Many people will contribute because:
A. The rate increase is to pay for cost of MPC*s
expansion into areas adequately served by other
utilities
B, Customers not only have to pay a reasonable
rate of return to MPC investors but have to
supply those investors through retained earn
ings with the capital which they must pay the
return on
C. MPC needs money to build gas import lines from
Canada, but it can be served by Montana develop
ment
D, Rate of return is already high
E/ Return is going out of state

Consumers' Council Seeks
More Time to Organize
Organization of the counties did not progress as
planned.

By mid-June it became apparent that the consumers

needed more time to raise money to pay their advocates.
Also, consumer rate expert Dr. David A. Kosh and consumer
attorneys

C.W, Leaphart, Jr., Leo C. Graybill, Jr., and

Oscar Hendrickson needed more time to prepare their case be
cause Montana Power had not yet provided some information
Dr. Kosh had requested.

That information would require

time to analyze.
Hunt summarized the situation:
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We had about three months to prepare our case and
counted completely upon free will donations. Robert D,
Corette said after the first day of hearings that it
took them three years to prepare Montana Power's case.
And the |300,000 he said it cost for preparation and
presentation can be passed on to its customers in
the electric bill. Under state law, this is considered
an operating cost of doing business which can legally
be included in the rate structure. Unfortunately,
there is no provision for financing preparation and
presentation of the public's case.^"
In addition to needing more time, the Council members
realized that a delay in the hearing would cause a delay in
the increase if the Company was successful in getting one.
Such a delay would forestall increased utility bills and be
"worth from a few dollars to the pensioner to several
hundred dollars to businessmen, , , . town, county, and
state," according to Mayor Hunt,
Taking all these things into consideration, Leaphart
asked the Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission for
a delay in the second half of the hearing.

The Commission

delayed cross-examination one month, from July 9 to August 7,
to give Montana Power time to submit some requested informa
tion.

Kosh wrote the Public Service Commission that he would

have difficulty appearing for a public hearing on August 7
39
Interview with Hon, William E, Hunt, president of
the Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, July 24,
1968,
^^Letter from Hon, William E, Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council to Willis M, McKeon, Malta,
Montana, attorney, June 13, 1968,
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because of prior commitments in Colorado and Puerto Rico,^^
So Kosh could appear, Leaphart tried to reschedule the
hearing for August 19.
The Commission's counsel, William E, O'Leary, replied
to Leaphart on July 2, 1968, "The Board /of Public Service
Commissioner^Z is unwilling to continue the date for
cross-examination because of the delay which such a con
tinuance would occur /sic/ in these proceedings,"

Also,

Leaphart's request was denied because Public Service Com
missioner Paul T. Smith had planned to attend the Democratic
National Convention during the time Leaphart had suggested
for the hearing.
Leaphart wrote Kosh that the hearing was still set
for August 7 and explained, "I am aware of the fact that
quite often there is an extended interval between cross and
direct examination, , • . but in Montana this is quite an
42
acquiescence to modern rate making,"
On August 7) Dr. Kosh was in Colorado on a rate case
as he said he would be.

Leaphart again asked for a delay

until September when Kosh could be present.

Montana Power

counsel, Robert D. Corette, protested Leaphart*s request as
^^Letter from Dr. David A. Kosh, Montana Consumers'
Council utility consultant, to Montana Public Service
Commission, June 21, I968.
llO

Letter from C, W, Leaphart, Jr,, Montana Consumers'
Council lawyer, to Dr. David A, Kosh, Montana Consumers'
Council utility consultant, July 8, I968,
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"unfair, unusual, auid completely unwarranted."^3 Leaphart's
request for a delay was denied, but the Commission did
schedule a time in September for Kosh to appear.
In the event that his request would be denied, Leaphart had gone over some to the cross-examination that Kosh
wanted undertaken,

Kosh also sent his associate, Mr, Glass-

man, to help Leaphart during part of the August hearing.
The timing of the second half of the split rate hear
ing was advantageous to the Montana Power Company,

It was

conducted during the National Republican Presidential Nomi
nating Convention when many of Helena's newsmen were in
Florida and when the attention of the nation was pre-empted
from following the reporting of cross-examination and rebut
tal of Company witnesses.

The Company had gotten its side

to the press and the people in May when there was little to
detract from it.

But in August, when the protestants had a

chance to challenge Company testimony, they had to compete
for attention with many exciting events.

Also, the pro

testants were handicapped by the denial of a hearing delay
because their chief rate expert. Dr. Kosh, was not able to
attend any of the 11 days of testimony or cross-examination,
Kosh did, however, prepare from the transcript of testimony
and cross-examination, a statement which he read on behalf
of the consumers at a short hearing September 3.

ho

Kosh was

^John J. Morrison (Associated Press), The Missoulian.
August 8, 1968, p. 20.
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the only expert testifying on any of the hearing dates who
conducted a computer analysis of Montana Power's rate
structure.
J.D. Holmes, reporter for the Associated Press, wrote
an account of the September 3 hearing and devoted 12 column
inches to Dr, Kosh's testimony,'

On September 4, 1968, the

story appeared on page seven of the Great Falls Tribune.
During the first three days in May,

the Tribune had carried

four front-page stories (5^ column inches of print) about
Company experts' testimony.

Another 26 column inches of

print, continuing these front-page stories,were printed on
other pages of the paper.
The Montana Standard of Butte played the Kosh story
prominently on the front page and continued it to page two.
May stories on Company rate experts were positioned, pagewise, in the same manner as the story on Dr. Kosh,

But,

Company experts were given three times the space that the
consumers' expert was given.44
The Billings Gazette ran the AP story at the bottom
of page one, but edited out six column inches of Dr. Kosh's
testimony.' On that day. Gazette editors played stories on
the Czechoslovak insurrection,

Mayor Daley of Chicago, a

Turkish earthquake, and Montana's then emerging New Reform
Political Party ahead of the consumer expert's testimony.
^^The Montana Standard, September 4, I968, p. 1,
and May 2 and 3» 1968, p. 1.
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The story on testimony for the consumer was positioned better
than May accounts of Company testimony, which appeared on
pages 12 and 17 of the Gazette.

But, Company experts garnered

three times the newspaper space alloted to the consumer
expert.
The extra time to prepare testimony granted the Con
sumers* Council did little to help organizational efforts
that continued to bog down.

On July 10th, Roger H. Elliot

reported to Hunt that the Council had only received $1,179»
Hunt traveled to Butte, Missoula, and Great Falls to meet
with businessmen in continuing fund-raising efforts.

He

also asked Francis J. McCarvel, a Kalispell attorney, to
raise some money.

McCarvel made a few contacts, but did not

have time to do much.
At the suggestion of the Farmers* Union, the Council
finally decided to hire Charles A, Banderob of Huntley,
Montana, to travel the state as a professional fund raiser.
Banderob was hired in August, and it was agreed that he would
get approximately 25 per cent of what he collected to help
defray his expenses and to pay his wages.

By the final day

of hearings testimony on September 3, it was reported that
Banderob had collected an after-commission net total of
$210.36 for the Council.

When Banderob was finished, he had

traveled for three weeks, and put more than 5,000 miles on
^^The Billings Gazette, September 4, 1968, p. 1;
May 2, 1968, p. 12; and May 3» 1968, p. 17.
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his car.

He had raised about |5,000—one-third of all the

46

money the Consumers' Council finally collected.

Banderob's

commission did not pay his expenses because he had to hire a
man to run his farm while he traveled.
Reception of Consumers' Council
Request for Aid
Consumer Council efforts to raise money and gain mem
bers were disappointing to Mayor Hunt.

Only 21 of Montana's

126 municipalities, none of its $6 counties, and three of
its l64 school districts donated to the Council.
Support for Council
One town sent Mayor Hunt a blank claim in which the
dues amount was not filled in."

He returned the claim and

asked the town clerk if she would fill in the amount of money
the town wanted to give to the council.
Raymond Hokanson, superintendent-clerk of Livingston
School District Number Four, wrote Hunt that the district
trustees had met at their annual budget meeting on June 24,

1968, and "voiced their wholehearted support of your cause.
However, it is impossible for our school board to set aside
^^Interview with William E. Hunt, president of Montana
Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, September 3, I968; and
Senate, S. 607 Hearings, 1969, p. 151.
47The names of the cities and individuals who donated
to the Consumers' Council have been withheld at Mayor Hunt's
request. He said he wants the names withheld to prevent any
reprisal Montana Power may take against its known opponents.
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money for this purpose,"

I3

Although the Consumers* Council

was made aware of the Livingston School trustees' feelings,
this sentiment was never communicated to the body that had
to judge on the rate request—the Montana Public Service
Commission,
Mr. T, L, Forehand, mayor of Joliet, Montana, did not
communicate with the Consumers' Council, but he did send a
letter on April 22, 1968, to the Montana Public Service Com
mission opposing the rate raise.

He said the increase would

be a hardship on schools and complained that Montana Power's
service to his town had been poor.

Other governments that

were not in close contact with the consumers but that wrote
the Public Service Commission opposing the rate raise in
clude:

The Columbia Falls School District Trustees, the

Hill County Board of Commissioners, Sanders County School
District Number Two, and the Anaconda City Council.
Mayor Hershel M, Robbins wrote the Public Service
Commission that the Roundup City Council was unanimously
opposed to a Montana Power rate raise.

But he wrote Mayor

Hunt that he did not want to use city or Montana Municipal
League funds to hire an independent rate expert.

Robbins

said the state already had "sufficient experts" on its pay
roll who would listen to the citizens' protests and act
according to their wishes.

It is interesting to note that

^^Letter from Raymond Hokanson, superintendent-clerk
of Livingston School District Number Four, to Mayor William E.
Hunt, president of Montana Consumers' Council, June 25, 1968.
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Bobbins communicated his feelings to Hunt on April 23, I968,
before the Public Service Commission had hired an expert to
help determine the validity of Montana Power's rate increase
request.

Indeed, the Public Service Commission did not even

hire its consulting engineer, George P. Hess, until the end
of June—a month and a half after the first part of the rate
hearing was over.^^
Opposition to Council
Two municipalities wrote Hunt expressing opposition
to the Council,

One of these, West Yellowstone, Montana, is

not supplied with energy from the Montana Power Company
according to the town's mayor, Billie B. Smith,

Smith wrote

that his tovm council "feels that the Montana Public Service
Commission will not allow an unfair rate increase,
Mayor Walter H. Myers of Virginia City, Montana, wrote
his opposition to the Consumers' Council idea:
Our city Council any myself personally believe
that when we become smart enough to manage the Mon
tana Power Co., we will then have reason to believe
we can tell them when to raise or lower their rates,^
kg

The People's Voice, June 28, I968, p. 4.

^^Letter from Hon, Billie B, Smith, mayor of West
Yellowstone, Montana, to William E, Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council, June 21, I968,
^^Letter from Hon. Walter H.' Myers, mayor of Virginia
City, Montana, to William E. Hunt, president of the Montana
Consumers' Council, received by Hunt on April 29, 1968,
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The rest of the local governments let the issue melt
into oblivion.

At its May 9» 1968, meeting, the Red Lodge,

Montana, council considered the Consumers' Council's request
for aid and referred it to the Montana Municipal League for
action.
The Whitefish, Montana, council wrote Mayor Hunt on
May 8, 1968, that it was holding off action on the consumers'
aid request for one week while it studied the matter.

The

Whitefish Council's final decision was never relayed to
Mayor Hunt.
The Ronan city clerk informed Mayor Hunt on July 2,

1968, that as part of the only government retail power sell
ing outlet in Montana, the Flathead Irrigation Project,
Ronan citizens enjoyed the lowest rates in the state.

The

clerk wrote:
As our power in this area is furnished by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, we do not feel it would
serve any useful purpose to attempt to resist any
rate increases.
Bozeman, Montana's city manager, Oscar E. Cutting,
wanted to know the attitude of the Montana Municipal League
about the Consumers' Council before he would make any com
ments,=

After finding out that the League had failed to sup

port the Consumers' Council and after working up a preliminary
budget for the city, Cutting wrote Hunt that he found it
necessary to inform the Bozeman City Commission
that we would be completely unable to come up with
a contribution along the line solicited by your let
ter and the City Attorney also advised the Commission

95

that he felt there could be a serious question as
to the legality of such an expenditure,-52
Mayor McLaughlin of Great Palls said that Mayor
Hunt's request for help from the city of Great Palls would be
presented to the city council.

But he did not think that it

would help the request if he championed a resolution support
ing a consumer movement.

Despite the fact that a majority of

the council is in the same political party as the mayor, he
felt that they were an independent bunch and said, "I can
not tell them what to do."^^
Butte equivocates,—In Butte, Montana, according to
former mayor Thomas P, Powers, "A motion passed unani
mously concurring with Mr, Hunt's request for ten (10) cents
per person to form the . ,• , 'consumer coalition,'"

Exactly

what happened to this resolution is unclear because the
Butte City Council has no taped or written record of the
resolution,'

Powers, however, said, "The rate expert

/Dr, KoshZ proposed by Mr,' Hunt was already conducting such
an investigation for the Railroad and Public Service Commis
sion hence we would have been paying an exorbitant fund for
a mere copy of a previous survey,This belief was
•^^Letter from Oscar E, Cutting, city manager of Bozeman, Montana, to William E, Hunt, president of the Montana
Consumers' Council, June 20, 1968,

•53interview with John J. McLaughlin, op., c i t .
Letter from Thomas P, Powers, op. cit.
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erroneous, but apparently it was enough to convince the
Butte Council not to donate to the Consumers' Council,'
resolution, if ever passed, was apparently rescinded.

The
And

Butte's city attorney, William N. Geagan, was sent to pro
test the rate raise at the Helena hearing,

Geagan questioned

only one Montana Power witness and did not file a brief in
protest.

It is also possible that the donation at this time

of $100,000 to build Butte's first public swimming pool by
Montana Power's board chairman, J, E, Corette, might have
generated enough good feeling toward the Company to prevent
effective opposition to the rate increase request.
Montana bank examiner questions contributions to the
Council.—One of the main obstacles the Consumers' Council
had in getting contributions was the questioning by different
sources of the legality of such contributions.

This question

came into the open July 11, 19^8, when Albert E. Leuthold,
Montana's State Bank Examiner, wrote Mayor Hunt asking,
"By what authority do you feel the municipality can legally
make a contribution to this organization?"

Leuthold said

that "if there is a legal question involved we would be
glad to request an Attorney General's Opinion."

The Bank

Examiner's allegations of impropriety were carried widely
by the press.
Mayor Hunt said he thought the letter from the Bank
Examiner's office was inspired by the Montana Power Company
and was an attempt to discourage the collection of money by
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his consumers' protection association.
Leuthold, however> said that his inquiry was a matter
of routine investigation^

"office received an inquiry

from the Meagher County Commissioners about the propriety of
Mayor Hunt's request for funds," said Leuthold,

"One of

our field auditors also noticed a donation to the Consumers'
group while going over the Deer Lodge city books and asked
us if it was acceptable,"

He said that other than these two

requests, nobody has asked for clarification of the issue and
that to his knowledge no one from the Power Company or Governor
Babcock's office had prompted the requests.

The auditor

who called the donations to Leuthold's attention said that
no Montana Power Company representative had asked him to do
so, but that he had done it on his own.^^

Leuthold had

written Hunt on July 11, 1968, that he did not take "issue
with the merits of the cause for which you work or ques
tion Municipal officials personal and private activities , ,
Two months before the Bank Examiner had questioned
donations to the Consumers' Council, Hunt had anticipated a
challenge.

He wrote to the Montana Trial Lawyers Association

and asked them to help prepare a brief if the matter came up
in court.

The trial lawyers never did prepare a brief, but

•^•^Interview with A.' E. Leuthold, Montana State Bank
Examiner, August l6, 1968.
^^Telephone interview with Basil Kennedy, auditor for
the Montana State Bank Examiner, August l6, 1968.

."
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some of them talked with Hunt about the legality of the pro
posed contributions.^?
On July 16, 1968, Mayor Hunt replied to Bank Examiner
Leuthold that :
Contributions were made on the theory that towns
and cities could join together for a common good in
the same manner they could join the Municipal League
to further the needs of municipality, , . ,
When Montana Power Company advised the cities and
tovms to increase their budget for gas and electri
city by 15/0 it became a matter of concern to the
cities and tovms and I believe it was incumbent upon
the cities and towns to investigate the need for the
rate and to furnish evidence of the results of the
investigation to the Public Service Commission, , , ,
Because the hearings required special experience
and training, the municipalities, instead of sending
their own town or city attorney to the hearing,
pooled their resources and under the authority of
Section 11-811 RCM 19^7» . . , made contributions
to a single organization.
That section of the law provides in part;
Nothing herein shall be taken or construed as
preventing the city council from employing other
and additional counsel in special cases, and pro
viding for the payment of such services.
Hunt did not tell Leuthold about another law, Section

11-989 RCM 1947, which states:
The council of any incorporated city or town shall
have power, by ordinance, to provide for and regulate
the inspection and the measurement of gas, electric,
or other light, and electric or other power, sold
within its limits or brought into or carried through
any such city or town.
^^Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt to Wade J, Dahood,
Anaconda, Montana, president of Montana Trial Lawyers Associ
ation, April 23, 1968,
•^^Montana, Revised Codes (1947), sec, II -989.

99

Hunt said he felt this section confirmed the legality of
contributions to the Consumers' Council, but wanted to
reserve its mention as an ace in the hole in case he had to
defend contributions in court.
Hunt also had an informal discussion with the Attorney
General's office about the legality of the contributions and
concluded that he did not "know what the result of an
Attorney General * s opinion would be but . . . it appears
that they would conclude the same thing that I have done,"
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Mr. Leuthold did, in fact, request an Attorney
General's opinion on the matter.

Attorney General Forrest H.'

Anderson assigned the opinion to a lawyer who went on vacation
shortly after he received the assignment.

Whether or not

the Attorney General did this to purposely cause a delay in
the opinion cannot be ascertained for sure/

But the delay

did give the Consumers' Council additional time to collect
money without having such a collection declared illegal
until after the Consumers' rate experts and lawyers were
paid.
The delay in the Attorney General's opinion may have
had a detrimental as well as a beneficial effect upon the
fund-raising efforts of the Consumers' Council.

The fact

^^Letter from Hon. William E. Hunt, president of the
Montana Consumers' Council, to C. W. Leaphart, Jr., Leo C.
Graybill, Jr., and Oscar Hendrickson, attorneys for the
Montana Consumers' Council, July 17, 1968.
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that contributions to the Consumers' Council were not declared
legal by a high state authority gave local governments such
as the Bozeman City Commission a convenient excuse not to
donate for fear of doing something illegal,' Such was the
case in Cascade County, Montana,
Cascade County commissioners ignore Council request
for funds,'—When Mayor Hunt's June 18 letter asking for aid
arrived in the office of the Cascade County Commissioners,
only Republican Commissioner Chan W.' Ferguson was present.
The other two commissioners, Democrat Edward L, Shubat and
Republican John St,' Jermain, were out of town.
Ferguson filed the letter without acting on it.

Commissioner
An August 12,

1968, investigation in the commissioners' office produced
the finding that Shubat and St, Jermain had not been made
aware of Mayor Hunt's letter,

Ferguson was asked if he had

purposely buried the letter because of favoritism to the
Montana Power Company or fear of it.

Commissioner Shubat

interrupted rather heatedly before Ferguson could answer
saying, "I don't think Chan would purposely keep anything
from us."

He preferred to credit the commissioners' inaction

on the letter to bureaucratic inefficiency rather than dis
honesty.

Shubat said he would refer the letter to Cascade

County Attorney Gene B, Daly for an opinion on the legality
of donations to the Consumers' Council and make the
commissioners' final decision available.

Notice of any

further action by the commissioners, however, was not made
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available.

It would be erroneous to conclude from these

facts, however, that Mayor Hunt's request for aid had
been thwarted by pro-Montana Power county commissioners.
Both Shubat and St, Jerraain are on record as having given
personal contributions to help the Cascade County Consumers'
Association fight Montana Power's 196I gas rate raise.
It is likely that bureaucratic inefficiency such as
that in Cascade County had its toll on Mayor Hunt's request
for support,'

On April 22, the date Hunt sent notice of

Chester's resolve to hire an expert to the cities, J, H,
McAlear of Red Lodge wrote Hunt, "The copy of the re
solution should be mailed to the City Clerk of each muni
cipality rather than to the mayor in order to be sure that
it is called to the attention of the respective city coun
cils,"

Hunt replied the next day, "I had thought of

sending the resolution to the clerk ,

,• but decided against

it because I wanted to make it personal to the mayor,

I was

going to send one to each member of each council and to the
newspaper editor but ran out of time and money,"

The mayors

in some cities probably failed to relay Hunt's request for
aid, and since no one else in the city government received
a copy of the resolution, it was effectively buried.
Few Governments Determine
Effect of Raise on Budget
The Chester Town Council had resolved to report to
the people on an act that would raise taxes in the state.
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county, or tovm.

They knew that a 15 per cent increase in

energy rates would require a concurrent tax increase of one
dollar for every person in Chester if an increased city
energy bill was to be paid,'

Pew other public officials,

however, tried to ascertain the effect of the proposed rate
increase before acting upon Mayor Hunt's request to join
in hiring an independent rate expert,

Choteau, Montana,

made estimates about what the increase would mean to it,
Missoula City Council acts without knowledge of the
effects of the rate increase.—Before any estimate had been
made on how much the increase would cost Missoula taxpayers,
the Missoula, Montana, City Council voted 9-1 not to join
the Consumers' Council,
According to the Missoula City Council minutes, before
the vote, "Mayor Shoup commented that the Montana Municipal
League had denied this request at the executive session
last week, "

A motion was then made by Alderman J, J,^ Howe

that Hunt's request for financial aid be denied.

It was

seconded by Alderman James P," Nugent, a Montana Power
employee,

Nugent, now deceased, and Lamar Jones, another

Montana Power Company employee, were among those voting
against Hunt's request.
Neither Mayor Richard G, Shoup nor the City Clerk
of Missoula could estimate how much a 15 per cent increase
in the electricity bill would cost the city of Missoula,

p.' 6,

^^Minutes of the Missoula City Council, May 13, 1968,
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If they had researched it, they would have found that
Missoula pays 25 different gas and light bills averaging
about $10,000 every month, or $120,000 every year, to
Montana Power,'

The City Clerk did not know precisely which

rate schedule each of these different light bills was
figured under so this researcher had to estimate that a
15 per cent increase in power rates would cost Missoula at
least $18,000 a year.' A 25 per cent increase would cost
$30,000 a year.

On the basis of this estimate, the Missoula

City Council was asked to reconsider its action and support
an independent rate investigation.

The council refused.

State officials procrastinate in determining effects
of rate increase,—Commenting on data released by Jerry R.
Holloron, columnist for the Lee Newspapers, The People's
Voice wrote that "MPCo.'s proposed increase in electric
and natural gas rates

. .• will cost our strapped state

treasury an estimated $180,000 a year.
Until prompted by newsmen, the officers of state
government had not attempted to determine how much the pro
posed rate increase would cost Montana.'

Governor Babcock said,

"The Railroad and Public Service Commission is an elected
body which preempts my jurisdiction over the conduct or
decision of this rate hearing.
this matter."

It represents the state in

He said he would not take a political stand

^^The People's Voice, May 24, 1968, p. 1. See also
Jerry R. Holloron, "New Group Opposes MP Rate Hike," The
Billings Gazette, June 2, I968, p. 1.'
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on whether or not the increase was justified,
"No legislators have discussed the Montana Power Com
pany rate raise in depth with me," said Donald L, Sorte,
then executive director of the Montana Legislative Council.
"Nor have they asked my staff to determine the effect the
raise will have upon the state budget,
On îiay 1, 1968, Montana state legislator, Russell L.
Doty, Jr., asked Governor Babcock's budget director,
Richard P.' Morris, to ascertain how much the proposed rate
increase would cost the state of Montana,'
nated until August.

Morris procrasti

This caused C, W. Leaphart, a con

sumer lawyer, to remark that Morris would probably not come
up with the data because his uncle was the head accountant
for the Montana Power Company,

Morris said he had never

been in contact with his uncle on the matter nor had he been
told by the Governor or anyone else to stall the information
or prevent its release.
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Finally, Morris had Ralph C, Kenyon, the Montana
State Controller, get a computer printout of all of Montana
Power's claims against the state for a period of one year,
Kenyon obtained 58 11 x 17-inch pages of raw data at a cost
^^Interview with Hon, Tim Babcock, governor of Montana,
August 8, 1968,
Interview with Donald L, Sorte, August 8, 1968,
All
Conversation with C, W, Leaphart, Jr,, lawyer for
Montana Consumers' Council, August 7, I968, Interview with
Richard F, Morris, Montana state budget director, August 8,
1968.
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of about $200 for computer time.

Morris said this cost was

one of the reasons for the delay,'
Kenyon asked William M/ Johnson, the overworked Public
Service Commission auditor, to apply the rate schedules to
this data,

Johnson said he would do this when he had time.

But except for helping a few state agencies figure new bud
gets, Johnson never did have time to determine what the raise
would cost the entire state government.

Instead, state

officials accepted Jerry R. Holloron's $180,000 estimate of
what the increase would be,'
Holloron's early estimates seem low,'

The computer

printouts of utility bills released three months after
Holloron's original research, revealed that the University
of Montana at Missoula spent about $220,000 a year on gas
and electricity.-

If that bill were to increase 15 per cent,

the additional cost would be $33,000.

But in addition to

the University of Montana, Montana Power serves five other
state colleges, 10 state institutions, the deaf and blind
school, the state highway department and highway patrol
installations, the capitol complex in Helena, and state
liquor stores.

It is likely that the combined total of

increased utility bills from all of these state departments
was considerably higher than $180,000,

Certainly high

enough to offset the increased statewide property tax
Montana Power will have to "pay" on improvements made
with its increased revenue.
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As has been mentioned, the Consumers' Council was
aided by many existing interest groups in its quest for an
independent rate investigation.

The next chapter will be

devoted to a discussion of that aid.

CHAPTER IV
THE îffiCrîANICS/OP GROUP MOBILIZATION
"No group can be stated, or defined, or valued
. . . except in terms of other groups."^
Rural Electric Cooperatives
Organization and Staff
Twenty-five rural electric cooperatives (RECs) serve
53,970 Montana families.

2

To promote their common interests,

21 of these cooperatives have affiliated with Montana Asso
ciated Utilities, Inc. (MAU), a non-profit corporation,
which consists solely of electric utilities.

3

All of Mon

tana's RECs as well as Montana Associated Utilities belong to
the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA).
Nationally, the NRECA lobbies for low-cost power generation
and rural transmission and distribution projects.

It

^Bentley, 0£. cit., p. 21?.
2

Letter from Ray W. Penton, editor, Montana Rural
Electric News, March 23, 1970.
3

Montana Associated Utilities, I968 Directory ;
Montana Rural Electric and Telephone Cooperatives (Great
Palls, Montana: Montana Associated Utilities, Inc., I968),
pp. i and 63. (Includes Glacier Electric Cooperative, which
recently joined so the membership does not show in the
Directory.)
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participated in court proceedings to protect the interests
of electric cooperatives, coordinates cooperative activi
ties, and conducts training schools on management, account
ing, engineering, maintenance, etc, for its members.

Mon

tana Associated Utilities performs these same services on
a smaller scale for its Montana members.
To coordinate its statewide efforts, MAU has hired
a fulltime executive secretary, Riley Wm, Childers, and
a staff assistant (office secretary), Earlene Lee,

It also

retains the Great Falls auditing firm of Artz, Clark,
Stevens and Deming, and until recently, Hubert J, Massman of
Helena acted as attorney.

Working from MAU headquarters on

the second floor of Great Palls' Rainbow Hotel, Childers
attends district cooperative meetings and coordinates the
work of 11 standing committees that include:

publications,

power use, legislative, retail rate, advertising, insurance,
water resources, job training and safety, and three others.
Cooperative staff members and customers serve on these
committees,
Public Relations
Print media,—Each month Ray W, Fenton of Public Rela
tions Associates in Great Falls edits the Montana Rural
Electric News (IffiEN),

It is a 20-30 page, two-color magazine

comprised of editorials, columns from officers and staff, a
section for teenagers and housewives, and full-page reports
with pictures on the activities and problems of MAU's member
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cooperatives.
The Montana Rural .Electric News ( MREN) is distributed
to 29,671 subscribers, libraries, and schools each month.
It claims a readership of 150,000 and has the largest circu-

4 It gave

lation of any rural publication in the state.

sparse coverage to the Montana Power Company rate raise
request and to the Consumers' Council opposition.

These sub

jects were not mentioned in nine of the 12 MREN issues pub
lished from March of 1968 through March of 19^9.

The March,

1968, issue carried six column inches of news telling that
the Montana Public Service Commission planned to hire an
expert in the case.

The June issue included a reprinted

editorial from The Billings Gazette and a news story, all of
which totaled only 18 column inches.

Over half of the

attention given the Consumers' Council by MREN came after the
rate hearing was completed and too late to aid organizational
efforts.

In September's 24-inch "Watts' from Washington"

column, Vic Reinemer pleaded for money to finish paying the
expert. Dr. David A. Kosh, who had testified for the con
sumers.

This issue also carried an illustrated feature

describing the Consumers' Council July organizational meeting
in Missoula.
Sound media.—Montana Associated Utilities also spon
sored a radio broadcast over 20 Montana stations for its
^Montana Rural Electric News, XVII, No. 3 (November
1969), 26.
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members and the general public.

Commencing in April of

1968, MU and the Montana Farmers Union presented a fiveminute radio editorial commentary each weekday at noon.

The

Farmers Union sponsored the program Monday through Thursday,
and 14 MAU cooperatives sponsored it on Friday.
The cooperatives used their five minutes each week
primarily to inform the urban public on what rural electrics
accomplish.

The program also championed "territorial

integrity" and municipal power and counteracted investorowned utility propaganda.

The total yearly cost to the rural

electric cooperatives for this program was #12,000.

The

total promotional budget of MAU for all expenditures in
cluding MEM was 1^7,000 for the year 1968,^
Even though the expense of radio time was shared, the
Friday MAU program was not intentionally related in content
to the Farmers Union program.

According to Ray W. Fenton,

the REGs did not even use the voice of Farmers Union
announcer, Clyde T, Jarvis, because they were "afraid that
political association would cause membership complaints."^
^Interview with Ray W. Fenton, editor, Montana Rural
Electric News, Great Falls, Montana, August 8, 1968.
^Ibid, The radio program was dropped on April 17,
1970, just two years after it began. The cooperatives that
sponsored the program felt it was good and that it should be
continued. But that everybody should pay for it since every
body benefited from it. Some cooperatives that had pre
viously refused to sponsor the program continued to refuse,
however. And some eastern Montana cooperatives became afraid
that the program would raise the ire of Montana-Dakota Utili
ties, a private utility that they often buy power from. So,
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fhe diversified political views found among the mem
bers of electric cooperatives hinder the formation of
cooperative and non-cooperative policy decisions.

Most

rural folks, regardless of political belief, benefit from
rural electrification.

But not everybody supports it.

Con

servative John Birch and Farm Bureau types join liberal
Farmers Unionites at monthly meetings to form the policies
of their cooperatives.

And these people of widely differ

ing views are not always in accord.'

Often the policy coming

from the monthly board meetings is a compromise between
these polarized views.

And, as in the case, of the 11

cooperatives that chose not to sponsor the five-minute
radio program, compromised policy is no policy,
MAU's continuing inability to articulate its own
interest will cause a decline in the political punch the
rural electric cooperatives are able to muster as a counter
vailing force to Montana Power,

That political punch has

already been "pulled" by reapportionment and by the decline
in rural population.

The loss of electric patrons in rural

areas conceivably could be offset if the cooperatives are
allowed to sell electricity to people who move to coopera
tive service areas in the suburbs.
since some of the cooperatives were not cooperative, the pro
gram was stopped.
The Montana Power Company requested tapes of all
Montana Associated Utilities' broadcasts. The Intermountain
News Network sent the tapes and, presumably, the Company
monitored what its competitors were saying.
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Territorial Integrity
Through the years, however, the Montana Power Company
has initiated and successfully prosecuted lawsuits to estab
lish the Company's right to serve customers in electric
cooperative areas that were once rural but that have become
urban or suburban because of population growth or migration.
State courts have granted Montana Power the right to construct
facilities in these areas and serve them even though service
lines may already exist there, and even though consumers have
elected to receive cheaper electricity from the coopera7
tives.
To counteract this "skimming of the cream" from
their most profitable service areas, the cooperatives have
sought "territorial integrity" legislation.

If this legis

lation passes, existing service areas will not be subject
to raiding and the numerical and political strength of the
cooperatives will increase as suburban areas grow.

Other

wise, the influence of rural electric cooperatives will
dwindle because cooperatives will be growing at a slower rate
than Montana's other electric utilities,

O

^Montana Rural Electric News (April, 1968), pp. 12-21,
(January, 1969), pp, 12-13.
^Even though the number of families served by rural
electric cooperatives may dwindle in Montana, the amount of
electricity marketed will double every seven to 10 years.
This will be due to the increased use of irrigation systems,
pumps, milking machines, and other electrical innovations,
according to projections made by the Federal Power Commis
sion,
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MAU and the Consumers'
Council
Montana Associated Utilities did not use the power it
now has to countervail Montana Power's influential request
for increased rates.

William Hunt, the president of the

Montana Consumers' Council, spoke at a MU board meeting on
July 18, 1968,

Mayor Hunt's speech produced little overt

help from the cooperatives.

And they took no public stand

supporting the Consumers' Council investigation of the rate
increase request.
Cooperatives not affected by rate increase.— A com
mercial and residential electric rate increase has no effect
upon the cooperatives that buy only wholesale electricity
from Montana Power.
oppose the increase.

Therefore, they had little reason to
As Eugene P, Pike told members of the

Missoula Electric Cooperative, "The only effect any Montana
Power Company rate increases would have on your cooperative's
rates is that it would make them look just that much better,"^
Cooperatives buy wholesale electricity from Montana
Power,—Other reasons for cooperative non-support of the
Consumers' Council can be deduced from the following state
ment by Riley Wm, Childers, executive secretary of Montana
Associated Utilities.

He said, "Support of our Association

^Montana Rural Electric News, June, 1968, p. 9. Pike,
incidentally, fought the rate increase even though it had
no effect on the coop, he manages.
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becomes somewhat more complicated because of the nature of
the /rate raise/ petition and existing contracts , . ,
/between/ various rural electrics and the power company.
In 1965, Montana Power charged the cooperatives a lower
wholesale rate—4.72 mills per kilowatt-hour—than any
investor-owned utility in the United States.

Only the

Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley
Authority, both government projects, had lower wholesale
r a t e s , T w e l v e of the 1? rural electric cooperatives that
are located within or adjacent to Montana Power's service
area buy wholesale electricity from the Company. 12 These
cooperatives may not have wanted to oppose the rate increase
request and risk Montana Power reprisals in the form of
higher wholesale rates or refusal to sell power to the
cooperatives.
^^Letter from Riley Wm,' Childers, executive
secretary of MU, to William E, Hunt, April 29, I968.
11

The Montana Power Go,, Serving YOU is Our Bus
iness , 1966, p. 10.

1 ?Smith, Barney & Co., and Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Preliminary Prospectus, The Montana Power Company First
Mortgage Bonds Series Due 1974, February 9, 1970, p. 11.
Cooperatives purchasing electricity from Montana Power
include: Big Flat Electric, Hill County Electric, McCone
Electric, Missoula Electric, Park Electric, Sun River Elec
tric, Tongue River Electric, Yellowstone Valley Electric,
Beartooth Electric, Big Horn County Electric, Fergus Elec
tric, and Vigilante Electric.
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Cooperative board members are not financially inde
pendent .—At least two other reasons exist to explain why
rural electric cooperatives did not overtly support the
Consumers' Council,'

First, some of the cooperative board

members are as financially interested in the welfare of
Montana Power as they are in the welfare of their coopera
tives.

For example, Charles E. Sweeney, president of the

board of directors of the Big Horn Electric Cooperative, is
vice-president of the Big Horn City State Bank in Hardin,
Montana, which does business with Montana Power.

Because

he wears two hats, Sweeney is vulnerable to implicit or
explicit pressure from Montana Power.

An anti-Company

position by the Sweeney-led cooperative board might
jeopardize the bank's business with the Company,

This may

be one reason the board has often acted in a pro-Company
manner as it did when Yellowtail Dam was built near the
cooperative's service area.

As a cooperative. Big Horn

Electric was offered the opportunity to hook onto the
Yellowtail Power network and buy low-cost federal power
directly from the Bureau of Reclamation.

Big Horn Electric's

board of directors turned down this government offer and
chose instead to continue buying electricity at wholesale
prices from Montana Power, which purchased electricity
from the Bureau of Reclamation.
Like most major corporations in the state, Montana
Power does some business with most all of the banks in its
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service area.

This public relations policy prevents the

officers of one bank from becoming irate because a competitor
is getting all of the Company business.

The policy also

creates a "live and let live" attitude that effectively
neutralizes opposition to many Company positions.
Another example of where the conflicting financial
interest of a cooperative board member destroyed united
cooperative policy occurred at the Glacier Electric Coopera
tive in Gutbank, Montana.

Glacier Electric's I968 board

president, G. S. Frary, owned Montana Power stock and demon
strated repeatedly that he was not likely to favor any
cooperative action that would not enhance his investment.

He

did not favor Glacier Electric opposition to a Montana Power
built transmission line which, when completed, would aid the
Company in serving a large cooperative customer.

And he

opposed and helped prevent Glacier Electric's affiliation
with Montana Associated Utilities, the statewide cooperative
organization.

Glacier Electric became a member of MAU

after Frary resigned his board position in I969.
Cooperative board members are elderly.—Another expla
nation of why the rural electric cooperatives did not overtly
support the Consumers' Council lies in the attitude of their
elderly board members.
The average age of cooperative board members is that
of the men who pioneered rural electrification in Montana—
over 65.

The attitude of these conservative-thinking elders
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discourages the more liberal "young turks."
conservative policy.

The result iJ

Perhaps these older men are tired of

"locking horns" with Montana Power,

Public relations man,

Bay W, Fenton, believes
they have the notion that "If we leave the Montana
Power Company alone, it won't get riled and will
leave us alone," Also, they are afraid that if they
help publicly, it will hurt the rural electrification
movement. Therefore, it the co-ops do help, it will
be from behind the scenes to keep the heat off. Some
rural electric personnel and patrons will donate indi
vidually in an attempt to keep Montana Power occupied
so it won't have time to fight them.^3
Clandestine donations?—Indeed, the help that the
Consumers' Council did get was from behind the scenes.

One

cooperative, which does not want to be mentioned by name,
donated $200 to the Consumers' Council.

The money was

donated because it was thought that the Council investigation
would prevent the Montana Power Company from getting money
to extend its facilities into the cooperative service area.
Mayor Hunt thought that another |1,000-|l,500 may have been
donated anonymously by MÂU members.
ACRE! The Cooperative
Political Action Arm
In times past it has been difficult for a cooperative
to donate to a political cause.

Cooperatives may allocate

five per cent of their net margin (what is left after
patronage rebates) for educational purposed such as advertising.
But they are subject to the "no-political-contribution" laws
^^Interview with Ray W, Fenton, o_£. cit,
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that govern the actions of any business.

Recently, MU

has set up a political action group called Montana Action
Committee for Rural Electrification (Montana ACRE) so that
it can support candidates and causes in the political arena,
ACRE is asking for minimum dues contributions of |10 from
individuals (no corporations) who want to support the
political friends of rural electricity.

Preliminary

indications are that ACRE will be a successful program.
Donation booths set up at the annual meetings of the Sun
River and Sheridan Electric Cooperatives each produced about
300 ACRE members.
The Montana Farmers Union
Organization and
Membership
Agrarian interests were slow to oppose the corpora
tions in Montana.

The policies espoused by the Farmers

Alliances did not reach the state until 1914', after they had
penetrated the rest of the country.
Society of Equity was organized.

In that year, the Montana

It quickly mushroomed to

maturity with 15,000 members by 1917.
succeeded by the Nonpartisan League.

And, in 1918, it was
The members of this

organization tried to raise the price of farm products and
lower the price of goods farmers bought.

These goals brought

it into conflict with the corporations that controlled the
^^Interview with Ray W. Penton, editor, Montana Rural
Electric News, November 28, I969.
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railroads, grain elevators, and large general stores
like the Missoula Mercantile.

Many of the League's mem

bers thought the corporations controlled Montana^s politi
cal machinery, too, and they gathered frequently to hear
men like Burton K. Wheeler vehemently condemn the Company,
The most long-lived of the progressive farm organi
zations is the Montana Farmers Union.

It started in Montana

when 21 farmers formed Ronan Local No. 1.

Following four

years of organizing, the Montana Farmers Union was chartered
in Great Falls on April 3, 1916, during the first annual
convention.
The Farmers Union represented 2,000 farm families
back in 1916 and grew steadily until 1958 when 15,9^0 families
dispersed in all of the state's 56 counties professed member
ship,^^

The Farmers Union, like the other liberal farm

organizations, has often opposed Montana's corporate in
terests.

Maintaining its prior opposition to the Company,

the Farmers Union became the most influential pressure group
to support the Consumers' Council in its quest for an inde
pendent evaluation of Montana Power's I968 electric and gas
rate increase request.
In past journalistic analyses of Montana politics,
too often the influence of the Farmers Union has been over
or underestimated, and almost always such analysis has been

tana:

^^What Is Montana Farmers Union (Great Falls, Mon
Montana Farmers Union, rev. 1966), p. h.
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too simplistic.

To avoid these mistakes and more thoroughly

evaluate the influence of the Farmers Union and its ability
to muster countervailing power against Company forces, it is
necessary to examine mathematically the actual support the
Farmers Union can claim.
Approximately one-third of Montana's 26,000 farm
families belong to the Farmers Union.

About one-sixth of

the state's farm families belong to the Farm Bureau, the
Farmers Union's largest competitor.

Farmers Union member

ship dwindled from a peak of 15,9^0 families in 1958 to
8,500 families in 1969.

Although some of this decline in

membership undoubtedly is due to the fact that seven thousand
Montana farms have ceased operation since 1958, much of the
decline in membership is also due to other factors such as
leadership problems, market conditions, and the doubling of
membership dues in 1966.

The Farmers Union has about the

same number of member families now as it had in 1952 when
Montana had 10,000 more farms than exist today.

The payment

of #10 dues by each of these 8,500 farm families entitles
the husband, wife, and all children over l6 to voting member
ship in the Montana Farmers Union.

So the actual voting

membership of the Farmers Union is in the neighborhood of 16,000^
^^Montana, Department of Agriculture, Montana Agri
culture Statistics, XII (Helena, 1968), 19. Also What Is
Montana Farmers Union (Great Falls, Montana: Montana
Farmers Union, rev. I966), p. 4.
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These 16,000 people have formed nearly 200 Farmers
Union locals.

Three or more locals in a county can consti

tute a county union of which there are 4-1.
meet monthly.

Locals usually

County Farmers Union organizations convene

monthly or quarterly and are composed of delegates from the
county's locals.

Both locals and county unions send dele

gates to an annual convention of the state Farmers Union,
At this meeting the state president and vice president are
elected.

Delegates also select people to serve on the five-

member board of directors— two directors being elected during
one year and three the next.
The Farmers Union has three basic functions:
motes education, cooperation, and legislation.

it pro

The union

conducts educational projects such as summer camps, work
shops, citizenship encampments, lobbying trips to state and
national legislatures, and conventions, which in a recent
year attracted more than 1,200 youth and 1,200 adults.
Public Relations
In the past, the Farmers Union has utilized a cir
culating library, pamphlets, action letters, a national leg
islative newsletter, three organizational newspapers and radio
to reach its adult members.

Also, about 3,000 copies of the

National Farmers Union Washington Newsletter are distributed
^^What Is Montana Farmers Union, loc. cit., p. 10.
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in Montana, according to Thomas

Ryan, former secretary-

treasurer of the Montana Farmers Union.

This newsletter

does not deal with Montana affairs and did not carry stories
concerning the Montana Power rate raise request.
Print media.—The Pilot, a monthly one-page news
letter mailed to about 300 Farmers Union officers, carried
two stories concerning the rate raise request.
About 15 column inches of print were devoted to
opposing the rate raise request in the Montana Farmers Union
News, a four-page monthly, which was mailed to 10,000 farm
families until it suspended publication in the fall of 1969
because of inadequate financing.

The Pilot is now being

mailed to the general membership of the Farmers Union in
place of the suspended Montana Farmers Union News.

Clyde T.

Jarvis, then director of public relations for the Montana
Farmers Union, said that he had included Consumers' Council
material in a Farmers Union mailing to about 10,000 families.
To educate the general public the Farmers Union spon
sored radio commentaries.

It also joined the labor movement

in support of the cooperative newspaper. The People's Voice.
The People's Voice, edited between 19^6 and I969 by
independent-minded Harry L. Billings and his wife, Gretchen,
18

Interview with Thomas J. Ryan, former secretarytreasurer of the Montana Farmers Union, August 10, 1968.
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, director of public
relations, Montana Farmers Union, Great Falls, Montana,
August 9, 1968.
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devoted much space each week to vigorous opposition of the
rate raise request.

During a time in the 194^8 and 1950s

when most of Montana's other papers were Company-dominated,
The Voice led the opposition to Montana's corporate interests
But by 1968, that once-potent opposition was waning.

Gret-

chen G. Billings, who had reported Company maneuvers clearly
and accurately, was beset with back trouble and was unable to
do much reporting,

Harry L, Billings was struggling to keep

the paper, which did not take commercial advertising,
financially solvent.

And Patricia Scott, The Voice reporter,

frankly admitted her lack of knowledge about public utility
regulation.

Despite these handicaps, Voice editorials

continued to be thought-provoking.

For example, Harry L.

Billings compared electric rate raises with tax increases
in understandable layman's terms--a comparison not to be
found in other statewide newspapers.

20

And Gretchen G.

Billings entertained a lively discussion in her column
"What Do You Think?"

advocating that the terms of all three

Public Service Commissioners should expire at the same time
in order to make the Commission responsible to the electorate,
The Voice was no longer as alone in its anti-Company crusade
as it had once been, however.

Other newspapers were taking

over the editorial role that they had ignored during the
^^The People's Voice, August I6, I968, p. 2.
^^The People's

May 31, 1968, p. 4.
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period when they were owned by the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company.

The Missoulian. which in 19^4 had not even mentioned

the existence of the Federal Power Commission hearings in
Butte, was now editorializing for a more competent Public
Service Commission,

pp

And The Billings Gazette, also a former

Anaconda Copper owned newspaper, editorialized against the

1968 raise and in favor of public utility districts (PUDs).^^
Weekly Voice accounts of the rate hearings did increase
the public's knowledge, and some of these accounts were more
comprehensive than those carried by the daily press.
daily press often outreported The Voice.

But the

And, at times, Harry

L. Billings reprinted daily press articles causing Montanans,
who once relied on The Voice as the state's most reliable non
corporate source of information to realize that the Lee News
paper and Great Falls Tribune state bureaus were reporting the
facts as independently and more rapidly than The Voice.

The

Voice's financial support dwindled as its function of independ
ent reporting and editorializing was assumed by the daily press.
The death knell of The Voice sounded when Harry L.
Billings favored Eugene J, McCarthy for president while op
posing the labor-supported Lyndon B, Johnson Vietnam policy.
Billings also favored Harriet Miller and LeRoy Anderson, Demo
cratic candidates for congress and governor, instead of Arnold
01sen and Eugene Mahoney,who had the sympathies of many in the
labor movement.

Billings had opposed Voice supporters before—

The Missoulian, June 5> 19o8, p, 6,
23
The Billings Gazette, March 25, I968.
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he endorsed Henry A. Wallace in 1948—a!nd retained sufficient
financial backing to publish, but the situation was different
in 1968.

If The Voice folded, some laborers and farmers be

lieved they could turn elsewhere to have their stories told.
And they would not be perplexed by an editor who occasionally
criticized them as well as corporate interests.

Some cooper

atives and unions continued supporting The Voice, but others
gradually took their printing jobs elsewhere and thereby cut
off revenue that helped support the paper in the absence of
advertising that was accepted only on a limited basis. Since
his supporters did not need his independent voice as badly as
in 1948, Harry L. Billings could not now be as independent in
his thinking as he had been then.

Reacting to Billings' inde

pendence, members of the Montana Carpenter's District Council
forced a labor convention resolution censoring and chastizing
a voice report.

The resolution did not eliminate API—CIO

union financial backing of The Voice.

But this insult to his

free newspaper drained the last drop of enthusiasm from Harry
L. Billings, who had devoted his life to labor's cause.
resigned.

He

A short time later the paper folded.

It is ironic that that which Harry L. Billings sup
ported most—an independent press in Montana—forced his
paper out of business.

Not all of the countervailing power

of independent reporting that The Voice once offered Mon
tana's corporate interests died when The Voice ceased to
publish weekly.

Rather, The People's Voice ceased to publish

126

partly because an alternative countervailing power could
be provided by a large and independent, but competing,
daily press.
Whether or not that daily press will remain indepen
dent now that The Voice's example is gone remains to be seen.
Certainly, the countervailing power of the uncensored
reporting in The Voice and daily newspapers combined to give
Montanans the clearest picture of a utility rate hearing
that they have ever had.

Now that The Voice has closed,

that countervailing power has dwindled.
Sound Media
In 1968, the Montana Farmers Union Insurance Agency,
an independent tax-paying corporation, was sponsoring a
noontime commentary on Montana affairs by Clyde T. Jarvis,
director of public relations for the Montana Farmers Union,
The program was aired weekdays over 26 stations located in

21 Montana towns and cities,

Jarvis said that the program

included references to the Consumers' Council and the rate
raise controversy in about 20 broadcasts between April 15
and August 8, I968.
At one time during these broadcasts, Jarvis and other
consumer advocates thought that the Montana Power Company or
someone prompted by it was subtly pressuring the Intermountain News Network to have the Farmers Union program
removed from the air,

Jarvis said he thought that the
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network had been threatened with a libel suit, and that
equal time had been demanded to rebut some of the things
he had said.

oh

Jack Paige, executive vice president of the Intermountain Network, Inc., responded when questioned on this
matter, "We have never been asked by Montana Power or any
other organization to remove the Montana Farmers Union
Program,
Prior to Mr. Paige's letter, however, another net
work official intimated to Bay W. Penton, public relations
man for the rural electric cooperatives, that D. A. Davidson
Company and Power-Tovmsend Company were unhappy about the
Jarvis broadcasts.

They sponsored stock and weather reports

that were aired adjacent to the Farmers Union program over
station KBLL in Helena.

They threatened to go off the air if

the views expressed by Jarvis were not disassociated from
their programs,

KBLL offered to move the Farmers Union

program and to follow Jarvis' broadcast with a disclaimer
saying that views expressed by him were not those of the
station or its other sponsors.

Also, Socs N. Vratis, a

lobbyist for the Montana Retail Association, was unhappy
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, director of public
relations for Montana Farmers Union, Great Falls, Montana,
August 9, 1968.
^•^Letter from Jack Paige, executive vice president of
Intermountain News, to author, August 13, 1968.
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with statements that Jarvis had made about an initiative his
organization was placing on the ballot to have the inventory
tax removed from Montana merchants,

Vratis said, "I asked

Helena station KBLL, not the network, for free equal time to
counter Jarvis's statements.
used it.

It was granted, but I never

I could have cared less about getting Jarvis off

the air."

He said that Montana Power personnel had not

prompted him to seek equal time.
In addition to disseminating information concerning
the Consumers' Council, Farmers Union personnel personally
solicited money and support for the Council.

The Farmers

Union leadership got together after the rate increase
request was announced and decided to oppose it because it
would increase their office budget.

Then at about 20 meet

ings around the state, Clyde T, Jarvis gave an informal talk
on the subject that concluded with the question, "Is anyone
in favor of the increase?"
Jarvis said, "Nobody needed convincing.

The leader

ship's stand was wholeheartedly endorsed by the rank and file.
As far as I know, nobody quit the Farmers Union because of our
position,
Financial Aid to the
Consumers' Council
"We used all of our staff and public contacts to help
Z^Interview with Socs N. Vratis, Helena, Montana.
March 27, 1970.
27interview with Clyde T, Jarvis, 0£. cit.
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the Consumers' Council," said Gordon R, Twedt, Farmers Union
president.

The staff distributed anti-rate raise petitions

to its members and asked signers to contribute,

Twedt said

he thought they were "averaging one dollar for each signa
ture. "
Jarvis estimated that "over $0 per cent

2_$o7 of our

members contribute—even from beyond Montana Power's service
area—because they want to keep the general rates down so
Montana-Dakota Utilities won't seek an increase."

PP

Thomas J. Ryan thought that 33 per cent of the Farmers
Union members would contribute, many of them because of the
general publicity on the Consumers' Council and not because
29
of direct solicitation by the Farmers Union.
Other than individual member contributions, there is
no record of Farmers Union donations to the Consumers'
Council.Mayor Hunt used the long distance phone "WATS"
line that the Farmers Union has, but he left money to cover
the cost of his usage.
Contrary to rumor, the Montana Farmers Union does not
28

Interview with Gordon R. Twedt, then president of
the Montana Farmers Urfion, Great Falls, Montana, August 12,
1968, Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, 0£. cit.
29
Interview with Thomas J. Ryan, 0£. cit.
^^The Farmers Union political corporation is not to
be confused in this case with the Farmers Union Grain Termi
nal Association (GTA), a grain-marketing cooperative that
supports the political corporation and that gave $300 to the
Consumers' Council.
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donate as an organization to any political campaign fund.
In 1968, the Farmers Union had a budget of about $l60,000.
Approximately $95»000 of this was garnered from organization
dues and most of the rest from Farmers Union gas stations,
elevators, and hardware dealers.

The elevators, gas stations,

and hardware dealers, as cooperatives, may allot five per
cent of their net margin (what is left after patronage re
bates) for educational and advertising purposes such as
carried on by the Montana Farmers Union,

In addition, the

Montana Farmers Union receives $2,000 to $3,000 each year
in gifts and grants.

These monies support the many programs

already mentioned, but none supports partisan politicians.
The Farmers Union does not even allow candidates to use its
mailing list.

Rather, individual Farmers Union members sup

port politicians of their choice.

For example, Leonard

Kenfield, the past president of the Farmers Union, campaigned
in his own voting precinct for years for candidates he
favored.

And Thomas J. Ryan was instrumental in organizing

several ad hoc non-partisan committees to screen and endorse
liberal candidates for political office.
The Farmers Union As a
Future Countervailing
Influence in Montana
In 1969, because of dwindling resources and declining
membership, the Farmers Union cut back its budget by approxi
mately $30,000.

When public relations director, Clyde T.

Jarvis was elected president, his position was not refilled.
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The full-time secretary-treasurer position was changed to a
non-paying part-time post.

And the Montana Farmers Union

News stopped publication.

The funds saved from the cutback

are to be used to increase the group's membership.
Clyde T, Jarvis, the new Farmers Union president, has
also adopted a policy that he says
will be a totally new approach for us, Down through
the years we have opposed quite a few things and quite
a few organizations and groups. But we can't do this
any longer. The reality of the situation is that fam
ily farmers and ranchers are a dwindling sector of our
economy. This fact is most evident when we attempt to
get agriculture legislation passed. We're going to have
to work with those people now. 31
He said the Farmers Union will probably find itself coopera
ting with other farm groups, commodity groups, civic clubs,
service organizations, and Chambers of Commerce.

He said he

believes it is imperative to the life of a small town that
the Chamber of Commerce in every community in Montana
is enlisted in the battle to bring equitable income
to farmers and ranchers. Without this income, these
people can't be good customers and without good cus
tomers the small town businessman is out of b u s i n e s s , ^2
Does this new attitude on the part of Farmers Union
leadership mean that the Farmers Union will be less of a
countervailing force to Montana Power the next time the
Company seeks a rate increase?

Maybe so.

Farmers will be

reluctant to be as involved as they were during this rate
raise fight—especially since not many of them are customers
31
Great Falls Tribune (Montana Parade), November l6,
1969, p. 2,
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of Montana Power.
Unless Montana Power Company policy changes, however,
the Company will continue to be a natural enemy of the
Farmers Union,

The Company, for example, will have to change

the alliance with the railroads that it has had since John D.
Ryan, a Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad board member, started
the Montana Power Company.

The farmers want lower freight

rates and will continue to fight the situation that now
exists whereby it costs more to ship freight from Montana to
the west coast than it does to ship freight originating in
North Dakota or Canada.

John E, Corette sits on the board

of directors of Burlington-Northern Railroad and on the board
of trustees of the Committee for Economic Development,

The

Committee advocates procedures that would put agriculture into
the hands of a very few.

The Farmers Union, of course, has

always advocated the virtues of family farming and disagrees
with the policies of the Committee for Economic Development,
Consequently, if the Farmers Union and Montana Power are to
reach a conciliation, Montana Power will have to stop donating
to and participating in the affairs of the Committee for
Economic Development.

In addition, Montana Power will have

to stop its raiding of electric cooperative service areas.
The Farmers Union has always supported electric cooperatives
and it is unlikely that this support will stop.
As long as the interests of the Farmers Union members
and the Montana Power Company remain diametrically opposed,
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it is not likely that they will cooperate to any extent.

But

given the present weakened, position of the Farmers Union, it
is unlikely that there will be any extensive countervailing
opposition to Company policies either,

Jarvis has said of

the Farmers Union's new conciliatory approach that the group
had "better not become a political organization or it will
be

dead. "33

Yet the Farmers Union has always been a political

interest group in the sense that it has tried to effect the
allocation of Montana's resources for the benefit of its
members.

Abrogation of that function will destroy the

Farmers Union's reason for being.
Montana AFL-CIO
Farmers Union leaders believe they must form coalitions
with urban forces in order to get favorable legislation in
Montana, and leaders of the Montana American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
believe that labor unions must continue their alliance with
rural forces.

"We couldn't get the time of day out of the

legislature if it wasn't for the farmers," says James S.
Umber, past executive secretary of the AFL-CIO.

But he

also concedes that rural organizations such as a few elec
tric cooperatives could better solidify the farm-labor coali
tion if they would organize their workers under a union
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis by Don Weston of
KGVO television, Missoula, Montana, January 21, 1970.
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contract.

This would change International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers' (IBEW) membership and interests enough to
temper its support of utilities on most all non-contract
issues.
Group Cohesion
As it is, the APL-CIO suffers internal dissension
if it goes on record opposing a utility rate increase.

The

Montana APL-CIO is comprised of about 25O local unions and
labor councils that have a membership of 27,000 to 30,000.
Some of these locals belong to the IBEW, a national affiliate
of the APL-CIO,

According to James S. Umber:

IBEW officers scream if we /APL-CIOZ oppose a rate
increase. They say that their electric or phone
workers will not get a wage increase if the utility
is not granted a rate increase. They say we should
be organizing cooperatives instead of fighting a
union employer. Sometimes we get heat from the
building trades unions too, because they anticipate
more jobs for their members if a utility is planning
a construction program.^
An example of IBEW support for a utility rate raise
was verified by a personal letter to public service com
missioner, Ernest C. Steel, from Stanley E, Thompson, an
international vice president of the IBEW,

The letter, which

Steel took from home to the office to make part of the file,
asked "that the Mountain States Telephone Company in Montana
^^Interview with James S. Umber, past executive
secretary, Montana APL-CIO, September 1, 1968,

135

be granted a rate

"^5

increase.

During the 1968 Mon

tana Power Company rate raise request hearing, the IBEW did
not express support- for the utility position.

Indeed, be

cause of a late-arriving resolution submitted to the malapportioned twelfth annual convention of the Montana APLCIO, the IBEW was forced to give tacit approval to the
Consumers' Council,

Under the rules of parliamentary

procedure, all resolutions to be considered by the conven
tion must be submitted 30 days ahead of time.

Permission

to introduce late resolutions must be given unanimously by
all of the convention delegates present.

If the IBEW

delegates had opposed the introduction of the anti-rate
raise resolution, the pressure begrudging such opposition
from the other convention delegates would have been over
whelming.

If the resolution had been introduced on schedule,

it would not have required a unanimous vote to be considered.
Then the IBEW delegates could have avoided peer pressure
35
Letter from Stanley E. Thompson, international
vice president, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, to Public Service Commissioner Ernest C, Steel,
November 9> 196?.
^^Montana State APL-CIO conventions are malapportioned
because voting delegates to them are allotted on the basis
of a formula that gives a local union with 100 or less mem
bers one voting delegate and a local union with 4,^01 to
5,500 members 10 delegates. This formula makes it possible
for a small local to have at least
times more voting
power than a large one. And although the courts have not
yet had to decide the question, it is possible that in
"union" and "closed shop" states sufficient state action
could be shown to require the State APL-CIO to comply with
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution,
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and abstained from voting.

Such an abstention would have-

denied labor the public relations advantage of being able
to claim internal cohesion—a "united front" against the
Montana Power Company rate raise,
APL-CIO Aid ^ the
Consumers' Council
A resolution.—The resolution opposing the Montana
Power rate increase request passed by the APL-CIO state
convention was not accompanied by a donation of money to the
Consumers' Council.

And the resolution came in August—

after the rate hearings—too late to give the delegates much
of an opportunity to ask their local unions for money to
support the position of the state labor organization.

Other

than passing the resolution opposing the rate increase, the
APL-CIO did little to aid the Consumers' Council.

The APL-

CIO staff was hindered from extensive participation in Con
sumers' Council affairs by personal and family illness, im
pending labor negotiations, and the planning of COPE (Com
mittee on Political Education) participation in the I968
political campaign. 37

Despite these handicaps, the state

APL-CIO did appeal to its affiliates for funds and passed on
all Consumers' Council correspondence to member union locals,
COPS.—The political action committee of the APL-CIO,
37

Interview with James W. Murry, former Montana COPE
director, presently executive secretary of the Montana APLCIO, September 1, I968.
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COPE, registers voters and gets out the voters dur-ing elec
tions,

It also interviews and endorses candidates it feels

will favor labor legislation.

COPE is supported partly by

voluntary donations from union members and partly from a
yearly sixty-cents-per-member assessment made on each local
union.

The funds garnered from the assessment go to pay staff

and to educate the union membership concerning union issues.
The voluntary contributions are used to assist candidates for
federal political offices.

Contributions to candidates in

state and local races can be legally made from local union
treasuries.

The total COPE budget for voter registration in

1970 was about $16,000.
for staff salaries.

This did not include money expended
COPS did not donate to the Consumers*

Council.
James W. Murry, executive director of the Montana
AFL-CIO, said his organization could compete with Montana
Power as a countervailing power in some situations.

He

said, "We don't have as much money as the Company, but we
have a field organization of people, who knock on doors and
vote, that money cannot buy."^^

This organization was

effective in 19^3 when the AFL-CIO thwarted the campaign of
a "right-to-work" committee that Robert D. Corette, Montana
Power lobbyist and board member, served on.
^^Interview with Ernest Post, director of Montana
COPE, Missoula, Montana, August 25, 1970.
^^Interview with James W. Murry, September 1, 1968.
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Informing the Membership
The AFL-CIO and its member unions communicate with
their members via "house" organs that are usually published
monthly.

But the state organization has not had a general

membership paper recently.

The People's Voice used to

promptly articulate labor's position on matters before it
ceased publication in 1969.

But after The Voice folded, labor

was a year and one-half late in publishing a legislative vot
ing record.

Labor now relies on the commercial media to reach

its member.

In this way it also reaches Montana's ^0,000 to

55,000 workers who are not affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
This haphazard communication with its membership does
not fulfill the requirements of a good public relations pro
gram.

Such a program requires that labor build a constant,

continuing reservoir of opinion and understanding that is
favorable to labor's position.

Unless a reservoir of favor

able opinion is maintained, Montana Power will be able to more
easily embark at some future date upon a successful anti-labor
public relations campaign.

And then labor's position as a

countervailing force to Montana Power will have been weakened.
This chapter has been a discussion of the support that
existing interest groups gave to help the Consumers' Council
countervail the power of the Montana Power Company.

The next

chapter will detail the extent of the Montana Power monopoly
and its influence in Montana.

chapter y

THE EXTENT OP MONOPOLY POWER
While those who would oppose the corporate interest
were struggling for support from the people, the
opposition has been unified, and ready for action.
The alliance of mining, finance, ranching and mercan
tile interest has been able to go forth to battle as
a unit. Almost always in Montana political life this
natural alliance has been able to confuse and divide
the progressive forces before they assembled.
An Energy Monopoly
Montana Power is a governraentally protected electric
and gas utility monopoly.

Today it sells to 79 per cent of

Montana's population in the largest service area, 96,000
square miles,of any public utility in the United States. 2
As Figure 1 illustrates, Montana Power supplies energy to 182
communities in 4l of Montana's ^6 counties.

In addition, it

energizes 440 miles of electric railway.
Jules Karlin, "Progressive Politics in Montana,"
Vol, I of A History of Montana, eds. Merrill Burlingame
and K. Ross Toole (3 vols.; New York: Lewis Historical
Publishing Company, 1957), P. 279. See also, Joseph P.
Kelly, "A Study of the Defeat of Senator Burton K. Wheeler
in the 1946 Democratic Primary Election" (unpublished
Master's thesis. Department of Political Science, University
of Montana, Missoula, 1959), p. 2.
2
Montana Power Co., Serving YOU Is Our Business (I966),
PPe 2-3.
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Electric Utility Monopoly
As early as 1922, Montana Power claimed it was the
third largest hydro-electric enterprise in the United States
with an annual output of 1,100,000,000 kilowatt hours.

It

led the nation in per capita consumption of electricity-each of its customers using an average of 2,06l kilowatt
hours a year.

Because of Montana's slow population growth

rate, Montana Power's position among utilities has declined.
By 1967, the year of a nationwide copper strike that de
creased electricity consumption, 63 of the 22^ U.S. electric
utilities sold more electricity than did Montana Power.

k-

The Company remains dominant within Montana, however.
Montana Power owns 11 of the 1? electric-producing
facilities in the state and has petitioned as a partner
with three other companies to build another project or two
on the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon.

Other investor-

owned utilities own two generating plants in Montana and the
federal government possesses the remaining four.

The govern

ment sells some of its electricity to Montana Power.

The

Company purchases about 825,000,000 kilowatt hours a year from
the Bonneville Power Administration—enough to satisfy the
electricity needs of all of the Company's residential cus
tomers .
^The Daily Missoulian (souvenir edition), Montana
Power Co. advertisement, July 20, 1922, p. 22.
^"The Top 100 Electric Utilities," 0£. cit., p. 83.
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In 1967, Montana Power owned more than 4,686 miles of
electric transmission lines in its service area.^

With a

few exceptions, these are the only transmission lines in the
area.

And Montana Power used them to transmit or "wheel"

438,285,569 kilowatt hours of electricity for other distri
butors in 1967.^

This did not include power the Company

transmitted for itself.

Transmission lines carry electricity

from the production facilities to the distribution facili
ties.

They are the inter-city lines that carry electricity

at high voltages.

The intra-city lines that carry electricity

to homes and businesses at lower voltages are called distri
bution lines.
Montana Power had more than 9»773 miles of electric
distribution lines serving l67,06l customers in 1967.^
oince Montana is one of two states in the nation that does
not have public utility districts, the only competition the
Company has in electric distributions comes from the rural
electric cooperatives.

In 1967, the Montana cooperatives

^Montana Power Co., I967 Report to Stockholders
(System Map updated for Applicant's exhibits in Montana Rail
road and Public Service Commission Docket No. 5698), p. 21.
In 1969, the Company had 5,348 miles of transmission line,
^Montana Power Co., I967 Form 1 Report to the FPC,
pp. 425 A and B.
^Montana Power Co., I967 Report to Stockholders,
pp. 10 and 21. In I969, the Company had 10,031 miles of
distribution line.
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had a combined total of 35,173 miles of transmission and
distribution line that served 52,783 customers.^

Since the

cooperatives operate in sparsely populated areas, they have
fewer customers—only 1,5 per mile of line—than the Montana
Power Company, which has 11.6 customers per mile of line.
Because they have fewer customers to pay for more utility
plant, the cooperatives are not in a strong financial
position to offer much countervailing power to the Company.
Coal, Oil and
Other Ventures
In addition to its electricity ventures, the Montana
Power Company is also developing other forms of fuel.
Western Energy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Montana
Power, controls 850 million tons of coal reserves in
Montana. 9 Most of this coal will be used by Montana Power
to fuel steam-electric generating plants like the one
recently constructed in Billings,

Some of the coal is being

sold to utilities in the Midwest,

Recent technological

developments have made it possible to produce pipeline gas,
gasoline, and other synthetic fuels from coal.

So it is

possible that some of Montana Power's coal will be marketed
for these purposes.

But, to date, negotiations with companies

^Montana Associated Utilities, 1968 Directory, op. cit.,

p. 63.
^Some of these coal reserves are controlled by the Com
pany through leasing at a low price. For example, on March 1,
1964, the Montana Po".'er Company leased 1,198 acres of coal
land in Big Horn County for one dollar a year per acre.
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interested in using coal in this manner have ground to a
halt.10
Montana Power had ^2,537,688 worth of oil properties
in Montana in

1967.

It also participates in Canadian oil

ventures through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Altana
Exploration Company and Canadian-Montana Gas Company, Ltd.
The Company owns city water systems in Missoula and
Superior.
Gas Utility Monopoly
Montana Power also monopolizes gas energy production.
When the Cut Bank field developed in 1931> the Company con
structed a 20-inch pipeline from the field to Helena, Ana
conda, and Butte.And in 1954, Montana Power bought the
northern Montana gas distribution facilities from MontanaDakota Utilities.
Montana Power owned 1,657 miles of gas transmission
line in I969—the only gas transmission pipeline in western
Montana.

It also owned 1,304 miles of gas distribution mains.

With minor exceptions, Montana Power is the sole source of
supply for all domestic, commercial, and industrial consumers
of natural gas in the western two-thirds of Montana.

The

l^Montana Power Co., 1967 Report to Stockholders,
p. 4.
l^Montana Power Co., Serving YOU Is Our Business
(1966), p. 2.

1^5

exceptions include three gas distribution companies in Great
Falls, Shelby, and Cut Bank, which buy gas at wholesale
prices from Montana Power.
about 21,400 customers.

These three companies serve

Montana Power sold at retail to
12

84,791 natural gas customers in 1969.

The percentage of

people using natural gas in cities served by Montana Power
ranges from 79 to 91 per cent,^^
Montana Power has 475,000 acres of gas leases in
Montana and produces approximately 40 per cent of the state's
natural gas.
in 1968.^^

It sold 50,200,000 Mcf of gas to Montanans
One Mcf equals 1,000 cubic feet.

The other

major producer in the state is Montana-Dakota Utilities,
Independent producers have been able to sell about 3 to 3.5
billion cubic feet of gas (3,500,000 Mcf) to Montana
Power each year, but the Company has relied on gas imports

from southern Alberta, Canada, for 75 per cent of its gas. 1S
Monopoly Pricing Advantages
High Crest Gas
Sale Offer
In 1966, because of its monopoly position, Montana
^^Montana Power Co., 1969 Report to Stockholders,
p. 8, map.

13
^Montana Power Co., 1967 Report to Stockholders, p. 6
l4pigured from Moody's Investor Service, Inc., op. cit
August 1969, p. 5^+1 Î Montana, Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n.
Annual Review for the Year 1967: Relating to Oil and Gas,II,
Lynn R, Coleman, High Crest Oils, Inc., Brief, Re The Montana
Power Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n.,
Kovember 25, 1968), pp. 4,5,8.
^•^Coleman, o^. cit.. p. 9.
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Power was able to buy gas from independent Montana producers
at an average wellhead price of 8,3 cents per Mcf.

In the

rest of the United States, the I966 wellhead price averaged
15.46 cents per Mcf—approximately double the price in Mon
tana.'

In 1968, High Crest Oil Company offered to sell gas

to Montana Power for 12& cents per Mcf at the wellhead.

This

was nine cents less than the border price Montana Power paid
for Canadian-produced gas.

The Company refused the High

Crest offer saying that it would require "more than |2 million
during the first four years" to gather the gas, store it,
and deliver it to the line at useable pressures and in regu
lated amounts.
Undaunted, High Crest offered to deliver gas to the
Montana Power Company in Great Palls for 27§ cents per Mcf—
l4§ cents less than the wholesale price Montana Power was
charging the Great Palls Gas Company,

Montana Power still

refused the High Crest gas saying that it preferred to con
tinue buying Canadian-produced gas because the reserves there
were proven.
J, E. Corette, Montana Power's board chairman, told
the Great Falls Rotary Club that High Crest claimed a proven
reserve of 260,000,000 Mcf.

But he said that PPC geologists

had estimated the reserve at 95,000,000 Mcf and that independent
l^Great Falls Tribune, February 18, 1968, p. 17;
telephone interview with L. S. Stadler, vice chairman of
the board and chief operating officer of the gas and oil
department of the Montana Power Co., July 13, 1970.
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geologists hired by Montana Power calculated that 180,000,000
to 190,000,000 Mcf of proven gas were in the field.
High Crest said that the Montana reserves connected
to the Montana Power system in I969 totaled only
121,000,000 Mcf,

It said that a conservative 333,000,000 Mcf

estimate of proven and probable reserves in the High Crest
field would exceed the existing Montana Power reserve.

And

that the Bear Paw area that contained the High Crest field
was an "excellent prospect" that "may contain as much as
one to two trillion cubic feet of gas (1,000,000,000 Mcf)."
Even if the Montana Power estimate that the field contained
only 180,000,000 Mcf was correct, this would be sufficient
to supply the Company in excess of 30,000 Mcf per day for
18
12 years.
And Montana Power was only requesting permission
to import two-thirds that amount—20,000 Mcf per day in two
increments—from Canada to satisfy increasing demand for gas
and to augment the 50,000 Mcf already being imported each
day.19
After further exploration in its field, High Crest
released the estimates of an FPC geologist who said the
l^Great Falls Tribune, February 18, 1968, pp. 1, 7.
^^Coleman, op, cit., pp. 8, I5.
l^stadler, 0£. cit. See also Montana Power Co., I969
Report to Shareholders,p. 5» for information regarding an
additional 10,000 Mcf per day that Montana Power seeks to
import.
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reserves were in excess of ^^4,000,000 Mcf.

Northern

Natural Gas Company of Omaha, Nebraska, thought the field
contained more than 700,000,000 Mcf of gas and offered to
buy it from High Crest for 15g cents per Mcf paid at the
wellhead.

This price is 4^ cents per Mcf higher than the

final Montana Power offer and 3 cents per Mcf higher than the
sell price High Crest had been willing to agree on.

Northern

Natural Gas Company plans to pipe the High Crest gas 130
miles from the Tiger Ridge field near Havre, Montana,to
Swift Current, Saskatchewan.

20

There it will meet a line

which Northern Natural wants to build across Canada.

The

gas will eventually be marketed in the midwestern United
States.
The new Northern Natural pipeline will undoubtedly
introduce competition and higher prices into the natural gas
market, all of which will be good for the independent gas
producers in Montana.

But the consumers will not benefit

from the introduction of this new countervailing power.
Montana Power officials say,

"These increased prices must

of necessity be reflected in our sales rates, and sooner or
later either cause an increase in the price of gas to our
customers or prevent any possible decrease in such prices."21
20

Coleman, op. cit.. pp. 11, 16-18;
Tribune, March 2, 1970, p. 1.

Great Palls

^^Great Palls Tribune, March 2, 1970, P» 1.
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This prediction is no consolation to consumers who watched
Montana Power let lower prices slip through its hands.
Explaining the Refusal
to Buy

Cost-plus contract.—An explanation of why Montana
Power refused to purchase High Crest gas was suggested by
High Crest attorneys who thought that Montana Power might
have Canadian arrangements that would enable it to receive a
double or more return on its own investment in Canadian gas.
Montana Power buys Canadian gas under a cost-of-service plus
seven and one-half per cent contract with Alberta & Southern
Gas Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pacific Gas
and Electric Company.

Op

Alberta & Southern buys its gas for

resale from several Canadian producers including Altana
Exploration Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Montana
Power,

After these transactions, the gas is piped to Mon

tana by the Canadian-Montana Pipeline Company, which Montana
Power owns jointly with three other utilities, 23
High Crest attorneys said that "Montana Power apparently
includes its Canadian reserves in its rate base" and receives
a return on that investment from Montana consumers.

In

^^Montana Power Co,, Applicant's Exhibit No. 14,
Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5^98 (Montana R.R. &
Pub. Serv. Comm'n,, May 2, I968), pp. 17-22,
^^The other companies sharing ownership of CanadianMontana Pipeline Co. are Washington Water Power Co., Pacific
Power & Light Co., and Portland General Electric Co. Montana
Power Co. , 1967 Form
Report to the FPC, p. 103.
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addition,
however, the border price of gas purchased from Alberta
& Southern is included as an /operating/ expense in
Montana Power's cost of service. This could result in
a situation where Montana Power could earn a return on
Altana's reserves, obtain unregulated income from the
sale of gas from those reserves at the going Canadian
producer price, and then /repurchase its gas supplies
from Alberta & Southern . . . and recover this expense
in its cost of service.2^
L. S. Stadler, chief operating officer of Montana
Power's gas and oil department, said the High Crest supposi
tion was "totally and completely false."

He said that the

only Canadian gas reserves that Montana Power includes in
its rate base were those of the Canadian-Montana Gas Company,
Ltd., which does not sell gas to Alberta & Southern but which
pipes gas directly to the Canadian-Montana Pipeling Company.
Altana reserves are not included in Montana Power's rate
base and apparently Altana sells gas to Alberta & Southern
and to Trans-Canada Pipelines, Ltd. only because its reserves
are located too far north to be reached conveniently by the
Canadian-Montana Pipeline Company.

24

Montana Power does not sell as much gas—a few billion
cubic feet a year—through Altana to Alberta & Southern as it
buys from Alberta & Southern via the Canadian-Montana Pipeline
Company.

Montana Power has not, however, negotiated a separate
2k

J. Evans Attwell and Lynn R. Coleman, High Crest
Oils, Inc., Initial Brief of Intervener, Re The Montana Power
Co., Docket No. G-I737I (Federal Power Comm'n., March 25,
1968), pp. 7, 8.
^%tadler, o^. cit.
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contract with Alberta & Southern to pay only transportation
charges on that portion of gas that Alberta & Southern handles
for Montana Power,

Instead, Montana Power pays for all the

cost of service (including Alberta & Southern's cost of pur
chasing, storing, and transporting gas) plus seven and onehalf per cent for all gas, whether purchased or repurchased,
from Alberta & Southern.

The contract between the companies

does not have to be approved by any regulatory agency.

It

was negotiated in I96I when the interest rate on utility
bonds was about four and one-half per cent, but it allows
Alberta & Southern an unregulated seven and one-half per cent
profit,This profit is well above the six to six and onehalf per cent return generally accepted as adequate by
utility regulatory commissions.
The money that Montana Power receives from the sale
of Altana gas is not recorded in the Company's books as
"operating revenue,"
income,"

Bather it is labeled "nonoperating

This means that the money Montana Power received

for the sale of Altana gas is not used to help the consumers
pay for the repurchase of that gas.

Instead the money is

held aside and paid to the stockholders as dividends.

The

stockholders probably should be allowed a return on the money
that they have invested in Altana, either through including
Altana's assets in the rate base or through income obtained
from Altana*s sale of gas (as is now the case). But under

p. 26.

^^Moody's Investor Service, Inc., op. c i t . , I 9 6 7 ,
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the present system, Altana sells to Alberta & Southern for a
price higher than the average wellhead price of natural gas
in Alberta. Indeed, Altana now sells its gas for between
13i and 18 cents per Mcf gathered and "sweetened" depending
on the contract situation. The average wellhead price in
Alberta was 15.37 cents per Mcf in 1969.
Under the present setup, Montana Power could have
offered to accept the cost plus seven and one-half per cent
contract if Alberta & Southern would agree to "adequate"
compensation for Altana's gas. Such an agreement, even if
it was not arrived at through a conspiracy to set prices,
(and J. E, Corette said it was not), but through a tacit
understanding of the mutual benefits to the companies involved,
militates against the consumer. He has to pay for it all in
a higher gas bill.
High Crest attorneys postulated another reason why
Montana Power might have refused to buy gas at High Crest
prices. They said, "Evidently Montana Power hopes to use
its dominant position in the gas business to acquire the
High Crest gas at a distressed price, or perhaps buy the
reserves themselves."27
Lawyers for the Great Palls Gas Company were present
at the Montana Power Company rate increase hearings, but they
did not intervene on behalf of the consumers. In fact,
27

Attwell, 0£, cit., p. 82.
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instead of urging Montana Power to accept the low price
offered by High Crest, they waited until the Public Service
Commission increased the wholesale gas price paid Montana
Power from ^2.5 cents per Mcf in 196? to 4^.3 cents per Mcf
in 1969. Then Great Falls Gas petitioned the Public Service
Commission for an increase of its own rates based on the
increased cost of gas purchased from Montana Power. Only
two protestants, State Senator Richard G. Dzivi and Cascade
County Treasurer Clarence 0. Lindseth, appeared in opposi
tion to the Great Falls Gas Company request, which was unani
mously granted by the Commission,
Interlocking personnel.—John Kenneth Galbraith

states that, "retailers /Tike the Great Falls Gas Company/
are required by their situation to develop countervailing
power on the consumer's behalf."2 8
It is difficult to explain why the Great Falls Gas
Company did not act in accord with Galbraith's hypothesis by
trying more vigorously to obtain lower rates. The Gas
Company had a contract with Montana Power that did not ex
pire until 1979) but High Crest offered to sell to Montana
Power at Great Palls, as well as to the Gas Company. According
to Montana Power, the rates charged Great Falls Gas were to
be renegotiated in 1969. Why the existing contract could not
have been changed at that time to reflect the lower price of
High Crest gas is not made clear by the companies, however.
^^Galbraith, 0£, cit.. p. 117.
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It is possible that the relationship between the
owners, directors, and personnel of the Montana Power

and

Great Palls Gas Companies is closer than meets the eye.
Information on this relationship is very difficult to ob
tain, however.

Attempts to obtain such information from

witnesses at the Montana Power Company rate hearing met
repeated objections from Robert D, Corette, the Company
counsel.

The information that is available follows.

Montana Power retains the law firm of Jardine,
Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver in Great Falls.

Samuel B.

Chase was with this firm before he became a lawyer for
and director of Montana Power,

John H. Weaver is the present

designate in the firm and does most of the legal work for the
Company.

But Alex Blewett, Jr., a Montana Highway Commis

sioner and former majority leader of the Montana House of
Representatives, is also a member of the firm.

Blewett is

a stockholder in the Great Palls Gas Company.
Blewett said, however:
The only thing I knew about those gas rate negoti
ations is what I read in the papers and I read quite
a lot. This is the truth and I could say it under
oath. I never consulted with anyone in either the
Great Palls Gas Company or the Montana Power Company
on this matter.29
He added that he had not communicated with Samuel B.
Chase for some time and said that he thought Chase had re
tired from the Montana Power Company.

He did not know that

^^Telephone interview with Alex Blewett, Jr., attorney
with Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, July 15, 1970.
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although Chase had retired as a vice-president and lawyer,
he still held his position as a director.
Montana Power recently appointed Melvin M. Ryan to
its legal staff in Butte. He was previously affiliated with
the Great Palls law firm of Church, Harris, Johnson,
Williams and Allen. Two members of that firm, I. W. Church
and Carter Williams, are on the board of directors of the
Great Falls Gas Company.Ryan represents Montana Power when
it negotiates with Great Palls Gas.^^
Lines of Monopoly Influence
Interlocking Personnel
Having interlocking or common personnel is not un
common among many Montana corporations. For example,
John D. Stephenson, another attorney in the firm of Jardine,
Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, is on the 10-man board of
directors of the First National Bank of Great Palls. Harold
K. Dickinson, a retired division manager of the Montana
Power Company, is also on that board. And Errol P. Gait,
chairman of that board, was on the Montana Power board of
directors until I969, when he was succeeded by Adrian 0.
McLellan, president and board member of the First National
^^Other directors include; J. Patrick Lannan, H. M.
Saubert, Earle Garrison, R. V. Dehon, and Forrest C. Hedger
(who donated $100—more than anybody else—to the primary
campaign of Democrat J. Anderson, an unsuccessful candidate
for the Public Service Commission in I968).
^^Transcript of Hearings, Re The Montana Power Co.,
Docket No. 5698 (Montana H.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n.), p. 75o.
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Bank of Great Palls.

The Pirst National Bank of Great Palls

is a member of the Pirst Bank Stock Corporation of which
J. E. Corette, Montana Power board chairman, is a director.
Other Montana member banks of the Pirst Bank Stock
Corporation include:

Westside Pirst National Bank, Great

Palls; Western Montana National Bank and Southside National
Bank, Missoula; Valley State and Midland National Banks, Bil
lings; First Metals Bank, Butte; Pirst National Banks in
Helena, Havre, Bozeman, Lewistown, and Miles City; First
State Bank, Forsyth; Pirst National Park Bank, Livingston;
Pirst Choteau County Bank and the First Trust Company of
Montana.

John E. Tenge, president of the Midland National

Bank, is a Montana Power director.

And Pete Hamilton, Havre

mayor who promised help to the Consumers' Council but who
never did is an employee of the First National Bank of Havre.
J. E, Corette is also a director of the Pacific Gas
Transmission Company, which is 50 per cent owned by Pacific
Gas and Electric Company and which buys gas from Alberta &
Southern and transports it to the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company in California and to the El Paso Natural Gas Company.
Before he died, Walter H. McLeod, Montana president
of the Missoula Mercantile Company, was a co-director with
J. E. Corette of the Northern Pacific Railway and Montana
Power Companies.

Former Montana Power director, W. J.

Jameson of Billings, and present director, R. H. Robinson,
have done legal work for Northern Pacific.

J. E, Corette has
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become a director of the Northern Pacific's successor, the
Burlington-Northern Railway Company, a consolidation of four
railroads. He is also a charter member of the Upper Midwest
Research and Development Council, an economic research group
that sends its reports to legislators and other Montana leaders,
Montana Power donated $10,500 to this Council between 196^
and 1967.
Consumer Solicitor Confronts
the Web of Influence
The extent of the Montana Power Company's connections
can easily be illustrated by relating the experiences of a
Consumers' Council fund raiser. Rather than rely exclusively
on interviews for information about the problems encountered
by Consumers' Council solicitors in July of I968, I engaged
in a day of soliciting to get first-hand information on the
reaction of businessmen to the consumers' cause.
The Missoula Mercantile.—Wayne L. Grow, controller
for the Missoula Mercantile, was contacted first. The case
against the rate raise was explained and Grow was invited to
attend a meeting with Consumers' Council president William
E. Hunt to gain further information, or to donate to the
Council.
After consulting others in the store, Grow declined
the invitation to attend the meeting or to donate. At the
time, he gave no explanation other than, "We don't think we
would be interested in this at this time."

258
A

year and one-half later, in January of 1970, it

was noticed that Montana Power's stockholder reports named
Walter H, McLeod, Montana president of the Missoula Mer
cantile Company, as a former director of the Montana Power
Company. The Mercantile has recently been sold to the
Bon Marché chain and McLeod has died. But it is conceivable
that people who are still employed by or who invest in the
Mercantile are also directly interested in Montana Power's
welfare. When directors of the Montana Power Company die
or retire, members of their firms are often nominated to
fill the vacancy. For example, Arthur P. Lamey of the Billings
law firm Coleman, Lamey and Crowley succeeded W. J. Jameson,
a senior partner in the firm, on the Montana Power board of
directors. And R. H. (Ty) Robinson, a lawyer in the Missoula
firm of Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, succeeded Harry C.
Pauly as a Company director, Pauly was a member of the
Garlington firm when it was called Murphy, Garlington and
Pauly. Also, a Helena attorney, Newell Gough, Jr. of Weir,
Gough and Matson, took the place of Taylor B. Weir on Montana
Power's board of directors,
Wayne L. Grow said he thought the hypothesis that the
store did not donate because of its affiliation with Montana
Power was not correct. He said the store had not been
affiliated with McLeod since 1959 when the Allied Chain had
bought it from the Montana Mercantile. In further explaining
why the store had not donated to the Consumers' Council, he

159

said, "We can't give to everybody who comes in here with his
hand out or we'll be banJcrupt in no time." When asked if
the store would donate to an organization that would help
keep its costs doi^, he said that it was true that the
store's utility bill had risen substantially.
But, there is not much we can do about an increase.
That is all set by the government, the Federal Power
Commission or the Federal Trade Commission or one of
those agencies. They and the utilities keep it pretty
quiet until the raise is announced and once it is
granted you can't do much about it.
It could be concluded from this interview that the
reason the Mercantile did not donate to the Consumers'
Council may be more due to Grow's misunderstanding of the
utility rate-setting process than to the influence of inter
locking financial interests.
The First National Bank of Missoula.—After con
tacting the Mercantile management, I ventured across the
street to the First National Bank of Missoula, an indepen
dent bank not affiliated with the First Bank Stock Corpora
tion. A former schoolmate, Martin L. Mikelson, was asked
if bank president Randolph Jacobs was in. Mikelson said that
Jacobs was not expected back that day and asked why Jacobs
was being sought. After it was explained that Jacobs was
going to be asked to donate to the Consumers' Council,
Mikelson replied, "I don't think Mr, Jacobs would be inter
ested in anything like that. Besides I'm not a very good
^^Interview with Wayne L. Grow, controller of the
Missoula Mercantile, July 13, 1970.
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person to be talking to about this. I married Bob Corette's
daughter, Susan, and we own quite a bit of stock in the
Power Company," Robert D, Corette is an attorney and direc
tor of Montana Power.
The Florence Hotel.—The quest for funds was continued
at the Florence Hotel, Missoula's largest. Robert C. Lemm,
the hotel's general manager, said that he did not believe
the Florence Hotel would want to oppose the Montana Power
Company's rete increase request even though a raise would
add to the costs of running the hotel. He said, "The Com
pany does a lot of business with us and we would not want
to do anything to make them mad." A month later, in August
of 1968, while scanning a Montana Power Company report to
the Federal Power Commission, it was noticed that the Com
pany had acquired in August of 1940 250 shares of Hotel
Florence Company stock. It sold the hotel stock in 196?,
but perhaps the vestiges of Company influence could have
remained. Table 5 contains a list of investments that
Montana Power is involved in. From this list the reader
can ascertain who is not going to be inclined to oppose a
Montana Power rate raise request.
St. Patrick Hospital.—Since hospitals use a lot of
gas and electricity and since St. Patrick Hospital in
Missoula had been an active contributor against a previous
Montana Power Company rate raise, the hospital's administrators
were solicited for a Consumers' Council donation. After

I6l
TABLE 5
SELECTED 196? MONTANA POWER C0I4PANY INVESTMENTS^

•Investment

Worth

$25,000
10,000

Butte Brass & Controls Co, stock
Downtown Parking Inc. stock
Economic Development Corp. stock
Hotel Florence Co, stock
Grizzly Peak Inc. stock
Lewistown Community Hotel Co. stock and deben.
Missoula Development Corp. stock
Missoula Snow Bowl stock and deben.
Montana Hotel Corp. stock
Pacific Northwest Power Co. stock
Park & Shop, Inc. stock
Pacific Gas Transmission Co, stock
^Source:
the FPC (account

Montana Power Co.,
p. 202.

196?

Form

500,

25,000
1,500
10,000
600^

16,000
1,000
5,000
6,000
663,000
1

Report to

124),

^Disposed of in I967 at a net loss of $21,875 to
Montana Power.
^Disposed of in 196? at a net gain of |16 to Montana
Power.
being referred to two different people in the hospital,
the solicitor was told to contact the patients' accounts
manager, Dennis L. Ryan.

Ryan said that his brother, Melvin,

was an attorney for the Montana Power Company and that he
would not approve a contribution to oppose something his
brother was fighting for.
None of the Missoula businessmen contacted accepted
an invitation to an evening meeting with Consumers' president
William E. Hunt.

The meeting netted nearly $30 in small

contributions from housewives, teachers and workers.

Thinking
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that some Missoula businessmen woulâ want to donate even
though they had not desired to attend the meeting, Hunt sent
a follovmp letter requesting funds. The response was negli
gible. One businessman who had actively opposed the Com
pany's 1962 gas rate increase request and who did not want
to be quoted by name said that he was not going to become
active in the consumer effort or donate this time because
the effort he had extended in 1962 had little effect on the
Public Service Commission's decision.
This chapter has detailed the extent of Montana Power
Company activities and suggested lines of political influence
that might be in effect because of the alliances of Company
personnel. Some of the tactics that Montana Power uses to
influence public and group opinion will be elicited in
chapter six,'

CHAPTER VI
THE TACTICS OP GROUP INFLUENCE
If the twins /Montana Power and Anaconda Mining Companies/
dislike candidate or project, tlie chances of either usu
ally have been very slim indeed.-^
Political Action Groups Support
Company Policy
In 1961, after being addressed by Robert D. Corette,
the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce urged its members to write
the Public Service Commission favoring a Montana Power gas
rate increase request that Corette said was necessary to
provide capital for expansion of natural gas service into
the area. The Chamber's communication to its members said
"that the Commission had received very little support from
the Valley requesting gas, and since the Commission is a
political body, this interest is very important."2 Twentyfive letters from 37 Kalispell Chamber members were received
by the Commission, The Chamber's prodding drew editorial
criticism from The Daily Inter Lake because the introduction
of natural gas would replace a 1350,000 fuel-trucking industry
^Howard, op.. cit.. p. 33^.
2

Letter from Kalispell Chamber of Commerce to its
members, November 28, I96I.
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with a $80,000 gas industry and thereby leave 50 men un
employed.^ Since Montana Power did not serve Kalispell with
either gas or electricity, its personnel were not members of
the local Chamber as were some of the fuel truckers. Yet, the
Kalispell Chamber stood in direct opposition to its truckline members in favor of the non-member utility.
As in the aforementioned example, the Chambers of
Commerce and the Montana Taxpayers Association have often
represented interests that are compatible with Montana. Power's
interests, such as more utility service, a retail sales tax,
lower unemployment compensation benefits, or opposition to a
19^9 proposal of the Department of Interior to build electric
transmission lines for Port Peck and Hungry Horse Dams. So
consumer advocates like William E, Hunt and Harry L, Billings
speculated that these two interest groups would favor the
rate raise request. In order to evaluate this speculation,
it is necessary to look at the nature and function of these
groups.
The State and Local
Chambers of Commerce
The Chamber of Commerce, which is not related to the
Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a three tiered organization.
The Missoula Chamber, for example, had 85O members in I968,
including 650 business and professional firms. Some of these
firms are among the 1000 business affiliates of the Montana
p. 4.

^The Daily Inter Lake (Kalispell), December 3, I96I,
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Chamber of Commerce. The Missoula Chamber is among the
100 association affiliates to the Montana Chamber. Asso
ciation affiliates include local Chambers of Commerce,
Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, and other service clubs; and in
terest groups such as the Montana Stockgrowers or the Woolgrowers. The Montana Chamber affiliates with the United
States Chamber of Commerce.
The Montana Power Company belongs to the Montana
iL
Chamber of Commerce and to about 32 local Chambers. It paid
dues of $4,844 to the Montana Chamber in 19^7 and a total of
15,089 to the Billings, Butte and Great Palls Chambers. In
formation on 1967 dues payments to other local Chambers was
not released, but from past information, it can be estimated
that dues are near $5,000 in total.5 Executive vice pres
idents, Norris E. Johnson, of the Missoula Chamber and Del
H. Siewert of the Montana Chamber say their associations are
not subordinate to Montana Power.
Missoula Chamber of Commerce.—Johnson said that
Montana Power had not asked the Missoula Chamber to support
the rate raise as the Company had asked it to support the
^Letter from the Montana Power Co. to the PPC,
November 6, 1964, quoted in The People's Voice, September 30,
1966, p. 2.
^Montana Power Co., Form 1 Report to the PPC. 19621967, p. 427. These organizational dues payments are in
cluded as a cost of service in an "above-the-line" account
and are charged to the consumer. They are not like charitable
donations which are included in a "below-the-line" or non-cost
of service account and charged to the stockholders.

l66

lighting of Missoula's streets. He said, "We would support
the Company on a legislative issue, but it is not in our in
terests to take a position on an issue of this type." Would
the Missoula Chamber oppose the rate increase? Johnson
answered, "Probably not. How do you stand against people
who are members?" Would the increase be opposed if Montana
Power were not such a large dues payer ($1,060 in 1965)?
Johnson said dues are of little consideration because "it
wouldn't bother our $70,000 yearly administrative budget if
the Company cut off funds." He said that Chamber functions,
like the coordination of boxcar pools to gain low freight
rates, would continue to be performed for other members if
the Company quit. He said that tourist and convention pro
motion such as the paying of -$1,000 to the Amateur Athletic
Union to entice the skibob races to the Snow Bowl (see Table 5)
would also continue. He said his organization could not be
controlled by one segment of business as investor owned util
ities because it welcomed members with other views such as
cooperatives. But Johnson also said that 100 per cent member
ship of all of Missoula's businesses was not his organization's
goal. He thought there were 200 potential Chamber of Com
merce members in Missoula, but that "many can't afford mem
bership; some don't believe in the free enterprise system;
and some we wouldn't want as members because they use bad
business practices.
^Interview with Norris E, Johnson, executive vice
president, Missoula Chamber of Commerce, August 21, I968,
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Only one local Chamber of Commerce—Musselshell
Valley—wrote the Public Service Commission opposing the
1968 rate raise. This may not be significant since only two
Farmers Union locals and five labor union locals wrote the
Commission.
Montana Chamber of Commerce.—Del H. Siewert said it
was difficult for the Montana Chamber to get involved in the
rate raise controversy because "even experts disagree on
rates." He said, "Maybe I'm naive, but I don't think that
the outside consultants the Power Company has hired are a
bunch of crooks who have sold their souls." Siewert, whose
appointment as executive vice president was suggested by
Robert D. Corette, said the Company was in a difficult sit
uation because some of those who wanted utility rates re
duced were "the same people who want the Company to spend more
to reduce thermal pollution or to increase recreation facili
ties at Hauser Dam."
He said that the Chamber's newspaper, The Montana
Citizen, would probably not editorialize on the rate raise
request for its 13,000 subscribers in the state and local
Chambers unless Chamber committees or boards decided it
should. And that was unlikely because "quite frankly, we
try to create a back-scratching situation," he said. "That
way, if a member has to raise money for the community chest,
he gets help from others who know that the favor will be
returned when they need help."
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Siewert said that most of the Chamber's policy is
formulated in committees or from tabulation of a membership
referendum, as that taken on the sales tax. Committees,
working in the general areas of community development, ed
ucation, taxation, agriculture, transportation, travel, in
dustry, and public affairs are appointed by the Chamber
president and approved by 15 elected directors. Appointment
to committees is made after polling the members about their
interests. A member may be appointed to as many committees
as he cares to serve on.^
Montana Power officials are involved in this committee
structure. The 196^ budget and finance committee contained
four Montana Power directors. At least four of the 11 Company
directors have been president of the Montana Chamber. And
Robert D. Corette is the second Montanan to become a director
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Walter G. Kelley, division
manager of Montana Power, was elected 1969-70 president of
the Missoula Chamber, but resigned to accept a promotion.
The 1968-69 Missoula Chamber president, Dr. C. P. Brooke,
is a Montana Power stockholder. Other Company stockholders
who are active in chamber of commerce affairs include C. H.
Rittenour, Plains banker, and Robert G. Arnot, Sr., Conrad
furniture dealer.®
^Interview with Del H. Siewert,
cit. For analysis of
Company influence on the Chamber see Chap. I, pp. 14, I9, 20.
^This list of relationships of Company personnel and
stockholders is not complete,but rather a sample to illustrate
that which is true in many localities.
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Explaining the Raise
to Stockholders
On February 13, 1968, Montana Power sent a letter to
its 13,295 Montana stockholders explaining the rate increase
request. Similar communications have been sent to stock
holders explaining past policies. Therefore, because they
receive special information and because of their financial
interests, Company stockholders should be inclined to favor
rate raise requests. There are exceptions, however.
Senator Lee Metcalf owns 10 shares of Montana Power
and State Senator William H, Bertsche is a stockholder.
Bertsche, when manager of the Great Palls Brewery, testified
against a proposed I962 Montana Power rate increase. He said,
"the proposed rate penalized industrial customers of the Great
Falls Gas Company. And the Brewery was a customer." He was
asked if he had compared the dividends he earned as a Mont
ana Power stockholder with what the rate increase would cost
him as manager of the Brewery and decided that a rate increase
would not be offset by increased stock earnings? "No!" he
said, "Maybe I'm not like others, but I never compared the
dividend income to the Brewery expense. I merely bought
Montana Power stock as a good investment."9
Apparently stockholders other than Bertsche do not
compare their Montana Power dividend income to what their
utility costs would be after an increase. Assuming, as Senator
^Interview with William H. Bertsche, Jr., state sen
ator, Great Falls, Mont,, August 10, I968.
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Metcalf claims, that Montana Power charges each customer an
average of |60 a year more than would be necessary for the
Company to earn a "fair" six and one half per cent return on
an original cost rate base;!^ and assuming that each share
of common paid the 1970 yearly dividend of #1.68, one would
have to own 36 shares of Montana Power to gain enough
dividend income to cover the unnecessary utility bill outgo.
And, an Investment of $1,008 would be needed to purchase 36
shares at current prices near $28 a share.
Furthermore, assuming that the electric bill for
using 500 KVJH of electricity each month increased $l^u48 a
year as a result of a rate raise and that the resultant in
crease in dividends was eight cents per year a share (Mont
ana Power's average for the last decade), a shareholder
would have to om 19^ shares of common for seven years to
make up in increased dividends what he would lose in the
payment of a higher utility bill for the rest of his life
(28 years). An investment of $5,^32 is required to purchase
194 shares of stock at current prices.
While Montana consumers will pay an extra $8,700,000
in 1970 because of the utility rate raise, Montana Power's
Montana common stockholders will only earn an extra $78,116
in dividends in 1970 (based on eight cents per share per year
increase in dividends). Since a large number of Montana
Congress, Senate, "lOU No. 18: The Montana
Power Company," Congressional Record. Vol. 110, No. 5^»
March 23, 1964.
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Power's Montana shareholders do not receive enough in
dividends to "break even" after a rate raise, one could
theorize that they would oppose any rate increase if they were
acting strictly in their oxvn economic interests. Stock
holders, however, rarely oppose utility rate increases.
Their "maximum propensity to oppose (MPO)" the Company is
low.
Maximum Propensity
to Oppose
The maximum propensity to oppose, illustrated in
figure two, is the maximum part of a dollar that might be
spent in opposition to a utility rate raise by the consumer
for each extra dollar raise requested by the utility. The
amount of resources a consumer would lose (RL) yearly because
of- a rate raise is plotted on the right half of the horizontal
axis. The amount of resources a stockholder, company man
ager, charity, electrical or labor union member, or company
patronized business would gain or retain yearly because of
a rate increase is called resources gained (RG). These an
ticipated gains promote a low maximum propensity to oppose
the utility because they might be lost if the increase is not
granted or the patronage might be revoked by the utility if
the recipient openly opposes the rate raise. The several
factors which compose the maximum propensity to oppose are
derived from resources lost and resources gained.
The dollar value of an individual's time, donations
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or other resources which he is willing to expend (RE) in one
year either opposing a utility rate raise (ESQ) or supporting
one (RES) is plotted on the vertical axis. Resources ex
pended in opposition (REO) will be equal to the resources
lost (RL^) plus alpha—alpha being a loading factor to ac
count for long run expectations and emotional willingness
to contribute more in opposition in one year than would be
lost because of a utility rate raise. REO=RLi + a. Consumer
leaders have high alpha loading factors.
Resources expended in support (RES) will be equal to
the resources gained (EG) plus beta—beta being a loading
factor to account for long run expectation of gain and for
emotional willingness to give more in support in one year
than would be gained in that year because of a rate raise.
RES=RG + b. Utility officials have high beta loading factors.
The alpha and beta loading factors will usually be zero un
less the individual to which the formula is being applied is
anticipating long run (more than one year) loss or gain re
sulting from the increase. Resources expended will equal the
resources expended in opposition minus the resources expended
in support, RE=REO - RES=(RL]_ +a) - (RG + b). The maximum
propensity to oppose the utility is obtained by dividing
the resources expended (RE) by the resources lost plus one
one-hundredth (RL + .01). MPO=RE/(RL + .01)=/""(RL^ + a) (RG + b}7/(RL + .01)=g^EO - RE$/(RL + .01). The ,01 is added
to the denominator to prevent division by zero (undefined) in
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FIGURE 2
MAXIMUM PROPENSITY TO OPPOSE
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eases involving the utility company employees who get special
utility rates as part of their employment benefits and so
therefore are not as affected by a rate raise as ordinary
consumers. If the maximum propensity to oppose is positive,
there will be a tendency for the individual to act against
the utility; if the maximum propensity to oppose is negative,
there will be a tendency to favor the utility. If the minus
sign is dropped from a negative maximum propensity to oppose,
the result is a positive percentage which is called the
maximum propensity to support (MPS).
Examples of MPO.•—If the rate raise would increase
a consumer's yearly utility bill $15.^8 (RL) it would be
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plotted at point L on figure two. If the consumer was willing
to expend $1^.48 (REO) in donations or organizational time
allotted to the Consumers' Council, it would be plotted at
point L^. The maximum propensity to oppose the utility would
be + 100 per cent plotted at point C (MPO=RE/(RL + .01)=
$15.48/|15.49). If, however, the consumer anticipated that
the increase would cost him more in years to come, he might
be willing to expend more than $15.48 to support the Consumers'
Council during the year of the rate hearing. This would de
pend upon his financial ability to donate from current
disposable income. If he donated $25 (REO plotted at point
A), his alpha (a=L^A=RA - RL^) would be $9.52 and his MPO
would be + l66 per cent plotted at point C^. MPO= (#15.48 +
^9.52)/($15.48 + .01).
A stockholder, however, has a lower maximum propensity
to oppose the utility than a non-stockholder because he makes
up in increased dividends and appreciated stock prices, part
of what he loses as a consumer from increased electric rates.
For example, a shareholder with 100 shares of Montana Power
common stock who was anticipating an eight cent per year di
vidend increase as a result of a rate raise would expect to
gain $8 a year dividends. This would lower his resources
expended to $7.48 (RE=$15.48 - #8=RL2 - RG=GLi). In this
case, MPO would equal 48 per cent ($7.48/^15.49) and unless
emotional factors affected his decision, this man could
afford to donate to the Consumers' Council no more than 48
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cents out of each dollar his utility bill increased. A
larger donation would cause him to lose money.
If this stockholder determined that he would receive

eight cents extra dividends during the first year of the in
crease and 16 cents a share during the second year, 24 cents
during the third, and so forth, he might decide income would
exceed increased utility bill outgo. So, his beta would
increase in anticipation of future profits and ICPO would
shrink to zero or become negative. In this case, the man
might conceivably invest some money to help the utility get
a rate raise because his RES would be at point B, In the
following example, alpha and beta are the losses and gains
figured for the second ajid third years a rate increase is
operative. ^1P0=/J'RL^ + a) - (EG- + bj7/(EL + .01)=

+

130.96) - ($8 + #4017/(^15.48 + .01)=-|l.16/115.49=-?^. Since
liPO is minus, it becomes the maximum propensity to support
(ICPS=7^) plotted at C2.
Donations Reduce MPO
The Company is able to reduce the maximum propensity
to oppose of groups in the society other than shareholders
by restoring to them in charitable contributions or Company
patronage, part of the money which is lost because of rate
increases. It was mentioned in Chapter V that hospitals
would naturally have an interest in low utility rates because
they use large amounts of energy. Hospitals, however, have
a conflicting interest because, as Table 6 illustrates.
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TABLE 6
DONATIONS POE RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY OR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES CHARGED TO MONTANA
POWER STOCKHOLDERS 1964-196?
RECIPIENT

AMOUNT

St, Peters Hospital Building Fund, Helena
$18,000
St. Johns Hospital Building Fund, Helena
6,035
Mary Swift Tumor Foundation, Butte
2,500
4-H Program, Bozeman
11,035
YMCA, Butte
8,600
Boy Scouts of America, Butte
1,500
Montana School of Mines Alumni Fund, Butte
12,300
Rocky Mountain College, Billings
6,000
College of Great Palls
3,900
Carroll College, Helena
3,^50
University of Montana, Missoula
3,225
Montana State University, Bozeman
1,170
Harvard University Graduate School, Boston, Mass.
1,000
Community Chest, Great Palls
15,750
Community Chest, Butte
12,400
United Givers, Missoula
8,250
United Neighbors, Billings
7,700
United Givers, Helena
1,000
American Red Cross, Butte & other cities
3,^09
Upper Midwest Res, & Dev. Council, St. Paul
10,500
Western Governors Conference, Helena
5,000
Helena Chamber of Commerce
1,500
American Legion, various cities
1,380
Freedom's Foundation, Valley Forge, Penn,
1,100
Montana Safety Foundation
1,000
Island Development Committee, Missoula
2,000
Sleeping Buffalo Recreational Assoc., Malta
1,000
Russell Gallery, Great Falls
3,333
J.P. Kennedy for Performing Arts, Omaha, Neb.
1,000
Miscellaneous other donations (915) many of which
may have been received by the same benefactor at
different times. The Company refuses to release
the names of these benefactors,
60,100.92
TOTAL

$215,137.92

Source: Montana Power Co,, Form 1 Report to the PPC 1964-1967,
(account 426,1), p, 304,
"
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Montana Power frequently donates to hospital building funds,
A hospital will have higher utility bills if the rates are
raised, but it might lose Company donations if the increase
is opposed. So, donations reduce the maximum propensity to
oppose of hospital administrators. Similarly, a rate raise
will increase substantially the electrical costs of the
University of Montana computer center, but the Company's
donation of money to help get the last computer will lower
the maximum propensity to oppose of the chairman of the com
puter science department, especially if he needs a new com
puter and hopes the Company might donate again. If the
"charity" or recipient group has trouble funding itself, the
maximum propensity to oppose will be lowered by Company dona
tions more than would be the case if the group could depend
on funds from someone else.
Utility donations are rarely given with an overt
"gun-at-the-head" do not oppose us or lose the donation at
titude. The object of donations is to evoke good feelings
toward the Company which will help overcome detrimental
sentiments. The trick in giving is to help the recipient
rationalize that he has not accepted a bribe, and keep him
thinking that he is still a free agent. If he were pressured
by Company officials to pull his punches, his reaction would
probably cause much detrimental sentiment toward the Company.
On the other hand, since the donations are to build good
will for Company positions, the Company does not finance
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projects which conflict with its policies. Montana Power,
for example, did not respond to a League of Women Voters'
request for funds to publish Know Your State, a booklet
that presented factual material on state taxation and legisla
tive reform, Montana Power has in the past supported numerous
innocuous publications such as high school band programs or
University of Montana theater programs.
The other Company sponsored projects include: Boys
State, the Thomas Alva Edison Foundation Science Institute
for 350 educators at Bozeman, field trips to the Company's
offices in Butte for University of Montana business students,
Rose Bowl Parade floats, and the Screen News Digest, a current
events film series which is said to have reached 150,000
Montana students.11
Sometimes Montana Power officials are invited to
speak before groups to which the Company donates. Montana
Power also belongs to the Montana Taxpayers Association, an
organization which maintains a speakers bureau to espouse the
business community's philosophy.
Montana Taxpayers Association
Organization and Purpose.-—Montanans often confuse
the 49-year-old Montana Taxpayers Association (MTA) with
temporary local groups such as the Cascade County Taxpayers
Association. S, Keith Anderson, executive vice president of
^^The Montana Power Outlet, July, I968, p. 12.
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the Montana Taxpayers Association, says that his group has
individual members in all of Montana's

$6

counties, but does

not allow local organizations to affiliate with MTA.12 There
fore, he says he is irritated when some local organizations
oppose the legitimate needs of government and the MTA gets
blamed for it. These ad hoc organizations generally have no
staff and do little research on their programs. Anderson
says that his organization has a yearly budget of

$57,^75

to

support a staff whose main function is to audit school district, county and local budgets.13 These audits uncovered
errors which saved Montana taxpayers from $1,100,000 in
excess levies between i960 and 1967.^^ MTA also conducts
budget and tax schools for association members and government
officials.
Publications.—In conjunction with this seminar, it
publishes a pamphlet entitled Property Tax Laws, the Montana
Levy Book, which compares property tax levies by governmental
unit for each county, and the Property Tax Budget Guide, de
signed to aid officials in the analysis and preparation of
budgets.
^^The M'A does, however, publish a booklet entitled
Good Government Begins at Home: A Guide to Forming and Op
erating a Local Taxpayers Association. Apparently, MTA en
courages the formation of local groups even though it dis
courages affiliate members,
l^Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., 1967 Annual Report
(Helena), p. 2.
^^Ibid., p. 4,
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Lobbyists for the more than 2,000 individual members
of the MTA oppose increased taxes and budget proposals the
MTA considers unnecessary and legislation it believes will
"hamper" business or increase the functions of government.
It publishes the Legislative Bulletin to inform members on
these activities.
MTA recently acquired an offset press which it uses
to publish the Montana Taxpayer, a bi-monthly newspaper with
a 1967 circulation of 2,818 for association members.The
MTA has obtained very good press coverage of its programs.
It mails frequent press releases to all of Montana's daily
and weekly newspapers. In addition, MTA has a mailing list
of 5>000 individuals to which it can disseminate information.
Structure.—The membership of MTA is very loyal says
S.. Keith Anderson. "Once we get a member, we keep him even
though he may sell his ranch or go out of business.Since
most adults pay taxes, IfPA has a very broad based membership,
and.a larger potential membership than any other Montana
interest group. MTA's board of directors is selected from
27 different business classifications including: transportation,
banking, legal, medical, utility, lumbering, agricultural,
tourist, insurance, mercantile, manufacturing, mineral, and
real estate. According to Association literature, membership
^^ontana Taxpayers Ass'n. , Montana Taxpayer, XII,
No. 9 (October, 196?), p. 2.
^^Interview with S. Keith Anderson, executive vice
president of the Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., August 13, I968.
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includes "an unusually large number of out-of-state business
firms.One-third of the members are farmers and ranchers
and they pay about one-third of the "voluntary" dues,
.Finances,—The amount of dues payment to the As
sociation is said to be "voluntary," but the directors have
established minimum memberships and other guidelines for
maintaining the "voluntary" levels of support.
MTA and Montana Power,—In 196?, the Montana Power
Company paid $3,413 in dues to the MTA—one-twentieth of the
Association's total revenue,1 R Emmett P, Buckley, manager
of Montana Power's tax and insurance department, serves as
one of the MTA's 2? directors.
The MTA took no stand regarding Montana Power's
rate increase request. Company personnel and S. Keith Anderson
all said that Montana Power officials never asked the I4TA to
pass a resolution favoring the rate increase. Neither were
MTA members urged to write letters to the Public Service
Commission supporting the increase,19
Anderson said, "The Montana Power Company has never
been on my back in an attempt to exercise undue influence on
me. And if it did, the board would not stand for it." He
Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., Citizen Action.
^^Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1 Report to the FPC.p. 4-2/
^^interviews with Colin W. Raff, financial vice pres
ident of Montana Power Co., Owen E. Grinde, publications depart
ment, Montana Power Co., and W.H. Coldiron, vice president &
counsel, Montana Power Co., Butte, Mt,, June 18, 1970. Tele
phone interview with Emmett F. Buckley, tax and insurance de
partment manager, Montana Power Co., June 19, 1970.
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said he felt that the MTA board was comprised of individuals
who are "highly independent in thought and action,"

He said

the board is non-partisan (but there were at least twice as
many Republicans as Democrats on it).

And he felt it was

well balanced because it was comprised of "directors from
27 different segments of the community to insure that no in
terest dominates,"

Board members usually are not so heter

ogeneous that they destroy Î4TA policy, however.

Anderson

said board members are chosen partly on the basis of per
sonality to minimize the possibility that a board member
would continually oppose the executive secretary or the pres
ident,

The directors are elected at the annual meeting of

the MTA and meet two or three times a year as the need arises
to formulate policy and to approve the work program.

Be

tween board meetings, a seven member executive committee,
composed of the president, three vice presidents and three
directors, transacts necessary business.
It was estimated that Montana Power's proposed in
crease would raise state and local taxes, so Anderson was
asked if MTA would oppose the increase because of the tax
increase.

He said the MTA "could not become involved in

attacking its own members because factions would rip the
group apart,"

He said he envied single-occupation organiza

tions like the stockgrowers or bankers because he thought they
did "not have the problem of walking a tightrope over con
flicting policy interests" (they sometimes do),

Anderson did
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say, however, that he thought it was "clearly illegal for
municipal governments to donate to the Consumers' Council."
He said, "This would be like a unit of government donating
to a political

party.

"^0

Emmett P. Buckley, Company tax and insurance depart
ment manager, said MTA did not take any stands for or against
a utility raise "whether it be gas, light, or water, because
the raise should be granted on the basis of need demonstrated
to the Public Service Commission and not because of political
pressure," (Compare this statement with the one made by the
Kalispell Chamber of Commerce on page I63.)
Company Patronage Increases Resources Gained and
Lowers MPO.—Carl E, Dragstedt, a Missoula merchant and for
mer HTA director who was not on the board during the increase
request, said he imagined that the MTA did not oppose the
raise because the directors were personally sold on the idea
that a tax increase resulting from the utility rate increase
was necessary since the utility needed more revenue to con
tinue the service it had given in the past. He said the
Company had always been fair in its dealings with him and so
he had no need to doubt the need for the rate increase. He
said that during the 52 years he had done business in Missoula,
the Company had engendered his good will by buying "gloves,
work clothing, and certain types of boots" locally, from him,22
20

Interview with S, Keith Anderson, o^. cit.
21^Interview with Enimett P. Buckley, 0£. cit.
29
Telephone interview with Carl E, Dragstedt, Missoula,
Mont., June 19, 1970,
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Dragstedt is not the only merchant who has reason to
appreciate Montana Power's patronage. The Company "buys cars
and trucks from Montana merchants to update its 56O vehicle
fleet. The Company's advertising claims, "One of our poli
cies is to purchase locally, either from a Montana dealer or
from a national representative who maintains offices in the
State, all of the equipment, materials and tools that can be
obtained," In 19^5 it spent $6,274,000 within Montana on
such items.23
Cordial employee relations increase beta emotional
factors and lower the MPO.—Dragstedt said the Company had
always treated his brother-in-law, who was a Company account
ant, fairly. He said that when his brother-in-law retired a
few years ago, "the Company rented him a cottage at Kerr
Dam for

$75 a

month. Utilities, lawn care, and garbage dis

posal were provided for that price. And when his wife had
a heart attack, the Company remodeled the cottage for free
so she wouldn't have to climb stairs," He said that about
eight of 12 cabins at Kerr Dam are occupied by retired Com
pany employees. At one time, the cabins were occupied by
workers at the Dam. But because of increased productivity,
it no longer requires that many workers to operate the Dam.
The Montana Press
Z^Montana Power Co., Serving YOU is Our Business,
1966, p. 7.
^^Dragstedt, 0£, cit.

pix
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Information Management
Montanans have not mobilized more opposition to
Montana Power partly because they have lacked accurate in
formation about Company activities. It costs between 70
cents and five dollars to produce a page of transcript from
a utility rate hearing (depending on overtime paid for
overnight transcribing). The transcript of Montana Power's
1968 rate hearing contained more than 1,200 pages.

Early

in the hearing, Glen E, Mahoney, the Commission reporter said
that a transcript copy would cost about $200—a prohibitive
price for any consumer interested in probing the validity
of an increase request.At one time in Montana history it
was necessary to examine the hearings transcript to obtain
an impartial picture of the proceedings because Montana news
papers did not report hearings objectively.
Reporting the 19^^ hearings.—As has been stated in
Chapter I, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company did not sell
its daily newspapers until June 1, 1959. Pour Montana Power
directors were on the boards of directors of these papers
during the 19508.^^ One ACM paper. The Daily Missoulian.
completely ignored the 19^^ PPC-held hearings in Butte, The
Capitol Press in Oregon gave the hearings more publicity
^•^Interview with Glen E. Mahoney, hearings reporter
for the Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Helena, July 19,
1968.

^^The People's Voice. May 14, 195^, p. 1.
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than most Montana papers,27
'
The independent Great Falls Tribune ran Associated
Press (AP) accounts of the testimony on page four during
22 of the 35 days of hearings. But these accounts were
written for the AP by E. G, Leipheimer, publisher of the
Company-owned Montana Standard; Colin W, Raff, Standard
reporter who has since become a Montana Power vice presi
dent; and Ira K, O'Malley, AP reporter who replaced the
Standard's correspondents or "stringers." Publisher
Leipheimer reported the hearing only during the testimony and
cross-examination of Cornelius P. "Con" Kelley, ACM's board
chairman and a counsel to Montana Power's first president,
John D. Ryan, Leipheimer's accounts praised Kelley and Ryan
for bringing electricity to Montana. The following is his
report of PPC attorney, Reuben Goldberg's cross-examination
of C. P. Kelley:
"I am not an expert. I couldn't answer that,"
Kelley told him.
"Neither am I," Goldberg replied.
po
"That's apparent to both us /sic/." Kelley quipped.
The People's .Voice said the Butte courtroom was
packed with Anaconda Company employees and "finely dressed
women, who laugh and applaud at Kelley's attempts to be humorous
. . , and then snicker and sneer at the federal power
^^See The People's Voice, May 26, 1944, p. 2, for
reprint of Capitol Press editorial.
^^Great Falls Tribune, April 6, 1944, p. 4.
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attorneys.

"29 it reported that when Kelley was under cross-

examination by his own lawyers, he could
apparently recall the slightest detail of a trans
action occurring away back in 1909. ... It seems to
be a different story when the power commission counsel
prod him in cross-examination and ask him to recall
some large transaction perhaps involving millions of
dollars which he and Ryan manipulated in 1912 and 1913.
He slumps dejectedly in the witness chair; he can re
call nothing; his memory has failed him completely.
However, the power commission staff then go to the
four large trunks of letters, documents, minutes, and
exhibits which they have compiled . . . and bring out
a letter, usually ivritten by Kelley himself, or to
Kelley by Ryan, and refresh the ACM official's memory,
much to his disgust and embarrassment, and over the
heated objection of the utility company's counsel . . .
The AP stories contained lengthy explanations of
Montana Power's expert's reasons for classifying the Company
property differently than the PPG accountants.31 But, not
once did the AP stories give a detailed, understandable ac
count of the PPG position which was labeled "highly tech
nical," The usual method of portraying PPG witnesses is
illustrated in the following description of testimony by
Charles W. Smith and Russell C. Rainwater: "Their testimony
mainly described the PPG staff's position on accounting pro
cedures, on interpretation of the commission's uniform
system of accounts and on items in the accounts of the Mon32

tana Power Company."

These stories were full of details

^^The People's Voice, April 7, 19^4, p. 4.
^^Ibid.. p. 1.
^^Great Falls Tribune, April 14, 1944, p. 4.
^^Ibid., May 6, 1944, p. 4.
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about how long the PPG witnesses had dealt with power com
panies, but did not relate what the PPG staff's position
actually was. These stories included only one relevant
PPG figure, saying on numerous occasions: "The hearing was
on an order to show cause why the Company should not adopt
the PPG staff report . . . and write approximately
$50,000,000 off the Company's books.The $50 million
figure was wrong. The PPG wanted $53 million stricken from
the Company's rate base,
Joseph Kinsey Howard, then editor of the Great Palls
Leader, sent a stack of AP releases on the hearings to high
officials of the Associated Press with his comments. The
head of the Montana AP Bureau, Hugh Thompson, was released
for letting such important material written by "Company
stringers" go out over the AP wire. Thompson then became a
reporter for The Montana Standard before leaving Montana a
short time later.
Consumers denied advertising space.—During the
1944 hearing, the Butte Miners Union had attempted to adver
tise the holding of a mass meeting to support the PPG.
Both The Montana Standard and the Butte Daily Post refused
the advertising, adding to the blackout on consumer information.

The blackout had been lifted slightly by the
33ibid.. May 13, 1944, p. 5.

^^The People's Voice. April 28, 1944, p, 1,
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Company press on the coverage of consumer activities by
195^ when a group of 400 people from around Montana met in
Helena to protest the granting of the Montana Power gas and
Mountain States Telephone increases. The Independent Record
announced the holding of the meeting in a two-sentence
story.
Montana Power advertising,—After ACM sold its
newspapers, Montana Power found other means of getting pub
licity, The Company more than quadrupled its advertising in
the Great Falls Tribune-Leader, placing 728 column inches
of ads in 1957 and 3,44^ column inches of ads in I966. The
most advertising was done in the year the ACM papers were
sold (1959) when 6,995 column inches of advertising was
placed in the two papers (roughly

pages at 168 column

inches per page). In I966, Montana Power spent at least
1336,338.52 advertising products—gas and electricity—
which no one else could sell in that service area because
the Company has a legally granted monopoly. This increased
each customer's utility bill $2,03 since advertising expense
is charged to the customer as an operating cost,^^
Montana Power advertising often features electrical
and gas appliances and offers incentive light bulb packets,
^^The Independent Record. March 11, 195^.
^^Data figured from Montana Power Co., I966 Form 1
Report to the FPC (accounts 913, 930, 2930, 2913); iHT"
Report to Stockholders. p. 8,
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etc., free to appliance purchasers. Since Montana Power
does not sell appliances, they must be purchased from local
merchants who are allowed to display their wares in the show
room of Company offices around the state. This policy en
genders the good will of appliance dealers in Montana.
Putting the "press"
on the Press
Hot Springs Sentinel.—Some Montanans believe that if
Montana Power does not get the treatment it wants in the
state's newspapers, it sometimes retaliates by canceling
advertising or printing contracts. Richard C. Shirley,
editor-pyblisher of the now defunct Hot Springs Sentinel said
that he was visited in the middle 1950s by Owen E. Grinde
who was concerned about Shirley's editorial position on the
Paradise Dam issue. He said that Grinde told him that the
purpose of Montana Power advertising was to promote good will
and if Shirley did not have good will Grinde implied that
there was no point in advertising in the Sentinel. Shirley
continued editorializing and lost his advertising for the
several years until he ceased being editor and moved to a
paper in Eureka, Montana, in June of I96O. Once under a
new editor, the Hot Springs Sentinel regained Montana Power
advertising.Shirley said that Montana Power has placed a
37see for example, the last issue of the Hot Springs
Sentinel before it combined with The Plainsman on August 4,
i960.
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small amoimt of anti-cooperative advertising in his Eureka
paper, but only because it was the only way to reach people
in that area. He has not received the general Company ad
vertising usually sent to other papers each week. He is in
a rural electric cooperative service area where the Company
does not advertise unless they have to in order to maintain
a favorable climate.
Editor Pears Advertising Loss.—K. A, "Doc"
Eggensperger, the editor of the Sanders County Ledger. a
western Montana weekly, intimated that he was approached at
a Helena meeting by a Company official who delivered a "polite
hint reminding me that Montana Power was a good advertiser,
and saying that it was not in the Company's interest to give
as much publicity as had been given by my paper to the Committee
for Paradise Dam." Eggensperger said he would not have
changed his policy, but that he did not have to in order to
avoid losing Company advertising because "the issue died down
shortly after that meeting."
The Western News.—Hamilton's Miles Romney said that
he had fought with the Missoula Light and Water Company from
the time he took over The Western News from his father in 1922
until Montana Power bought it. Soon after the fight was
continued with Montana Power, and according to Bomney,
"several different firms, oil and tire distributors (Conoco),
ceased to advertise with me." He said that friends of his
^^Telephone interview with Richard C, Shirley, editorpublisher, Tobacco Valley News (Eureka), August 24, 1970.
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who were local agents of these firms told him that his paper
was blackballed on a list circulated by Montana Power. He
was careful to say that he could not prove, beyond what he
had been told,, that such a list ever existed. Romney dis
counted the theory that the local distributors were just
"passing the buck" to the Company as an excuse for not wanting
to advertise in The Western News. He said they advertised
with his competitor who at that time had a smaller circulation
than his paper. The Western News still has comparable to
cheaper advertising rates than the Hamilton daily paper.
Romney said he leased The Western News to his printer,
Walter B. Rothe, for seven years when he and his father
worked for the federal government. Rothe, who had no political
viewpoints, obtained Montana Power advertising. Romney re
turned in 1937 and resumed running the paper. Within two
weeks, Montana Power advertising stopped. Since that time
The Western News has received Montana Power advertising only
when Montana Power brought gas to Hamilton.39
Advertising Revenue Important.—Montana Power advertisin
is an important revenue source for several weekly newspapers.
Thirty-six per cent of the total advertising in the October 6,
1966, Belt Valley Times was Montana Power sponsored (70

column inches—two ads). Throughout most of the I966-I967
period during which the paper was examined, the Company ran
30
^^Telephone interview with Miles Romney, editorpublisher, The Western News (Hamilton), July 24, 1970.
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weekly 30 to 40 column inch ads that accounted for 10 to
36 per cent of the total advertising placed in the Belt
Valley Times.
Despite this advertising dependence, most editors of
Montana weeklies have never been threatened with loss of
Company advertising. And they feel that their newspapers are
free from Company domination. Donald R. Coe, editor of The
Plainsman, and Campbell C. Calvert, editor of the Laurel
Outlook, have both taken editorial stands against Montana
Power and say they have not been pressured by the Company
40
because of it.
Independence is of little consequence if editors'
views are the same as the Company's.—Some editors have never
been threatened with loss of advertising because their view
points rarely differ from that of the Company. Some of them,
like Livingston publisher, Fred

Martin, own Montana Power

stock. Publishers are free enterprise businessmen and many
of them compare their independent situation to that of the
utility whose ads say that American totalitarian influences
desire a government-owned press and a government-owned utility
business.
This independence has a long tradition in Montana as
is illustrated in the following research printed in 193^ by
kA
Telephone interview with Donald R. Coe, editor of
The Plainsman (Plains), and Campbell C. Calvert, editor of
the Laurel Outlook. July 24, 1970.
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Daniel Whetstone, archetype frontier editor of the Cut Bank
Pioneer Press ;
Jerry O'Connel / s l c j of Butte, democratic / s i c 7 can
didate for Public Service Commission, ... is loudly
attacking the electric rates charged by Montana Power
and telling his hearers it is robbery .... A comparison
of rates here and those charged by companies serving
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Port Worth, and
Salt Lake is interesting. The rate charged by the Mon
tana company is lower than any of them.
Ten years previous to this editorial. Whetstone had
vehemently denounced Company opposition to Governor Joseph
Dixon's reelection. He detested the Company press as a pro
stitution of the function of a newspaper. And he said
Montana Power was paying too little for federal land leased
on Flathead Lake. But on the utility rate issue, he sided
with the Company which did not supply electricity to his town.
This editorial position fit well his philosophy that the
value and pride of the press in a democracy was its indepen=
dence.42
Some weeklies were not as independent as the Pioneer
Press. The Phillips County News, for example, reprinted a
Company submitted editorial on the Knowles Dam issue in
1962.4^
^Cut Bank Pioneer Press, October I9, 1934, p. 3. See
page 59 for discussion of material similar to that presented in
this editorial,
42
Janet R. Doty, "Dan Whetstone of the Cut Bank
Pioneer Press," (unpublished senior paper. School of Jour
nalism, University of Montana, May 9, I968), pp. 9-20,
4T
^Phillips County News (Malta), August 30, 1962; U. S.,
Congress, Senate, "IOU No, 20: Montana Power Puts the Grass
in the 'Grass Roots' Papers," Congressional Record, 88th Cong,, 2d
Sess,, Vol. 110, No, 88, May 4, 1964, pp, 9625-28,
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"Conventional" public relations,—Montana editors are
annual guests at a Montana Power sponsored dinner at the Mon
tana Press Association convention.

In between times, Company

officials drop in to chat with editors or explain Company
activities,

Samuel G, Reynolds of The Missoulian and Edward

P. "Daz" Furlong of the Great Falls Tribune said they re
ceived such visits from Company officials during the spring
of the 1968 rate hearing.

Owen E. Grinde said he delivered

the February release announcing the rate raise request to the
AP and The Montana Standard because he "happened to be in
Helena and Butte that day,"
Once at the hearings, Grinde wrote one to seven pages
of press releases each day concerning the 1968 hearings.

The

consumers had no paid staff to write releases for them.

Over

50 per cent of the material used in AP stories on eight of the
13 days of the hearing came from Company press releases.

The

AP is the only statewide news agency subscribed to by the
Montana daily newspapers.

United Press International (UPI)

and Intermountain News Network (IMN), whose reporters attended
the hearings, release stories primarily to radio and television
stations.

Independent reporting by the Great Falls Tribune

and Lee Newspaper state bureaus, however, counterbalanced
the AP reports somewhat.
than it had been in

1957

And the press coverage was better
when Gretchen G. Billings and Owen E,

Grinde were the only "reporters" at the Montana Power electric
^^Grinde, op, cit.
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rate increase hearing.
Asking who for what, when and how.—When figuring the
maximum propensity to oppose, there is an apathy factor or
zone of tolerance which must be accounted for. The more
resources lost (RL), the more likely that the individual's
zone of tolerance to the increase will be exceeded. And the
more likely that he will oppose the rate increase, especially
if MPO is also high. Two consumers may both have MPOs of
100 per cent, but the consumer with a potential resource loss
of $1,000 a year will be more inclined to oppose the rate raise
than a consumer with a potential loss of $15»

Therefore,

utilities sometimes try to nullify opposition from large
industrial users by negotiating separate contracts with them
which do not impose as large a percentage increase on them as
on small residential or commercial customers,
Montana Power had negotiated a three per cent in
crease in rates with several large industrial customers prior
to seeking its 15 per cent 1968 rate increase from other cus
tomers. The industrial customers were able to keep their in
crease small because they can switch to other forms of
energy if electric rates get too high. And since their bills
were not increased 15 per cent, they had no interest in op
posing the increased rates sought from other consumers. By
negotiating separate industrial contracts, Montana Power
avoided the impact of an opposition from coalition between
Ilk

The People's Voice, November 15, 1957.
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industrial and other consumers.
The 1968 example is not the first time that Montana
Power has prevented a consumer coalition from reaching its
full strength (see Table 2, note a). In 1948, the Company
requested to increase the electric bill for only those cus
tomers who used over 1,000 KWH of electricity a month. The
small number of customers in this category were unable to
mount effective opposition to the increase.
Conclusions about the effects of Montana Power's
tactics on the political system will be drawn in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER VII
THE EQUILIBRATION OF GROUP INTERESTS
We have to shield ourselves not only from State auto
cracy but also from group autocracy or particularism.

In rebuttal to French sociologist
notion that three tiered society
(individual group, primary group,
and nation) protects primary group
members from being overwhelmed by
the nation,1
Equilibrium Not Attained
The hypothetical equilibrium—that the rate raise
would be prevented—did not materialize. The Public Ser
vice Commission allowed Montana Power to raise its rates 15
per cent.2 The Commission did not grant everything the
Company asked for. But it cannot be positively stated that
there was much give and take or compromise between the Com
pany and the consumers. The Company, it will be recalled,
apparently did not expect to get more than 15 per cent,
since that is the per cent by which it told the cities to
increase their budgets.

It may have asked for a 25 per

^Graham Wootton, "Pressure Groups: The Despair of
Patriots," Spectator, CCXII (February 28, 1964), p. 273,
quoting Angus Maude.
^Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5698, Order No.
3295 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., January 30, I969).
198

199

cent increase—more than it needed—to give itself some
bargaining leeway.

If this was the situation, rather than

being compromise on Montana Power's part, it was all take and
no give.
Some compromising did take place between the Public
Service Commissioners when they made their decision on how
much to grant the Company,

Commissioner Boedecker moved that

the Montana Power Company be allowed an amount of revenue
which would in effect deny the rate raise request.
motion died.

The

Commissioner Smith then moved to allow the

Company a greater amount of revenue.

Smith's motion passed

with Smith and Steel voting in favor and Boedecker voting
against.
The raise was not more effectively opposed because
some real barriers exist to hinder mobilization of effective
countervailing power to Montana Power,

These are the barriers

of legal precedent and governmental inefficiency, interlocking
directorates and allied interests, the Company's economic
power, and the public's lack of knowledge about or indifference
to existing exploitation.

These real barriers sometimes create

imagined barriers to mobilization.

The most common of these

is the belief among consumers that the Company is so omni
present and omnipotent that it does little good to attempt
opposition to Company policies.

The rest of this chapter

is devoted to the discussion of these barriers and to sug
gestions on how they might be overcome.
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The Commission Does
Not Balance Conflicting;
Interests
As it is presently constituted, the Montana Public
Service Commission does not properly fulfill its role of
balancing conflicting interests. It is forced by inadequate
financing to be more of a court than a regulatory agency. As
was pointed out in Chapter II, Montana Power spent $82,91^.20
in 1968 pursuing the $8,700,000 revenue raise. That was 39
per cent of the Commission's total budget for regulating over
858 utilities and carriers. The combined Consumers' Council

and Public Service Commission expenditures for the entire
preparation of the case amounted to roughly $39,000—half of
what the Company spent in I968. And Robert D. Corette said
that Montana Power had spent $300,000 on its case which ap
parently included preparatory work the Company had done
prior to 1968.
The consumers were unable to pay Dr. Kosh more than
they did (|5,000). And since he thought he deserved more
($15,000), it is not likely that he will represent them again.

Consumer experts often lose money fighting rate cases. The
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen backed out of the consumer
effort during the 1957 Montana Power rate hearing and did
not pay its legal representative $600. And William E. Hunt
said he received $750 to cover his expenses as president of
the Consumers' Council, but that he lost 50 days away from his
legal practice while working on Council affairs.
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If because of lack of finances, regulatory bodies take
on the function of courts, adjudicating upon the merits which
public utilities and consumers place before it, the market
forces of monopoly power will be operative and regulation
will be a sham.

The utilities, because they can finance

their rate case out of earnings and pass the cost of preparing
the rate case on to the consumers, will be able to present
a much larger case.

The consumers, who must finance their

case from donations, will be limited in their efforts.
Consumers Have
Difficulty Mobilizing
The consumers will have difficulty organizing even if
the press is free and does a credible job of reporting a rate
hearing.

The consumers will have difficulty organizing and

the great mass of them will remain inert even in the face of
substantial alleged overcharge because their maximum propensity
to oppose and their resources

expended in opposition are

lowered because of their perception of the situation.
Consumer interests are obscured by utility press
releases.—A consumer's willingness to expend resources in
opposition to a rate increase are lowered by the way the
utility announces the request—saying it will cost only pen
nies a day instead of dollars a year.

This helps prevent the

consumer from realizing his own interests.

The free press

publishes parts of utility press releases almost verbatim—
partly because its reporters are rushed and partly because
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the reporters lack expertise with which to interpret tech
nical data.

If reporters do try to interpret such data and

make a mistake, like Jerry Madden did in phoning an article
to the Great Falls Tribune, the Montana Power people go to the
publisher and criticize the mistake.

The nationwide wire

services might remedy this problem if they hired a public
utility reporter to travel the United States and be an
expert in interpreting the utility data.
Mobilization is difficult if consumers believe
regulation is effective.—Another consumer attitude which
hinders consumer mobilization and lowers the resources ex
pended in opposition is the belief that the regulatory agency
is capable of examining the merits of a case and judging on
them.

As Mayor Shoup said, "Why should Missoula contribute

to the Consumers' Council and pay double for the job the
Public Service Commission is supposed to do?"

Commissioner

Boedecker concurred saying, "It is a waste of money to hire
a consumer expert if the Commission is doing its job,"^
Consumers expect something they are not getting, however.
The Commission is not carrying out its balancing function
partly because it is underfinanced.
Mobilization is difficult if consumers believe
regulation is ineffective.—While some consumers believe the
Commission is doing its job others are disillusioned and
^Interview with Louis G. Boedecker, public service
commissioner of Montana, Helena, September 4, I968.
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experience feelings of impotence which are increased bysuspicions that public service commissioners take bribes.
These suspicions are unfortunate. Only one of the three
commissioners said he had been offered a bribe or pressured
by a representative of a utility appearing before the Com
mission. He said the bribe offer came from a utility of
ficial (not Montana Power) who was transfered from Montana
when the utility was informed of his activities. The Com
missioner said that during this same hearing a consumer
representative had told him to vote against the utility or
he would use his organization's influence to beat him during
the next election. These efforts did no good since they made
the Commissioner quite indignant with some persons involved
in both sides of the controversy.
Another rumor, that Elizabeth Holmes, once a wife of
the late public service commissioner, John Holmes, was re
ceiving more alimony than the commissioner's salary, is un
founded. The rumor spreaders said that the alimony check came
directly from the telephone company. Another said it came
from Montana Power. Elizabeth Holmes, an opponent of high
utility rates who recently changed apartments because of
them, said "John paid the alimony himself. It amounted to
$400 a month for a short while. But he got it reduced to
$300 a month during the last part of 1959 because he could
II
not afford the higher payments."
^Telephone interview with Elizabeth Holmes, Helena,
July 24, 1970.
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Simplistic interpretation of economic trends hinders
consumer mobilization.—Consumer protection groups have
trouble organizing when consumers are satisfied with service
and believe that they never had it so good.

They know that

the cost of doing business is going up and assume that costs
must be going up for utilities too.
that some increase is justified.

Therefore, they reason

Also, in times when people

are prosperous, they do not mind paying more for something
as long as it is available when they want it and as long as
there is no trouble connected with getting it.

Service and

convenience are important.
Multiple memberships "short circuit" consumer
organization.—Multiple and overlapping group memberships
do little to restrain the activities of organized groups.
But, they do act as a check on consumer mobilization,

A

prevailing philosophy of "live and let live" or "if you let
us make a dollar, we will let you make a dollar" was abun
dantly exhibited by the Chambers of Commerce, the Montana
Taxpayers' Association, the Montana League of Towns and Cities,
the Montana Press, bankers, merchants, lawyers, auto dealers,
and even the rural electric cooperatives and some labor
unions.

In this connection, Mayors John J. McLaughlin and

Thomas Powers may get more from the Montana Power Company
in donations and "gifts" for the cities of Great Palls and
Butte than they could by opposing the Company and advocating
lower utility rates.

205

Interlocking directors and shareholders are not dis
posed to oppose Montana Power. As David Truman has said,
"An individual's group affiliations largely determine his
attitudes, values, and the frames of reference in terms of
which he interprets his experiences."^ Also, Montana Power
patronizing policies create conflicting interests in Montana
businessmen and keep the maximum propensity to oppose low.
During the last rate increase, the resources lost to Montanans equaled $8,700,000 and the resources gained (or po
tentially lost if the merchants opposed the Company rate
increase) were almost equal to the resources lost. Montana
Power spends over #6,300,000 a year on local purchases not
including advertising (roughly $200,000), donations, new
jobs, increased dividends (about #78,000), etc.
One of the reasons why multiple memberships do not
act as a check on organized groups is because many consumers
are not joiners. We know, according to Oliver Garceau,
"that multiple memberships in a formal sense increase with
education and socio-economic status."^ Many consumers who
have an interest in preventing a rate increase simply do not
belong to organized political interest groups and so they
cannot temper policy in those groups. Even if these people
^Truman, o^. oit.. p. 505.
^Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political
Research," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, C'CGXIX (September, 1958), p. 108.
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perceive their interests, as some of them do, they still
remain inert. They are non-joiners who do not spontaneously
act to further their own interests. It takes money and time
to organize these potential groups. And the job is doubly
difficult in Montana because of the distances between cities.
Large group lethargy stifles the consumers' power
base.—Even large groups, such as labor unions, or the
Farmers Union have difficulty arousing their members to action.
Mancur Olsen, Jr. says this is true because if one member in
these large groups does or does not help support the Consumers'
Council, neither he nor the other members will perceive the
result. Therefore, nobody has incentive to act. In order
for these large groups to function, group members must be
forced to participate, says Olsen, So laborers vote the
union shop, farmers vote to accept commodity controls, and
citizens vote to sustain taxes. Each of these groups must
invoke compulsion upon themselves, says Olsen, or individual
members will "scab" on the system, enjoy the collective good
(lower rates) without paying for it (hiring a consumer rate
expert), and eventually destroy the group.7
Consumers are apathetic,—Consumer apathy in all
groups is illustrated by the fact that the Public Service
Commission received petitions in opposition to the I968 rate
^Mancur Olsen, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 19^), p. 2.
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raise which contained only 2p28 signatures. Only one letter,
from E. L. Alexander, an elderly former stockbroker, was
received by the Commission favoring the increase» The I968
petitions can be compared with those submitted in 1959 and 196I
which carried 2,800 and 1,800 signatures of consumers who
opposed the rate increases. Other causes championed in 1968
were more popular even though the rate increase meant a loss
of #8.7 million a year. Eugene McCarthy for President
people got 15,000 signatures in two months in support of
their candidate. And the Montana Retail Association suc
cessfully petitioned for 22,478 signatures to place the repeal
of the inventory property tax on the ballot.
Perhaps consumers do not sign petitions opposing the
rate increase because they feel the Commission will be ob
livious to this type of political pressure. In 1953; 78
organizations, businesses and protestants were represented by
16 lawyers at the Montana Power gas rate hearing., Leo

Gallagher, manager of Elliston Lime Company, said a gas rate
raise would increase his costs $3,400 and cause his plant to
shut down.^ The Commission granted Montana Power a 30 per
cent increase in gas rates three months after the request was
made despite the statements of Gallagher and others similarly
situated. After rendering its decision, the Commission indicted:
O
Letter from Leo Gallagher, manager of Elliston Lime
Co., to Harry L. Billings, no date. Elliston Lime continued
to operate despite the increase.
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the consumers who had fought this and another increase by
stating:
Certain individuals have used these two petitions
to further their own political careers. ... It is
anticipated that much to-do will be made or attempted
by those whose political ambitions transcend their own
good consciences. It is with the thought in mind that
they will endeavor to cast an untrue light upon the
facts in these two cases that this statement is issued."
The Public Service Commissioners said that signed
petitions have no effect because if a utility needs a raise
whether or not to grant it is an economic decision and not a
political one. Louis G. Boedecker said, "Petitions have a
different effect on the Commission than they have on Congress
men. Nobody wants an increase. But sometimes we have to go
on record and grant one.
Consumers and anti-Company politicians who confront
Montana Power gain feelings of impotence after losing a
grueling battle with the utility. They feel like the Missoula
businessman mentioned in Chapter V (p. 162). They feel that
they can do little in opposition to a monopoly utility before
an unresponsive Public Service Commission, so why try? This
is the self-fulfilling prophesy—the attitude that the
Company cannot be beaten so why try to beat them which' results
in the fact that the Company is rarely beaten because few
people sustain their effort to beat it.
^The Independent Record, August 14, 1953.
l^Boedecker, o^. cit. Interviews with Ernest C. Steel,
public service commissioner of Montana, Helena, September
1968, and Paul T. Smith, public service commissioner of Mon
tana, Helena, September 3» 1968.
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Montana Power is not invincible.—It is in Montana
Power's interest to maintain its invincible image because of
the demoralizing effect it has upon opposition.

But even

Company officials contend that many machinations are wrongly
attributed to the utility, such as the Montana Bank Examiner's
questioning of Consumers' Council donations, or the complaints
about Jarvis's Farmers Union radio program.

W. H. Coldiron

says, "If Montana Power did everything that everybody says
we do, we wouldn't have time to run the utility business.
After he headed the Consumers' Council, William E.
Hunt was beaten by a former Montana Power employee in his
race for mayor of Chester,

But he will not give the credit

for his defeat to Montana Power.

Hunt says, "Why give them

one more notch in their gun that they do not deserve and
scare off somebody who might try to oppose the Company and
succeed."

Hunt said he was beaten because of a street

paving controversy and other criticism of his administration
which did not surface until the last issue of the Liberty
County Times before the election.

He also said that the

conservatives got out their voters and he did not do the same
with his.

Hunt lost to Norman W. Harju by approximately

60 votes.

Hunt discounted Montana Power influence even

though the Liberty County Republican Chairman had told him
that he made to two trips to Butte, presumably to confer with
llColdiron, 0£. cit.
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Montana Power lobbyists about the election. Hunt said a
Montana Power employee ran for the city council in ward one
and was beaten. Harju resigned after one month as mayor to
work for the Broivning telephone company.

Before resigning,

Harju asked Hunt to be Chester's city attorney. Hunt declined
the job and moved to Helena where he is currently director of
the Montana Aeronautics Commission.12 W. H. Coldiron said
that Montana Power had not attempted to beat Hunt.

Just as Hunt is not willing to give Montana Power
credit for his defeat, Montana Power is not willing to give

the consumers credit for the 6,550 vote primary defeat of
Commissioner Paul T. Smith in 1970. W. H. Coldiron says
that he does not know why Smith was defeated. But, because
Smith beat Paul Cannon by 238 votes in Silver Bow (Butte),
C^inon's home county and the hotbed of Montana consumerism,

Coldiron did not believe in the "consumer rebellion" theory
which AP capitol reporter J, D. Holmes had attached to

Smith's defeat.13
Holmes pointed out that Smith had ten more years of
exposure in elected office than Cannon and that Cannon had a
poorer won-loss record.Ik Smith won only nine of Montana's
56 counties—all but Musselshell being in the western
^^Interview with William E. Hunt, Helena, March 17,
1970.
13
Coldiron, 0£. cit.

1 il'

The Missoulian. June 7, 1970, p. 23.
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congressional district. And Smith spent $9,084 on his
campaign—$7,201 more thsin Cannon. Concentrated campaign
spending in Democratic Butte could have given Smith the edge
there but not in other parts of the state where consumers
recalled Commission decisions made from 196? to I969 to
increase the rates of the Montana Power, Montana-Dakota
Utilities, Mountain Bell Telephone, and Great Falls Gas
Companies and to increase city water rates in Great Palls,
Butte and Hamilton.
Perhaps Smith was beaten because of the reason given
by Arthur P. Bentley in his explanation of the Dartmouth
College case. He said that "if the adjudicating agency
decides against the majority will, the decision will soon
be circumvented and the majority position substituted."^^
No one can say for sure what the majority feeling about the
rate increase is since neither Montana Power nor the con
sumers have sampled public opinion on the issue. But the
rural electric cooperatives completed a statewide survey in
the summer of 1970 which indicated that 6I.I per cent of
Montana's people felt that electric rates charged by investor
owned utilities were too high. Twenty-seven and one-half
per cent said rates were about right, .9 per cent said rates
^^Bentley, 0£. cit.. pp. 390, 391.
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were too low and 10.5 per cent said they were not sure.^^
Assuming that the voters did want to circumvent the high
rates the Commission set, in Montana, it would require six
years because only one Commissioner stands for election
every two years.
Redressing the Balance
Commission Reforms
Shorter election terms,—If the Commission is not
held immediately responsible for decisions it makes, the
public tends to forget the unfavorable effects of decisions
made several years prior to an election. To remedy this,
two of the Commission seats should be up for election every
two years as is illustrated in Figure 3®

This would be

accomplished if two Commission seats were elected for stag
gered four year terms with one of the four year terms being
open for election every congressional election year. The
third Commissioner would be elected for a two year terra.
This system of alternating terms would allow the voters to
judge two of the Commissioners every two years, yet save
two of the Commissioners the expense of having to campaign
that often if they could win a four year seat.
^^Montana Associated Utilities, Direction for the
What Hontanans Say and Think About Rural Electric
Cooperatives (Spokane. Wash.; Reid & Associates, 1970),
^ 6, question 10. Five thousand questionnaires were mailed
randomly to heads of households in all of Montana's counties.
Twenty per cent returned their questionnaires. Of those
answering, 71,8 per cent were furnished electricity by
investor owned utilities.
70's;
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FIGURE 3

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONERS' SUGGESTED LENGTH OF TERMS
Years in
which elected
2 year terra
4 year term
4 year term

1972
2
4

1974

1976

1978

1980

2
2
2
2
holdover
4 holdover
4
4
holdover
4
holdover

Larger salary.—Another barrier which tends to keep
the Commission ineffective is the low salary paid Commissioners
which does not attract the most competent people to seek the
job. Consumer president William E, Hunt, for example, was
urged to seek office as a Public Service Commissioner. He
declined saying he could not afford to leave his legal prac
tice for the Commissioner^ salary if he was going to put
his kids through college. A shortage of consumer-oriented
candidates leaves the voters with little choice. More alter
natives to the Commission's positions would be offered if the
Commissioner's salaries were not lower than those paid by any
other commission in the United States.
Larger budget.—The salaries and budget of the Com
mission could be expanded without a large tax increase. The
Public Service Commission contributes about $2^0,000 more to
the state coffers each year than it spends. This is revenue
accrued from fees and licenses. The Commission reported to
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
that its budget and staff were insufficient and should be
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increased by 25 per cent.^? Not all of the Commissioners
agree with this, however,
A larger budget was discussed before submitting an
appropriation request to the I967 legislature. Commissioners
Steel and Smith thought a small budget should be submitted
and outvoted Commissioner Boedecker who favored a larger
budget. Once the budget was submitted, Commissioner Smith
told legislators the Commission would help keep costs down
and would live with whatever was appropriated. So the leg
islature cut the budget request even further.
If a regulatory body is operating on a small budget,
an "original cost" rate base is the least expensive method
of determining utility value because it does not require as
much time estimating complicated "trends" as does the re
production cost new rate base method.
Promoting Utility
Competition
In addition to invigorating the Public Service
Commission, consumers can develop countervailing power to
investor owned utilities by advocating competition. Com
petition can be obtained by developing government ownership
of some (not all) electric generating, transmission, and
distribution facilities,Competition can be obtained by
l^Senate, State Utility Commissions. I967, pp, I6
insert, 22 insert,
l^Note the low rates and consequent larger consumption
of electricity near government-owned power plants in U, S,, Fed
eral Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills. R-66, I965.
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providing the customer-owned cooperative with territorial
integrity so that their service areas cannot be raided at
will by Montana Power.

And competition can be developed by

requiring the electric and gas divisions of Montana Power to
become separate and competing energy companies,
PUDs.—Montana is one of two states which does not
allow public utility districts or municipal electric systems.
In some places, such as Eugene, Oregon, where electricity is
sold for one-third of the price charged Montanans, municipal
electric systems provide a source of revenue for local gov
ernments because they make in-lieu of tax payments.

Yet the

potentiality that public utility districts might emerge if
electric utility rates were set too high did not act as a
countervailing force and deter Montana Power from seeking
higher rates.

The balancing power of potential groups did not

have the effect David B, Truman theorizes they should have
(pp. 11, 12) because they are prevented by law from arising.
State Senator John L. "Luke" McKeon introduced a bill to
allow public utility districts into the I969 legislature.
The bill died in committee after several utility lobbyists
testified against it.
in favor,

McKeon was the only person testifying

PUDs do not arise very often anywhere.

Only three

municipal electric systems started in the United States in

1965, and seven others were sold to investor owned utilities,
l^Edison Electric Institute, 0£. cit., p. 25.
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Short term utility franchises aid competition.—Even
if public utility districts were allowed in Montana, they
would face other barriers which would make it difficult for
them to be a potential threat to Montana Power.

Montana

Power has been granted franchises to serve many Montana cities,
and legally, a city could not switch to a municipal electric
system until its franchise expired.

Also, once a public

utility district is formed, it must obtain electricity from
somewhere—probably from Montana Power generating and trans
mitting facilities.
Water conservancy districts aid competition. •—A
municipal electric system could arise more easily if Montana
had a water conservancy district law which allowed small flood
control, reclamation, electric generation, and other con
servation projects.

But; Montana Power lobbyists have

managed to kill water conservancy district bills introduced
into the legislature.
Federal generating and transmitting facilities aid
competition.—Because Montana Power has a monopoly on most
transmission facilities in Montana, it could control the
supply and price of electricity to a municipal-owned
utility.

In fact, Montana Power did maintain a high price

for wholesale electricity carried to rural electric cooperatives
on Montana's "high line."

It charged the cooperatives

8.77

mills per Klffl until Congress appropriated money for a HavreShelby transmission line,

Montana Power's wholesale
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electricity rate then dropped to 5.5 mills a KWH. At that
time rural electric cooperatives bought electricity from the
federal government for 3»5 mills per KWH and Montana Power
bought electricity from the federal government for 2.5 mills
per KWH delivered free to Great Palls via the government
owned Port Peck-Great Palls transmission line.
Consumer Advocate
If a commission is not equipped to probe utility
accounts extensively, its function will be like that of a
court which listens to both sides of a story and decides on
the basis of evidence presented. If a commission is going to
function as a court, the consumers will need a competent,
well financed advocate to express their side of the story.
Such a proposal has been suggested by Lee Metcalf and ten
other U.S. Senators who have introduced a bill to establish
an Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel (S. 607). Besides
requiring preparation of model regulatory laws and requiring
more extensive reporting of utility operations, stock options,
expenditures, and interlocking directorates, Metcalfs bill
would establish an independent agency known as the United
States Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel. Among other
things, the presidentially-appointed head of this agency
could make grants to state or local governments or to a
combination of such governments which represent a population
of 100,000 people or more. The grant would finance up to 75
per cent of the cost of establishing local utility consumers'
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counsels who would appear at utility rate-making proceedings
on behalf of the consumer. After all, Metcalf said, "The
public provides public utilities, through rates, with such
experts as the public utilities may require to protect the
utilities' rights, but the public, through taxes, does not
provide adequate funds for its own protection."20
Will a U.S. Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel
offer enough countervailing power to redress the "balance"
between the Company and the consumers? It has been the
hypothesis of this thesis that an equilibrium more favorable
to the consumer can be more easily approached if the consumers
have outside help. The Company has been beaten in controver
sies involving the Broadwater County Water Users and the
Havre-Shelby electric transmission line when federal
agencies intervened on behalf of Company opponents.21
Will the federal government be able to shake loose
an appropriation to finance an Office of Utility Consumers'
Counsel? The PPC has had difficulty obtaining funds. Its
staff is smaller now than it was in 19^9» and it only has
20piorida Public Service Commission statement
quoted in a speech by the Honorable Lee Metcalf, U, S.
Senator from Montana, to the Midwest Association of Rail
road and Utility Commissioners, Bismark, North Dakota,
June 21, 1968,
21see Howard, 0£. cit., pp. 33^-3^2.
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enough money to audit utilities once every seven to ten
years.22 The appropriation for the Office of Utility
Consumers' Counsel will be subject to the same political
pressures of investor owned utilities which have kept public
service commissions inept and the FPC hamstrung. According
to the philosophy of Arthur P, Bentley, what the new office
"will get, if it survives, will be what the people it solidly
represents are strong enough to make it get, and no more
and no less, , ,
If the utilities thwart the Office of Utility Con
sumers' Counsel proposal, outside help to aid in countervailing
Montana Power's political influence will not be forthcoming.
But even if the power of the utilities is temporarily
countervailed by a consumer advocate and strong regulation,
in the absence of competition, utilities could call an
energy strike similar to the transit, postal, garbage, or
teacher strikes recently witnessed in the United States.
School systems cut programs when financing is not approved;
utilities may do the same. Such a strike would redress the
balance of power in favor of the utility.
^^Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer, Overcharge (New
York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1967), p. 22ÏÏ"I Staff size fig
ures originally obtained from U.S., Congress, Senate, Appro
priations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent
Offices Appropriations, 1966, May 17, 1965» testimony of
Joseph C. Swindler, chairman of the PPC, pp. 373 et seg.
^^Bentley, 0£, cit., p. 361.
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And so, with all these possibilities in mind, group
theorists are forced to re-evaluate their notion that the
activities of interest groups will not hinder services neces
sary in a democratic society. Utility, garbage, and transit
services are extremely important to the health and safety
of the nation. So are equitable and fair utility rates.
Competing interests must be "balanced" so that these two
goals of public policy are compatible. A start in this
direction may be made by adopting some of the aforementioned
proposals.
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